Family firms and the great crisis: evidence from the italian case

Few studies have analyzed how family firms have acted during the global great crisis in comparison to their nonfamily counterparts. This paper tries to fill this gap on the basis of the Italian experience using a sample of almost 4,500 for 2007 and 2010. We study whether family control affects labour productivity, labour costs and competitiveness and if the adoption of performance related pay (PRP) reveals an efficacious strategy to mitigate the effects of the crisis and reduce the gap in competitiveness with respect to nonfamily firms. We use quantile regression techniques to test the heterogeneous role of PRP and pay attention for its possible endogeneity. We have observed that after the outburst of the crisis, the distance in terms of competitiveness of family firms with respect to their nonfamily counterparts has been amplified. We also find that family firms may take advantage from the adoption of incentive schemes, such as PRP, to encourage commitment and motivation from their employees more than nonfamily firms. The positive role of PRP on labour productivity, coupled with a moderate influence of these schemes on wage premiums, enable them to regain competitiveness also under hostile pressures, as those featuring the strong global crisis.