The cost of action: CRM investment in the Philippines

Knowing the cost of investment in coastal resources management (CRM) is important especially in understanding the cost of undertaking one and ascertaining whether the outcomes are worth the money spent. In the Philippines, various CRM projects have already been initiated and no studies have tried to account for the total level of investment. This paper provides an estimate of money spent or invested on CRM in the Philippines and examines the investment per km2 of coral reefs.

The cost of quinine Cinchona pubescens control on Santa Cruz Island, Galapagos

We analyse the cost of controlling the invasive quinine tree Cinchona pubescens Vahl in the highlands of Santa Cruz Island, Galapagos. Control costs in ten 400 m2 plots formed the basis for estimating the cost of control over the whole island. In the plots, densities were 2100–24,000 stems/ha (stems >150 cm tall) and 55,000–138,000 stems/ha (all size classes combined). Control involved uprooting small plants, and applying of a mix of metsulfuron methyl and picloram to cut stumps or to machete cuts in the bark of larger trees. These methods are presently used by Galapagos National Park field crews to control quinine. Costs (in man hours, herbicide and US$) were related to stem density; the density of stems summed across four height classes was a better predictor of costs than density of any one size class. Regressions (on all size classes combined) formed the basis for predictive models of costs. Costs ranged from $14 to $2225 per ha depending on stem density. The amount of herbicide (active ingredient/ha) that must be applied to high density stands of quinine is higher than typical rates of application in an agricultural setting. The cost of treating all existing plants once across quinine’s known range on Santa Cruz Island (c. 11,000 ha) was estimated at c. US$1.65 million. CDF Contribution Number 1013.

The Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders: Report on the Design, Implementation, and Descriptive Results for 2006

This technical memorandum documents the design, implementation, data preparation, and descriptive results for the 2006 Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders. The data collection was designed by the NOAA Fisheries Southeast Fisheries Science Center Social Science Research Group to track the financial and economic status and performance by vessels holding a federal moratorium permit for harvesting shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico. A two page, self-administered mail survey collected total annual costs broken out into seven categories and auxiliary economic data. In May 2007, 580 vessels were randomly selected, stratified by state, from a preliminary population of 1,709 vessels with federal permits to shrimp in offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The survey was implemented during the rest of 2007. After many reminder and verification phone calls, 509 surveys were deemed complete, for an ineligibility-adjusted response rate of 90.7%. The linking of each individual vessel’s cost data to its revenue data from a different data collection was imperfect, and hence the final number of observations used in the analyses is 484. Based on various measures and tests of validity throughout the technical memorandum, the quality of the data is high. The results are presented in a standardized table format, linking vessel characteristics and operations to simple balance sheet, cash flow, and income statements. In the text, results are discussed for the total fleet, the Gulf shrimp fleet, the active Gulf shrimp fleet, and the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet. Additional results for shrimp vessels grouped by state, by vessel characteristics, by landings volume, and by ownership structure are available in the appendices. The general conclusion of this report is that the financial and economic situation is bleak for the average vessels in most of the categories that were evaluated. With few exceptions, cash flow for the average vessel is positive while the net revenue from operations and the “profit” are negative. With negative net revenue from operations, the economic return for average shrimp vessels is less than zero. Only with the help of government payments does the average owner just about break even. In the short-term, this will discourage any new investments in the industry. The financial situation in 2006, especially if it endures over multiple years, also is economically unsustainable for the average established business. Vessels in the active and inactive Gulf shrimp fleet are, on average, 69 feet long, weigh 105 gross tons, are powered by 505 hp motor(s), and are 23 years old. Three-quarters of the vessels have steel hulls and 59% use a freezer for refrigeration. The average market value of these vessels was $175,149 in 2006, about a hundred-thousand dollars less than the average original purchase price. The outstanding loans averaged $91,955, leading to an average owner equity of $83,194. Based on the sample, 85% of the federally permitted Gulf shrimp fleet was actively shrimping in 2006. Of these 386 active Gulf shrimp vessels, just under half (46%) were owner-operated. On average, these vessels burned 52,931 gallons of fuel, landed 101,268 pounds of shrimp, and received $2.47 per pound of shrimp. Non-shrimp landings added less than 1% to cash flow, indicating that the federal Gulf shrimp fishery is very specialized. The average total cash outflow was $243,415 of which $108,775 was due to fuel expenses alone. The expenses for hired crew and captains were on average $54,866 which indicates the importance of the industry as a source of wage income. The resulting average net cash flow is $16,225 but has a large standard deviation. For the population of active Gulf shrimp vessels we can state with 95% certainty that the average net cash flow was between $9,500 and $23,000 in 2006. The median net cash flow was $11,843. Based on the income statement for active Gulf shrimp vessels, the average fixed costs accounted for just under a quarter of operating expenses (23.1%), labor costs for just over a quarter (25.3%), and the non-labor variable costs for just over half (51.6%). The fuel costs alone accounted for 42.9% of total operating expenses in 2006. It should be noted that the labor cost category in the income statement includes both the actual cash payments to hired labor and an estimate of the opportunity cost of owner-operators’ time spent as captain. The average labor contribution (as captain) of an owner-operator is estimated at about $19,800. The average net revenue from operations is negative $7,429, and is statistically different and less than zero in spite of a large standard deviation. The economic return to Gulf shrimping is negative 4%. Including non-operating activities, foremost an average government payment of $13,662, leads to an average loss before taxes of $907 for the vessel owners. The confidence interval of this value straddles zero, so we cannot reject, with 95% certainty, that the population average is zero. The average inactive Gulf shrimp vessel is generally of a smaller scale than the average active vessel. Inactive vessels are physically smaller, are valued much lower, and are less dependent on loans. Fixed costs account for nearly three quarters of the total operating expenses of $11,926, and only 6% of these vessels have hull insurance. With an average net cash flow of negative $7,537, the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet has a major liquidity problem. On average, net revenue from operations is negative $11,396, which amounts to a negative 15% economic return, and owners lose $9,381 on their vessels before taxes. To sustain such losses and especially to survive the negative cash flow, many of the owners must be subsidizing their shrimp vessels with the help of other income or wealth sources or are drawing down their equity. Active Gulf shrimp vessels in all states but Texas exhibited negative returns. The Alabama and Mississippi fleets have the highest assets (vessel values), on average, yet they generate zero cash flow and negative $32,224 net revenue from operations. Due to their high (loan) leverage ratio the negative 11% economic return is amplified into a negative 21% return on equity. In contrast, for Texas vessels, which actually have the highest leverage ratio among the states, a 1% economic return is amplified into a 13% return on equity. From a financial perspective, the average Florida and Louisiana vessels conform roughly to the overall average of the active Gulf shrimp fleet. It should be noted that these results are averages and hence hide the variation that clearly exists within all fleets and all categories. Although the financial situation for the average vessel is bleak, some vessels are profitable. (PDF contains 101 pages)

The politics of participation: Evaluating stakeholder equity in co-management regimes

Within natural resource management, there is increasing criticism of the traditional model of top-down management as a method of governance, as researchers and managers alike have recognized that resources can frequently be better managed when stakeholders are directly involved in management. As a result, in recent years the concept of co-management of natural resources, in which management responsibilities are shared between the government and stakeholders, has become increasingly popular, both in the academic literature and in practice. However, while co-management has significant potential as a successful management tool, the issue of equity in co-management has rarely been addressed. It is necessary to understand the differential impacts on stakeholders of co-management processes and the degree to which diverse stakeholders are represented within co-management. Understanding the interests of various stakeholders can be a way to more effectively address the distributional and social impacts of coastal policies, which can in turn increase compliance with management measures and lead to more sustainable resource management regimes. This research seeks to take a closer look at the concepts of co-management and participation through a number of case studies of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Caribbean. (PDF contains 4 pages)