Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

Strategic Interaction and Conventions

The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.

Personal identity. A theoretical and experimental analysis

Published as article in: Journal of Economic Methodology, 2010, vol. 17, issue 3, pages 261-275.

Model of sources: a proposal for the hierarchy, merging strategy and representation of the information sources in virtual models of historical buildings

Contributed to: Fusion of Cultures: XXXVIII Annual Conference on Computer Applications and Quantitative Methods in Archaeology – CAA2010 (Granada, Spain, Apr 6-9, 2010)

Methodological keys for the acquisition and long-term use of photographic collections representing elements of Heritage

Contributed to: Fusion of Cultures. XXXVIII Annual Conference on Computer Applications and Quantitative Methods in Archaeology – CAA2010 (Granada, Spain, Apr 6-9, 2010)

Learning in Network Games

We report the findings of an experiment designed to study how people learn and make decisions in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to e.g. random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use this information to estimate learning types using maximum likelihood methods. There is substantial heterogeneity in learning types. However, the vast majority of our participants' decisions are best characterized by reinforcement learning or (myopic) best-response learning. The distribution of learning types seems fairly stable across contexts. Neither network topology nor the position of a player in the network seem to substantially affect the estimated distribution of learning types.

The use of role-play games in teaching: The International Climate Negotiation Game

This paper presents a role-play game designed by the authors, which focuses on international climate negotiations. The game has been used at a university with students all drawn from the same course and at summer schools with students from different levels (undergraduate, master’s and doctoral students and post-doctoral researchers) and different knowledge areas (economics, law, engineering, architecture, biology and others). We discuss how the game fits into the process of competence-based learning, and what benefits games, and role-play games in particular, have for teaching. In the game, students take on the role of representatives of national institutions and experience at first hand a detailed process of international negotiation concerned with climate change.

ADAPTECC: A Role-Play Game about Adapting to Climate Change

The ADAPTECC Climate Change Adaptation Game is a role-play game designed to enable players to experience the difficulties that arise at local and regional levels when authorities have to implement adaptation measures. Adaptation means anticipating the advert effects of climate change (CC) and taking measures to prevent and minimise the damage caused by its impacts. Each player takes the role of the mayor or a councillor of a town affected by CC who must decide what adaptation strategies and measures to take, or of a member of the Regional Environment Department which must distribute funding for adaptation among the various towns. At the end of the game, players should have a greater understanding of the challenges posed by adaptation to CC

Experimental Economics Meets Language Choice

Roughly one half of World's languages are in danger of extinction. The endangered languages, spoken by minorities, typically compete with powerful languages such as En- glish or Spanish. Consequently, the speakers of minority languages have to consider that not everybody can speak their language, converting the language choice into strategic,coordination-like situation. We show experimentally that the displacement of minority languages may be partially explained by the imperfect information about the linguistic type of the partner, leading to frequent failure to coordinate on the minority language even between two speakers who can and prefer to use it. The extent of miscoordination correlates with how minoritarian a language is and with the real-life linguistic condition of subjects: the more endangered a language the harder it is to coordinate on its use, and people on whom the language survival relies the most acquire behavioral strategies that lower its use. Our game-theoretical treatment of the issue provides a new perspective for linguistic policies.

Endogenous Timing in Pollution Control: Stackelberg versus Cournot-Nash Equilibria

27 p.

Stability analysis of RF amplifiers based on MIMO pole-zero identification

Spurious oscillations are one of the principal issues faced by microwave and RF circuit designers. The rigorous detection of instabilities or the characterization of measured spurious oscillations is still an ongoing challenge. This project aims to create a new stability analysis CAD program that tackles this chal- lenge. Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) pole-zero identification analysis is introduced on the program as a way to create new methods to automate the stability analysis process and to help designers comprehend the obtained results and prevent incorrect interpretations. The MIMO nature of the analysis contributes to eliminate possible controllability and observability losses and helps differentiate mathematical and physical quasi-cancellations, products of overmodeling. The created program reads Single Input Single Output (SISO) or MIMO frequency response data, and determines the corresponding continuous transfer functions with Vector Fitting. Once the transfer function is calculated, the corresponding pole/zero diagram is mapped enabling the designers to analyze the stability of an amplifier. Three data processing methods are introduced, two of which consist of pole/zero elimina- tions and the latter one on determining the critical nodes of an amplifier. The first pole/zero elimination method is based on eliminating non resonant poles, whilst the second method eliminates the poles with small residue by assuming that their effect on the dynamics of a system is small or non-existent. The critical node detection is also based on the residues; the node at which the effect of a pole on the dynamics is highest is defined as the critical node. In order to evaluate and check the efficiency of the created program, it is compared via examples with another existing commercial stability analysis tool (STAN tool). In this report, the newly created tool is proved to be as rigorous as STAN for detecting instabilities. Additionally, it is determined that the MIMO analysis is a very profitable addition to stability analysis, since it helps to eliminate possible problems of loss of controllability, observability and overmodeling.