An Estimated New-Keynesian Model with Unemployment as Excess Supply of Labor

Wage stickiness is incorporated to a New-Keynesian model with variable capital to drive endogenous unemployment uctuations de ned as the log di¤erence between aggregate labor supply and aggregate labor demand. We estimated such model using Bayesian econometric techniques and quarterly U.S. data. The second-moment statistics of the unemployment rate in the model give a good t to those observed in U.S. data. Our results also show that wage-push shocks, demand shifts and monetary policy shocks are the three major determinants of unemployment fl uctuations. Compared to an estimated New-Keynesian model without unemployment (Smets and Wouters, 2007): wage stickiness is higher, labor supply elasticity is lower, the slope of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve is flatter, and the importance of technology innovations on output variability increases.

Time Variation in an Optimal Asymmetric Preference Monetary Policy Model

This paper considers a time varying parameter extension of the Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) model to explore whether some of the variation in parameter estimates seen in the literature could arise from this source. A time varying value for the unemployment volatility parameter can be motivated through several means including variation in the slope of the Phillips curve or variation in the preferences of the monetary authority.We show that allowing time variation for the coefficient on the unemployment volatility parameter improves the model fit and it helps to provide an explanation of inflation bias based on asymmetric central banker preferences, which is consistent across subsamples.

Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).

Prosocial norms and degree heterogeneity in social networks

We provide empirical evidence to support the claims that social diversity promotes prosocial behavior. We elicit a real-life social network and its members’ adherence to a social norm, namely inequity aversion. The data reveal a positive relationship between subjects’ prosociality and several measures of centrality. This result is in line with the theoretical literature that relates the evolution of social norms to the structure of social interactions and argues that central individuals are crucial for the emergence of prosocial behavior.

Selectivity, pulse fishing and endogenous lifespan in Beverton-Holt models

Optimal management in a multi-cohort Beverton-Holt model with any number of age classes and imperfect selectivity is equivalent to finding the optimal fish lifespan by chosen fallow cycles. Optimal policy differs in two main ways from the optimal lifespan rule with perfect selectivity. First, weight gain is valued in terms of the whole population structure. Second, the cost of waiting is the interest rate adjusted for the increase in the pulse length. This point is especially relevant for assessing the role of selectivity. Imperfect selectivity reduces the optimal lifespan and the optimal pulse length. We illustrate our theoretical findings with a numerical example. Results obtained using global numerical methods select the optimal pulse length predicted by the optimal lifespan rule.

Are Bar Associations Anticompetitive? An Empirical Analysis of Recommended Prices for Legal Services in Spain

The European Commission Report on Competition in Professional Services found that recommended prices by professional bodies have a significant negative effect on competition since they may facilitate the coordination of prices between service providers and/or mislead consumers about reasonable price levels. Professional associations argue, first, that a fee schedule may help their members to properly calculate the cost of services avoiding excessive charges and reducing consumers’ searching costs and, second, that recommended prices are very useful for cost appraisal if a litigant is condemned to pay the legal expenses of the opposing party. Thus, recommended fee schedules could be justified to some extent if they represented the cost of providing the services. We test this hypothesis using cross‐section data on a subset of recommended prices by 52 Spanish bar associations and cost data on their territorial jurisdictions. Our empirical results indicate that prices recommended by bar associations are unrelated to the cost of legal services and therefore we conclude that recommended prices have merely an anticompetitive effect.

Can the change in the composition of the US GDP explain the Great Moderation? A test via oil price shocks

The paper investigates whether the growing GDP share of the services sector can contribute to explain the great moderation in the US. We identify and analyze three oil price shocks and use a SVAR analysis to measure their economic impact on the US economy at both the aggregate and the sectoral level. We find mixed support for the explanation of the great moderation in terms of shrinking oil shock volatilities and observe that increases (decreases) in oil shock volatilities are contrasted by a weakening (strengthening) in their transmission mechanism. Across sectors, services are the least affected by any oil shock. As the contribution of services to the GDP volatility increases over time, we conclude that a composition effect contributed to moderate the conditional volatility to oil shocks of the US GDP.

Competitive Pressure and Job Interview Lying: A Game Theoretical Analysis

We consider a job contest in which candidates go through interviews (cheap talk) and are subject to reference checks. We show how competitive pressure - increasing the ratio of "good" to "bad" type candi- dates - can lead to a vast increase in lying and in some cases make bad hires more likely. As the number of candidates increases, it becomes harder to in- duce truth-telling. The interview stage becomes redundant if the candidates, a priori, know each others' type or the result of their own reference check. Finally, we show that the employer can bene t from committing not to reject all the applicants.

Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes

A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer- ences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely implement prizes that respects the true state.

La metodología científica en economía de la empresa en la actualidad

[ES] Mientras la realidad se transforma a gran ritmo, las ideas de ciencia y de conocimiento científico entran en crisis. Esta crisis también se manifiesta en los estudios empresariales: muchos afirman que la Economía de la Empresa no es ciencia, sino un conjunto de conocimientos diversos, débilmente conectados entre sí. Otros se pierden en investigaciones alejadas de la realidad, y un último grupo no consigue remontar un enfoque meramente practicista. Por ello, estimamos que es un buen momento para recordar los fundamentos que sustentan una ciencia: su objeto formal y material y su método. Para ello se realizará una exposición sintética del pensamiento del profesor Soldevilla.

A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

Optimal overall emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly

We analyze optimal second-best emission taxes in a durable good industry under imperfect competition. The analysis is performed for three different types of emissions and for situations where the good is rented, sold or simultaneously sold and rented. We show, for durable goods that may cause pollution in a period (or in periods) different from the production period, that the expected overall emission tax and the expected total marginal environmental damage per unit produced in each period are the relevant variables to consider in the analysis of overinternalization and in the comparison of optimal emission taxes for renting, selling and renting-selling firms. Our results allow to extend some previous results in the literature to these durable goods and provide an adequate perspective on some other results (in particular, we point out the limitations of focusing only, for those durable goods, on the level and effects of the optimal emission tax in the production period).

Understanding Tariff Deficit and its Challenges

Regulators and market participants have become increasingly concerned about the Spanish electricity tariff deficit due to its size and the difficulties to control its growth. The deficit can be traced to inefficiencies in market organization and solutions should be designed to mitigate those inefficiencies. Tariff deficits have allowed for the transfer of part of the present costs of electricity services to future consumers, but this situation has reached a limit and a deep revision of regulation in this market cannot be postponed. In general, solutions that interfere with market prices and signals are not appropriate.

Democratic Values Transmission

This study addresses the issue of intergenerational transmission of democratic values embedded in social choice rules. We focus on a few rules which have been the focus of social choice theory: plurality, plurality with a runoff, majoritarian compromise, social compromise and Borda rule. We confront subjects with preferences profiles of a hypothetical electorate over a set of four alternatives. Different rules produce different outcomes and subjects decide which alternative should be chosen for the society whose preference profile is shown. We elicit each subject's preferences over rules and his/her parents' and check whether there is any relationship; 186 students and their parents attended the sessions at Istanbul Bilgi University. Overall, we find support for the hypothesis of parental transmission of democratic values and gender differences in the transmitted rule.

Economic Effects of Global Warming under Stock Growth Uncertainty: The European Sardine Fishery

Global warming of the oceans is expected to alter the environmental conditions that determine the growth of a fishery resource. Most climate change studies are based on models and scenarios that focus on economic growth, or they concentrate on simulating the potential losses or cost to fisheries due to climate change. However, analysis that addresses model optimization problems to better understand of the complex dynamics of climate change and marine ecosystems is still lacking. In this paper a simple algorithm to compute transitional dynamics in order to quantify the effect of climate change on the European sardine fishery is presented. The model results indicate that global warming will not necessarily lead to a monotonic decrease in the expected biomass levels. Our results show that if the resource is exploited optimally then in the short run, increases in the surface temperature of the fishery ground are compatible with higher expected biomass and economic profit.