Time Variation in an Optimal Asymmetric Preference Monetary Policy Model

This paper considers a time varying parameter extension of the Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) model to explore whether some of the variation in parameter estimates seen in the literature could arise from this source. A time varying value for the unemployment volatility parameter can be motivated through several means including variation in the slope of the Phillips curve or variation in the preferences of the monetary authority.We show that allowing time variation for the coefficient on the unemployment volatility parameter improves the model fit and it helps to provide an explanation of inflation bias based on asymmetric central banker preferences, which is consistent across subsamples.

Optimal Monetary Policy with Asymmetric Preferences for Output

Using a model of an optimizing monetary authority which has preferences that weigh inflation and unemployment, Ruge-Murcia (2003, 2004) finds empirical evidence that the authority has asymmetric preferences for unemployment. We extend this model to weigh inflation and output and show that the empirical evidence using these series also supports an asymmetric preference hypothesis, only in our case, preferences are asymmetric for output. We also find evidence that the monetary authority targets potential output rather than some higher output level as would be the case in an extended Barro and Gordon (1983) model.