Communications planning: a review of policy and communications

This report presents a discussion of communications strategies to influence policy outcomes. It is based on a series of interviews with projects, NGOs and regional organisations to review current activities and assess the implications for STREAM of developing a communications strategy within a livelihoods framework. The main message of the report is that in order to fulfil its guiding principles. STREAM must acknowledge that policy change is related to governance and civil society, and requires a broad range of partnerships and a broad range of voices in the policy-making arena. (Pdf contains 49 pages).

Description of sampling stations, methods of benthic sampling and biological water quality assessment; with some consideration of the influence of sample variation on the assessment values obtained

The first bilateral study of methods of biological sampling and biological methods of water quality assessment took place during June 1977 on selected sampling sites in the catchment of the River Trent (UK). The study was arranged in accordance with the protocol established by the joint working group responsible for the Anglo-Soviet Environmental Agreement. The main purpose of the bilateral study in Nottingham was for some of the methods of sampling and biological assessment used by UK biologists to be demonstrated to their Soviet counterparts and for the Soviet biologists to have the opportunity to test these methods at first hand in order to judge the potential of any of these methods for use within the Soviet Union. This paper is concerned with the nine river stations in the Trent catchment.

Influence of ocean conditions on the timing of early life history events for blue rockfish (Sebastes mystinus) off California

Settled juvenile blue rockfish (Sebastes mystinus) were collected from two kelp beds approximately 335 km apart off Mendocino in northern California and Monterey in central California. A total of 112 rockfish were collected from both sites over 5 years (1993, 1994, 2001, 2002, and 2003). Total age, settlement date, age at settlement, and birth date were determined from otolith microstructure. Fish off Mendocino settled mostly in June and fish off Monterey settled mostly in May (average difference in settlement=23 days). Although the difference in the timing of settlement followed this same pattern for both areas over the five years, settlement occurred later in 2002 and 2003 than in the prior years of sampling. The difference in the timing of settlement was due primarily to differences in birth dates for the two areas. The time of settlement was positively related to upwelling and negatively related to sea level anomaly for most of the months before settlement. Knowledge of the timing of settlement has implications for design and placement of marine protected areas because protection of nursery grounds is frequently a major objective of these protected areas. The timing of settlement is also an important consideration in the planning of surveys of early recruits because mistimed surveys (caused by latitudinal differences in the timing of settlement) could produce biased estimates.

Soviet Illegal Whaling: The Devil and the Details

In 1948, the U.S.S.R. began a global campaign of illegal whaling that lasted for three decades and, together with the poorly managed “legal” whaling of other nations, seriously depleted whale populations. Although the general story of this whaling has been told and the catch record largely corrected for the Southern Hemisphere, major gaps remain in the North Pacific. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the details of this system or its economic context. Using interviews with former Soviet whalers and biologists as well as previously unavailable reports and other material in Russian, our objective is to describe how the Soviet whaling industry was structured and how it worked, from the largest scale of state industrial planning down to the daily details of the ways in which whales were caught and processed, and how data sent to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics were falsified. Soviet whaling began with the factory ship Aleut in 1933, but by 1963 the industry had a truly global reach, with seven factory fleets (some very large). Catches were driven by a state planning system that set annual production targets. The system gave bonuses and honors only when these were met or exceeded, and it frequently increased the following year’s targets to match the previous year’s production; scientific estimates of the sustainability of the resource were largely ignored. Inevitably, this system led to whale populations being rapidly reduced. Furthermore, productivity was measured in gross output (weights of whales caught), regardless of whether carcasses were sound or rotten, or whether much of the animal was unutilized. Whaling fleets employed numerous people, including women (in one case as the captain of a catcher boat). Because of relatively high salaries and the potential for bonuses, positions in the whaling industry were much sought-after. Catching and processing of whales was highly mechanized and became increasingly efficient as the industry gained more experience. In a single day, the largest factory ships could process up to 200 small sperm whales, Physeter macrocephalus; 100 humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae; or 30–35 pygmy blue whales, Balaenoptera musculus brevicauda. However, processing of many animals involved nothing more than stripping the carcass of blubber and then discarding the rest. Until 1952, the main product was whale oil; only later was baleen whale meat regularly utilized. Falsified data on catches were routinely submitted to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics, but the true catch and biological data were preserved for research and administrative purposes. National inspectors were present at most times, but, with occasional exceptions, they worked primarily to assist fulfillment of plan targets and routinely ignored the illegal nature of many catches. In all, during 40 years of whaling in the Antarctic, the U.S.S.R. reported 185,778 whales taken but at least 338,336 were actually killed. Data for the North Pacific are currently incomplete, but from provisional data we estimate that at least 30,000 whales were killed illegally in this ocean. Overall, we judge that, worldwide, the U.S.S.R. killed approximately 180,000 whales illegally and caused a number of population crashes. Finally, we note that Soviet illegal catches continued after 1972 despite the presence of international observers on factory fleets.