The Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders: Report on the Design, Implementation, and Descriptive Results for 2006

This technical memorandum documents the design, implementation, data preparation, and descriptive results for the 2006 Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders. The data collection was designed by the NOAA Fisheries Southeast Fisheries Science Center Social Science Research Group to track the financial and economic status and performance by vessels holding a federal moratorium permit for harvesting shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico. A two page, self-administered mail survey collected total annual costs broken out into seven categories and auxiliary economic data. In May 2007, 580 vessels were randomly selected, stratified by state, from a preliminary population of 1,709 vessels with federal permits to shrimp in offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The survey was implemented during the rest of 2007. After many reminder and verification phone calls, 509 surveys were deemed complete, for an ineligibility-adjusted response rate of 90.7%. The linking of each individual vessel’s cost data to its revenue data from a different data collection was imperfect, and hence the final number of observations used in the analyses is 484. Based on various measures and tests of validity throughout the technical memorandum, the quality of the data is high. The results are presented in a standardized table format, linking vessel characteristics and operations to simple balance sheet, cash flow, and income statements. In the text, results are discussed for the total fleet, the Gulf shrimp fleet, the active Gulf shrimp fleet, and the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet. Additional results for shrimp vessels grouped by state, by vessel characteristics, by landings volume, and by ownership structure are available in the appendices. The general conclusion of this report is that the financial and economic situation is bleak for the average vessels in most of the categories that were evaluated. With few exceptions, cash flow for the average vessel is positive while the net revenue from operations and the “profit” are negative. With negative net revenue from operations, the economic return for average shrimp vessels is less than zero. Only with the help of government payments does the average owner just about break even. In the short-term, this will discourage any new investments in the industry. The financial situation in 2006, especially if it endures over multiple years, also is economically unsustainable for the average established business. Vessels in the active and inactive Gulf shrimp fleet are, on average, 69 feet long, weigh 105 gross tons, are powered by 505 hp motor(s), and are 23 years old. Three-quarters of the vessels have steel hulls and 59% use a freezer for refrigeration. The average market value of these vessels was $175,149 in 2006, about a hundred-thousand dollars less than the average original purchase price. The outstanding loans averaged $91,955, leading to an average owner equity of $83,194. Based on the sample, 85% of the federally permitted Gulf shrimp fleet was actively shrimping in 2006. Of these 386 active Gulf shrimp vessels, just under half (46%) were owner-operated. On average, these vessels burned 52,931 gallons of fuel, landed 101,268 pounds of shrimp, and received $2.47 per pound of shrimp. Non-shrimp landings added less than 1% to cash flow, indicating that the federal Gulf shrimp fishery is very specialized. The average total cash outflow was $243,415 of which $108,775 was due to fuel expenses alone. The expenses for hired crew and captains were on average $54,866 which indicates the importance of the industry as a source of wage income. The resulting average net cash flow is $16,225 but has a large standard deviation. For the population of active Gulf shrimp vessels we can state with 95% certainty that the average net cash flow was between $9,500 and $23,000 in 2006. The median net cash flow was $11,843. Based on the income statement for active Gulf shrimp vessels, the average fixed costs accounted for just under a quarter of operating expenses (23.1%), labor costs for just over a quarter (25.3%), and the non-labor variable costs for just over half (51.6%). The fuel costs alone accounted for 42.9% of total operating expenses in 2006. It should be noted that the labor cost category in the income statement includes both the actual cash payments to hired labor and an estimate of the opportunity cost of owner-operators’ time spent as captain. The average labor contribution (as captain) of an owner-operator is estimated at about $19,800. The average net revenue from operations is negative $7,429, and is statistically different and less than zero in spite of a large standard deviation. The economic return to Gulf shrimping is negative 4%. Including non-operating activities, foremost an average government payment of $13,662, leads to an average loss before taxes of $907 for the vessel owners. The confidence interval of this value straddles zero, so we cannot reject, with 95% certainty, that the population average is zero. The average inactive Gulf shrimp vessel is generally of a smaller scale than the average active vessel. Inactive vessels are physically smaller, are valued much lower, and are less dependent on loans. Fixed costs account for nearly three quarters of the total operating expenses of $11,926, and only 6% of these vessels have hull insurance. With an average net cash flow of negative $7,537, the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet has a major liquidity problem. On average, net revenue from operations is negative $11,396, which amounts to a negative 15% economic return, and owners lose $9,381 on their vessels before taxes. To sustain such losses and especially to survive the negative cash flow, many of the owners must be subsidizing their shrimp vessels with the help of other income or wealth sources or are drawing down their equity. Active Gulf shrimp vessels in all states but Texas exhibited negative returns. The Alabama and Mississippi fleets have the highest assets (vessel values), on average, yet they generate zero cash flow and negative $32,224 net revenue from operations. Due to their high (loan) leverage ratio the negative 11% economic return is amplified into a negative 21% return on equity. In contrast, for Texas vessels, which actually have the highest leverage ratio among the states, a 1% economic return is amplified into a 13% return on equity. From a financial perspective, the average Florida and Louisiana vessels conform roughly to the overall average of the active Gulf shrimp fleet. It should be noted that these results are averages and hence hide the variation that clearly exists within all fleets and all categories. Although the financial situation for the average vessel is bleak, some vessels are profitable. (PDF contains 101 pages)

Climate change adaptation through coastal and use management: The context of environmental justice

Despite an increasing literary focus on climate change adaptation, the facilitation of this adaptation is occurring on a limited basis (Adger et al. 2007) .This limited basis is not necessarily due to inability; rather, a lack of comprehensive cost estimates of all options specifically hinders adaptation in vulnerable communities (Adger et al. 2007). Specifically the estimated cost of the climate change impact of sea-level rise is continually increasing due to both increasing rates and the resulting multiplicative impact of coastal erosion (Karl et al., 2009, Zhang et al., 2004) Based on the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, minority groups and small island nations have been identified within these vulnerable communities. Therefore the development of adaptation policies requires the engagement of these communities. State examples of sea-level rise adaptation through land use planning mechanisms such as land acquisition programs (New Jersey) and the establishment of rolling easements (Texas) are evidence that although obscured, adaptation opportunities are being acted upon (Easterling et al., 2004, Adger et al.2007). (PDF contains 4 pages)

Efficiency, energy and stoichiometry in pelagic food webs; reciprocal roles of food quality and food quantity

In most lakes, zooplankton production is constrained by food quantity, but frequently high C:P poses an additional constraint on zooplankton production by reducing the carbon transfer efficiency from phytoplankton to zooplankton. This review addresses how the flux of matter and energy in pelagic food webs is regulated by food quantity in terms of C and its stoichiometric quality in terms of C:P. Increased levels of light, CO2 and phosphorus could each increase seston mass and, hence, food quantity for zooplankton, but while light and CO2 each cause increased C:P (i.e. reduced food quality for herbivores), increased P may increase seston mass and its stoichiometric quality by reducing C:P. Development of food quality and food quantity in response to C- or P-enrichments will differ between 'batch-type' lakes (dominated by one major, seasonal input of water and nutrients) and 'continuous-culture' types of lakes with a more steady flow-rate of water and nutrients. The reciprocal role of food quantity and stoichiometric quality will depend strongly on facilitation via grazing and recycling by the grazers, and this effect will be most important in systems with low renewal rates. At high food abundance but low quality, there will be a 'quality starvation' in zooplankton. From a management point of view, stoichiometric theory offers a general tool-kit for understanding the integrated role of C and P in food webs and how food quantity and stoichiometric quality (i.e. C:P) regulate energy flow and trophic efficiency from base to top in food webs.From a management point of view, stoichiometric theory offers a general tool-kit for understanding the integrated role of C and P in food webs and how food quantity and stoichiometric quality (i.e. C:P) regulate energy flow and trophic efficiency from base to top in food webs.

Social structure and underwater behavior of harbor seals in southern Monterey Bay, California

To understand harbor seal social and mating strategies, I examined site fidelity, seasonal abundance and distribution, herd integrity, and underwater behavior of individual harbor seals in southern Monterey Bay. Individual harbor seals (n = 444) were identified by natural markings and represented greater than 80% of an estimated 520 seals within this community. Year to year fidelity of individual harbor seals to southern Monterey Bay coastline was 84% (n = 388), and long-term associations (>2 yrs) among individuals were common (>40%). Consistent with these long-term associations, harbor seals were highly social underwater throughout the year. Underwater social behavior included three primary types: (1) visual and acoustic displays, such as vocalizing, surface splashing, and bubble-blowing; (2) playful or agonistic social behavior such as rolling, mounting, attending, and biting; and (3) signal gestures such as head-thrusting, fore-flipper scratch~ng, and growling. Frequency of these types of behavior was related to seal age, gender, season, and resource availability. Underwater behavior had a variety of functions, including promotion of learning and social development, reduction of aggression and preservation of social bonds by maintaining social hierarchy, and facilitation of mate selection during breeding season. Social behavior among adult males was significantly correlated with vocalization characteristics (r = 0.99, X2 = 37.7, p = 0.00087), indicating that seals may assess their competition based on underwater vocalization displays and adopt individual strategies for attracting females during breeding season based on social status. Individual mating strategies may include defending underwater territories, using scramble tactics, and developing social alliances. (PDF contains 105 pages)

Seasonality, labor and integration of aquaculture into southern African smallhold farming systems

Fish production on Malawian smallholdings is generally limited by the quantity and quality of inputs to the pond (Brummett and Noble 1995). The timing of labor availability and other farm activities limit the amount farmers put into their ponds resulting in lower growth rates and yields. There is potential for improving production and yields through modifications of production schedules to accommodate other farming activities. Limited material and labor inputs among farming system enterprises can be better allocated by considering seasonal availability of inputs and adapting the pond and fish farming technology to the farming system. This case from Malawi demonstrates that aquaculture technology that neglects the annual cycle of events and constraints on the farm will not be easily integrated into the farming system. Focusing on technology that maximizes fish production rather than facilitation of adoption and integration has been a feature of the majority of African smallholder agriculture/aquaculture projects. Farming Systems Research (FSR) must identify niches and opportunities for system improvement for it to be worth supporting as a development intervention.

A Cooperative Management Solution to a Fishery Commons

A common property resource with open access, such as a fishery, will be used to excess when faced with sufficient demand. This will lead to an excessive amount of effort on the part of the fishery, resulting in a depletion of the stock. This paper discusses the development of a property rights regime for the Atlantic calico scallop, Argopecten gibbus, fishery of Florida. The management solution of the Calico Scallop Conservation Association (CSCA) provides an example of the assignment of property rights to a common property resource without resorting to governmental intervention. In this particular fishery, self-regulation limited early harvesting which would be uneconomic; there may be other fisheries in which self-regulation could be economically efficient and biologically appropriate. While this solution may not be applicable to all common property resources, for those cases which may be similar; the example of the CSCA provides valuable information that may be helpful in establishing a more efficient use of the resource. Some types of government facilitation may also be useful.

Technical report on the environmental monitoring of the cage area at the Source of the Nile (SON) Fish Farm for quarter 4: October-December 2011

Source of the Nile Fish farm (SON) is located at Bugungu area in Napoleon Gulf, northern Lake Victoria. The proprietors of the farm requested for technical assistance of NaFIRRI to undertake regular environment monitoring of the cage site as is mandatory under the NEMA conditions. As the SON is a key collaborator/client of the institute, NAFIRRI agreed to undertake the assignment subject to facilitation by the client. The institute agreed to conduct quarterly surveys of key environmental parameters at the site including selected physical-chemical and biological factors, nutrient status, column depth, water transparency and sedimentation. Samples and field measurements were to be taken at 3 sites: within and/or close to the fish cages (WIC), upstream (USC) and downstream (DSC) of the cages. The first environmental monitoring survey was undertaken in February 2011; the second in May 2011 and the third in September 2011. The surveys cover physical-chemical parameters, nutrient status, invertebrate and fish communities. The present report presents field observations made for the fourth quarter survey undertaken in November 2011 and provides a scientific interpretation and discussion of the results with reference to possible impacts of the cage facilities to the water environment and the different aquatic biota at and around the cage site including natural fish communities.