The Effect of Data Revisions on the Basic New Keynesian Model

This paper proposes an extended version of the basic New Keynesian monetary (NKM) model which contemplates revision processes of output and inflation data in order to assess the importance of data revisions on the estimated monetary policy rule parameters and the transmission of policy shocks. Our empirical evidence based on a structural econometric approach suggests that although the initial announcements of output and inflation are not rational forecasts of revised output and inflation data, ignoring the presence of non well-behaved revision processes may not be a serious drawback in the analysis of monetary policy in this framework. However, the transmission of inflation-push shocks is largely affected by considering data revisions. The latter being especially true when the nominal stickiness parameter is estimated taking into account data revision processes.

Data Revisions in the Estimation of DSGE Models

Revisions of US macroeconomic data are not white-noise. They are persistent, correlated with real-time data, and with high variability (around 80% of volatility observed in US real-time data). Their business cycle effects are examined in an estimated DSGE model extended with both real-time and final data. After implementing a Bayesian estimation approach, the role of both habit formation and price indexation fall significantly in the extended model. The results show how revision shocks of both output and inflation are expansionary because they occur when real-time published data are too low and the Fed reacts by cutting interest rates. Consumption revisions, by contrast, are countercyclical as consumption habits mirror the observed reduction in real-time consumption. In turn, revisions of the three variables explain 9.3% of changes of output in its long-run variance decomposition.

An Estimated New-Keynesian Model with Unemployment as Excess Supply of Labor

Wage stickiness is incorporated to a New-Keynesian model with variable capital to drive endogenous unemployment uctuations de ned as the log di¤erence between aggregate labor supply and aggregate labor demand. We estimated such model using Bayesian econometric techniques and quarterly U.S. data. The second-moment statistics of the unemployment rate in the model give a good t to those observed in U.S. data. Our results also show that wage-push shocks, demand shifts and monetary policy shocks are the three major determinants of unemployment fl uctuations. Compared to an estimated New-Keynesian model without unemployment (Smets and Wouters, 2007): wage stickiness is higher, labor supply elasticity is lower, the slope of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve is flatter, and the importance of technology innovations on output variability increases.

Time Variation in an Optimal Asymmetric Preference Monetary Policy Model

This paper considers a time varying parameter extension of the Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) model to explore whether some of the variation in parameter estimates seen in the literature could arise from this source. A time varying value for the unemployment volatility parameter can be motivated through several means including variation in the slope of the Phillips curve or variation in the preferences of the monetary authority.We show that allowing time variation for the coefficient on the unemployment volatility parameter improves the model fit and it helps to provide an explanation of inflation bias based on asymmetric central banker preferences, which is consistent across subsamples.

Moral cleansing and moral licenses: experimental evidence

Research on moral cleansing and moral self-licensing has introduced dynamic considerations in the theory of moral behavior. Past bad actions trigger negative feelings that make people more likely to engage in future moral behavior to offset them. Symmetrically, past good deeds favor a positive self-perception that creates licensing effects, leading people to engage in behavior that is less likely to be moral. In short, a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced with a subsequent action that compensates the prior behavior. We model the decision of an individual trying to reach the optimal level of moral self-worth over time and show that under certain conditions the optimal sequence of actions follows a regular pattern which combines good and bad actions. We conduct an economic experiment where subjects play a sequence of giving decisions (dictator games) to explore this phenomenon. We find that donation in the previous period affects present decisions and the sign is negative: participants’ behavior in every round is negatively correlated to what they did in the past. Hence donations over time seem to be the result of a regular pattern of self-regulation: moral licensing (being selfish after altruist) and cleansing (altruistic after selfish).

Prosocial norms and degree heterogeneity in social networks

We provide empirical evidence to support the claims that social diversity promotes prosocial behavior. We elicit a real-life social network and its members’ adherence to a social norm, namely inequity aversion. The data reveal a positive relationship between subjects’ prosociality and several measures of centrality. This result is in line with the theoretical literature that relates the evolution of social norms to the structure of social interactions and argues that central individuals are crucial for the emergence of prosocial behavior.

Selectivity, pulse fishing and endogenous lifespan in Beverton-Holt models

Optimal management in a multi-cohort Beverton-Holt model with any number of age classes and imperfect selectivity is equivalent to finding the optimal fish lifespan by chosen fallow cycles. Optimal policy differs in two main ways from the optimal lifespan rule with perfect selectivity. First, weight gain is valued in terms of the whole population structure. Second, the cost of waiting is the interest rate adjusted for the increase in the pulse length. This point is especially relevant for assessing the role of selectivity. Imperfect selectivity reduces the optimal lifespan and the optimal pulse length. We illustrate our theoretical findings with a numerical example. Results obtained using global numerical methods select the optimal pulse length predicted by the optimal lifespan rule.

Can the change in the composition of the US GDP explain the Great Moderation? A test via oil price shocks

The paper investigates whether the growing GDP share of the services sector can contribute to explain the great moderation in the US. We identify and analyze three oil price shocks and use a SVAR analysis to measure their economic impact on the US economy at both the aggregate and the sectoral level. We find mixed support for the explanation of the great moderation in terms of shrinking oil shock volatilities and observe that increases (decreases) in oil shock volatilities are contrasted by a weakening (strengthening) in their transmission mechanism. Across sectors, services are the least affected by any oil shock. As the contribution of services to the GDP volatility increases over time, we conclude that a composition effect contributed to moderate the conditional volatility to oil shocks of the US GDP.

Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes

A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1, $2, .., $n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state i.e. who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents' prefer- ences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely implement prizes that respects the true state.

A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

Optimal overall emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly

We analyze optimal second-best emission taxes in a durable good industry under imperfect competition. The analysis is performed for three different types of emissions and for situations where the good is rented, sold or simultaneously sold and rented. We show, for durable goods that may cause pollution in a period (or in periods) different from the production period, that the expected overall emission tax and the expected total marginal environmental damage per unit produced in each period are the relevant variables to consider in the analysis of overinternalization and in the comparison of optimal emission taxes for renting, selling and renting-selling firms. Our results allow to extend some previous results in the literature to these durable goods and provide an adequate perspective on some other results (in particular, we point out the limitations of focusing only, for those durable goods, on the level and effects of the optimal emission tax in the production period).

Understanding Tariff Deficit and its Challenges

Regulators and market participants have become increasingly concerned about the Spanish electricity tariff deficit due to its size and the difficulties to control its growth. The deficit can be traced to inefficiencies in market organization and solutions should be designed to mitigate those inefficiencies. Tariff deficits have allowed for the transfer of part of the present costs of electricity services to future consumers, but this situation has reached a limit and a deep revision of regulation in this market cannot be postponed. In general, solutions that interfere with market prices and signals are not appropriate.

Democratic Values Transmission

This study addresses the issue of intergenerational transmission of democratic values embedded in social choice rules. We focus on a few rules which have been the focus of social choice theory: plurality, plurality with a runoff, majoritarian compromise, social compromise and Borda rule. We confront subjects with preferences profiles of a hypothetical electorate over a set of four alternatives. Different rules produce different outcomes and subjects decide which alternative should be chosen for the society whose preference profile is shown. We elicit each subject's preferences over rules and his/her parents' and check whether there is any relationship; 186 students and their parents attended the sessions at Istanbul Bilgi University. Overall, we find support for the hypothesis of parental transmission of democratic values and gender differences in the transmitted rule.

An austerity-driven energy reform

In July 2013, the government approved a major overhaul of the Spanish electricity sector to correct existing imbalances that have led to an exponential increase of regulated electricity costs and a huge tariff deficit. The reform addresses the problem of financial sustainability of the sector, severely affected by weak demand and overcapacity. Previous regulation introduced in 2012 and early 2013, also aimed at restoring financial stability of the sector, failed to correct the tariff shortfall and new regulatory measures were needed to reduce the 4.5 billion euros forecasted deficit for 2013. The frequent change of the rules of the game in the sector has created regulatory uncertainty, more so as it is not clear that the present reform will be sufficient to eliminate the deficit. Moreover, the government has left the door open to new regulation that would deal with the price formation system. In general, short run financial criteria have prevailed, while efficiency principles and a long run perspective have little weight in the reform.

The Relevance of Relative Position in Ultimatum Games

This paper investigates the effect of focal points and initial relative position in the outcome of a bargaining process. We conduct two on-line experiments. In the first experiment we attempt to replicate Güth, Huck and Müller's (2001) results about the relevance of equal splits. In our second experiment, we recover the choices of participants in forty mini-ultimatum games. This design allows us to test whether the equal split or any other distribution or set of distributions are salient. Our data provide no support for a focal-point explanation but we find support for an explanation based on relative position. Our results confirm that there is a norm against hyper-fair offers. Proposers are expected to behave selfishly when the unselfish distribution leads to a change in the initial relative position.