72 resultados para Albatross (Ship)
Resumo:
The research was carried out to assess the trace metal concentration in sediments of ship breaking area in Bangladesh. The study areas were separated into Ship breaking Zone and Reference Site for comparative analysis. Metals like Iron ( Fe) was found at 11932 to 41361.71µg.g-1 in the affected site and 3393.37 µg.g-1 in the control site. Manganese (Mn) varied from 2.32 to 8.25 µg.g-1 in the affected site where as it was recorded as 1.8 µg.g-1 in the control area. Chromium(Cr), Nickel (Ni), Zinc(Zn) and Lead (Pb) were also varied from 22.89 to 86.72 µg.g-1; 23.12 to 48.6;83.78 to 142.85 and 36.78 to 147.83 µg.g-1 respectively in the affected site whereas these were recorded as 19; 3.98; 22.22 and 8.82 µg.g-1 in the control site. Copper (Cu); Cadmium (Cd) and Mercury (Hg) concentration were varied from 21.05 to 39.85; 0.57 to 0.94 and 0.05 to 0.11 µg.g-1 in the affected site and 33.0; 0.115 and 0.01 µg.g-1 in the control site. It may conclude that heavy metal pollution in sediments at ship breaking area of Bangladesh is at alarming stage.
Resumo:
In the present paper the first results on the food and feeding habityas of hake in the region of the Argentinean continental slope are given. The data were obtained from the hake sampling made on board of the German research ship "Walther Herwig" during his first fishing exploratory trip in the Southwest Atlantic and from the investigation on the collected hake's stomachs.
Resumo:
President Febres Cordero visits the Galapagos. Ordeal by fire and water. Unusual reports on the Galapagos albatross. Protecting the Hawaiian Petrel. Sealion gives birth to twins. CDF officers decorated by the Government of Ecuador. Staff changes. The question of re-introducing Galapagos hawks to certain islands - a clarification. Visits and events at the Charles Darwin Research Station.
Resumo:
This data report contains all the meteorological, hydrological and dynamic data gathered during the VASPI cruises (I : from December 8th to December 13th 1982, II : from March 5th to March 9th 1983, and III : from October 6th to October 10th 1983) carried out along the continental shelf of Ivory Coast by the oceanographic ship "Andre NIZERY". These cruises, which represent a part of a coastal programme, are included in the more general scientific program FOCAL, whose main scientific objective is the study of the thermal context of the intertropical atlantic area.
Resumo:
The abundance and population density of cetaceans along the U.S. west coast were estimated from ship surveys conducted in the summer and fall of 1991, 1993, 1996, 2001, and 2005 by using multiple-covariate, line-transect analyses. Overall, approximately 556,000 cetaceans of 21 species were estimated to be in the 1,141,800-km2 study area. Delphinoids (Delphinidae and Phocoenidae), the most abundant group, numbered ~540,000 individuals. Abundance in other taxonomic groups included ~5800 baleen whales (Mysticeti), ~7000 beaked whales (Ziphiidae), and ~3200 sperm whales (Physeteridae). This study provides the longest time series of abundance estimates that includes all the cetacean species in any marine ecosystem. These estimates will be used to interpret the impacts of human-caused mortality (such as that documented in fishery bycatch and that caused by ship strikes and other means) and to evaluate the ecological role of cetaceans in the California Current ecosystem.
Resumo:
Minimizing bycatch of seabirds is a major goal of the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service. In Alaska waters, the bycatch (i.e., inadvertent catches) of seabirds has been an incidental result of demersal groundfish longline fishery operations. Notably, the endangered short-tailed albatross (Phoebastria albatrus) has been taken in this groundfish fishery. Bycatch rates of seabirds from individual vessels may be of particular interest because vessels with high bycatch rates may not be functioning effectively with seabird avoidance gears, and there may be a need for suggestions on how to use these avoidance gears more effectively. Therefore, bycatch estimates are usually made on an individual vessel basis and then summed to obtain the total estimate for the entire fleet.
Resumo:
In 1948, the U.S.S.R. began a global campaign of illegal whaling that lasted for three decades and, together with the poorly managed “legal” whaling of other nations, seriously depleted whale populations. Although the general story of this whaling has been told and the catch record largely corrected for the Southern Hemisphere, major gaps remain in the North Pacific. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the details of this system or its economic context. Using interviews with former Soviet whalers and biologists as well as previously unavailable reports and other material in Russian, our objective is to describe how the Soviet whaling industry was structured and how it worked, from the largest scale of state industrial planning down to the daily details of the ways in which whales were caught and processed, and how data sent to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics were falsified. Soviet whaling began with the factory ship Aleut in 1933, but by 1963 the industry had a truly global reach, with seven factory fleets (some very large). Catches were driven by a state planning system that set annual production targets. The system gave bonuses and honors only when these were met or exceeded, and it frequently increased the following year’s targets to match the previous year’s production; scientific estimates of the sustainability of the resource were largely ignored. Inevitably, this system led to whale populations being rapidly reduced. Furthermore, productivity was measured in gross output (weights of whales caught), regardless of whether carcasses were sound or rotten, or whether much of the animal was unutilized. Whaling fleets employed numerous people, including women (in one case as the captain of a catcher boat). Because of relatively high salaries and the potential for bonuses, positions in the whaling industry were much sought-after. Catching and processing of whales was highly mechanized and became increasingly efficient as the industry gained more experience. In a single day, the largest factory ships could process up to 200 small sperm whales, Physeter macrocephalus; 100 humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae; or 30–35 pygmy blue whales, Balaenoptera musculus brevicauda. However, processing of many animals involved nothing more than stripping the carcass of blubber and then discarding the rest. Until 1952, the main product was whale oil; only later was baleen whale meat regularly utilized. Falsified data on catches were routinely submitted to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics, but the true catch and biological data were preserved for research and administrative purposes. National inspectors were present at most times, but, with occasional exceptions, they worked primarily to assist fulfillment of plan targets and routinely ignored the illegal nature of many catches. In all, during 40 years of whaling in the Antarctic, the U.S.S.R. reported 185,778 whales taken but at least 338,336 were actually killed. Data for the North Pacific are currently incomplete, but from provisional data we estimate that at least 30,000 whales were killed illegally in this ocean. Overall, we judge that, worldwide, the U.S.S.R. killed approximately 180,000 whales illegally and caused a number of population crashes. Finally, we note that Soviet illegal catches continued after 1972 despite the presence of international observers on factory fleets.
Resumo:
In late October of 1966, an imposing ship steamed quietly through the placid waters of the Suez Canal. Clad in drab industrial gray, and flying a Soviet hammer and sickle flag at her masthead, the vessel was accompanied by a large fleet of smaller craft. Any observer able to decipher Cyrillic script could have read, in rusting metallic letters on her bow, the name Sovetskaya Ukraina. The more experienced would perhaps have identified her as a whaling factory ship, traveling with her attendant fleet of catcher boats and scouting vessels on a transit that would take them south into the Red Sea and beyond.
Resumo:
John Otterbein Snyder (1867–1943) was an early student of David Starr Jordan at Stanford University and subsequently rose to become an assistant professor there. During his 34 years with the university he taught a wide variety of courses in various branches of zoology and advised numerous students. He eventually mentored 8 M.A. and 4 Ph.D. students to completion at Stanford. He also assisted in the collection of tens of thousands of fish specimens from the western Pacific, central Pacific, and the West Coast of North America, part of the time while stationed as “Naturalist” aboard the U.S. Fish Commission’s Steamer Albatross (1902–06). Although his early publications dealt mainly with fish groups and descriptions (often as a junior author with Jordan), after 1910 he became more autonomous and eventually rose to become one of the Pacific salmon, Oncorhynchus spp., experts on the West Coast. Throughout his career, he was especially esteemed by colleagues as “a stimulating teacher,” “an excellent biologist,” and “a fine man.
Resumo:
The U.S. Fish Commission was initiated in 1871 with Spencer Fullerton Baird as the first U.S. Fish Commissioner as an independent entity. In 1903 it became a part of the new U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor and was renamed the Bureau of Fisheries, a name it retained when the Departments of Commerce and Labor were separated in 1912. The Bureau remained in the Commerce Department until 1941 when it was merged with the Biological Survey and placed in the Department of Interior as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. It was a scientific agency with well conceived programs of action, and it provided knowledge, advice, and example to state governments and individuals with fisheries interests and needs. Its efforts were supported by timely international agreements which constituted the precedent for Federal interest in fishery matters. The Fisheries Service earned stature as an advisor through heavy emphasis on basic biological research. The lack of such knowledge was marked and universal in the 1870’s, but toward the end of that decade, strong steps had been taken to address those needs under Baird’s leadership. USFC research activities were conducted cooperatively with other prominent scientists in the United States and abroad. Biological stations were established, and the world’s first and most productive deepsea research vessel, the Albatross, was constructed, and its 40-year career gave a strong stimulus to the science of oceanography. Together, the agency’s scientists and facilities made important additions to the sum of human knowledge, derived principles of conservation which were the vital bases for effective regulatory legislation, conducted extensive fish cultural work, collected and disseminated fisheries statistics, and began important research in methods of fish harvesting, preservation, transportation, and marketing.
Resumo:
A review of available information describing habitat associations for belugas, Delphinapterus leucas, in Cook Inlet was undertaken to complement population assessment surveys from 1993-2000. Available data for physical, biological, and anthropogenic factors in Cook Inlet are summarized followed by a provisional description of seasonal habitat associations. To summarize habitat preferences, the beluga summer distribution pattern was used to partition Cook Inlet into three regions. In general, belugas congregate in shallow, relatively warm, low-salinity water near major river outflows in upper Cook Inlet during summer (defined as their primary habitat), where prey availability is comparatively high and predator occurrence relatively low. In winter, belugas are seen in the central inlet, but sightings are fewer in number, and whales more dispersed compared to summer. Belugas are associated with a range of ice conditions in winter, from ice-free to 60% ice-covered water. Natural catastrophic events, such as fires, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions, have had no reported effect on beluga habitat, although such events likely affect water quality and, potentially, prey availability. Similarly, although sewage effluent and discharges from industrial and military activities along Cook Inlet negatively affect water quality, analyses of organochlorines and heavy metal burdens indicate that Cook Inlet belugas are not assimilating contaminant loads greater than any other Alaska beluga stocks. Offshore oil and gas activities and vessel traffic are high in the central inlet compared with other Alaska waters, although belugas in Cook Inlet seem habituated to these anthropogenic factors. Anthropogenic factors that have the highest potential negative impacts on belugas include subsistence hunts (not discussed in this report), noise from transportation and offshore oil and gas extraction (ship transits and aircraft overflights), and water quality degradation (from urban runoff and sewage treatment facilities). Although significant impacts from anthropogenic factors other than hunting are not yet apparent, assessment of potential impacts from human activities, especially those that may effect prey availability, are needed.
Resumo:
This study, part of a broader investigation of the history of exploitation of right whales, Balaena glacialis, in the western North Atlantic, emphasizes U.S. shore whaling from Maine to Delaware (from lat. 45°N to 38°30'N) in the period 1620–1924. Our broader study of the entire catch history is intended to provide an empirical basis for assessing past distribution and abundance of this whale population. Shore whaling may have begun at Cape Cod, Mass., in the 1620’s or 1630’s; it was certainly underway there by 1668. Right whale catches in New England waters peaked before 1725, and shore whaling at Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and Nantucket continued to decline through the rest of the 18th century. Right whales continued to be taken opportunistically in Massachusetts, however, until the early 20th century. They were hunted in Narragansett Bay, R.I., as early as 1662, and desultory whaling continued in Rhode Island until at least 1828. Shore whaling in Connecticut may have begun in the middle 1600’s, continuing there until at least 1718. Long Island shore whaling spanned the period 1650–1924. From its Dutch origins in the 1630’s, a persistent shore whaling enterprise developed in Delaware Bay and along the New Jersey shore. Although this activity was most profi table in New Jersey in the early 1700’s, it continued there until at least the 1820’s. Whaling in all areas of the northeastern United States was seasonal, with most catches in the winter and spring. Historically, right whales appear to have been essentially absent from coastal waters south of Maine during the summer and autumn. Based on documented references to specific whale kills, about 750–950 right whales were taken between Maine and Delaware, from 1620 to 1924. Using production statistics in British customs records, the estimated total secured catch of right whales in New England, New York, and Pennsylvania between 1696 and 1734 was 3,839 whales based on oil and 2,049 based on baleen. After adjusting these totals for hunting loss (loss-rate correction factor = 1.2), we estimate that 4,607 (oil) or 2,459 (baleen) right whales were removed from the stock in this region during the 38-year period 1696–1734. A cumulative catch estimate of the stock’s size in 1724 is 1,100–1,200. Although recent evidence of occurrence and movements suggests that right whales continue to use their traditional migratory corridor along the U.S. east coast, the catch history indicates that this stock was much larger in the 1600’s and early 1700’s than it is today. Right whale hunting in the eastern United States ended by the early 1900’s, and the species has been protected throughout the North Atlantic since the mid 1930’s. Among the possible reasons for the relatively slow stock recovery are: the very small number of whales that survived the whaling era to become founders, a decline in environmental carrying capacity, and, especially in recent decades, mortality from ship strikes and entanglement in fishing gear.
Resumo:
On 11 September 1994, a large shark was captured and later identified as the ragged-tooth shark, Odontaspis ferox (Risso). The shark was captured during routine bottom trawl survey operations onboard the NOAA R/V Albatross IV, approximately 25 n.mi. south-southeast of Cape Hatteras, N.C. (lat. 34° 51' N, long. 75° 26' W) with a “36 Yankee” bottom trawl towed at 3.5 knots. Average water depth at the time of capture was 173 m, bottom temperature was 17.8°C, and salinity was 36.41‰. Total length (cm), fork length (cm), weight (kg), and sex were recorded, the specimen was tagged, photographed, and returned live to t
Resumo:
At this time, four additional species, unreported by Wilson [1932], can be added to the list of those species to be found within the limits of the bay. These are Acartia tonsa Dana, Cyclops vernalis Fischer, Diaptomus spatulocrenatus Pearse, and Paracalanus crassirostris Dahl var. nudus nov. The specimens from which identifications were made were collected by means of Clarke-Bumpus nets, in use on the motor ship "Mahatru."
Resumo:
Results of recent seabird bycatch studies in the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas Convention Area were combined to estimate total seabird bycatch of pelagic longline fishing in the Atlantic Ocean, and bycatch per selected species. Available studies do not apply to the full spatial and temporal extent of the fishing effort, so assumptions were made to account for missing information. Over the 4 years from 2003 to 2006 the total seabird bycatch estimate was 48,500. Results indicate that about 57% of the pelagic longline seabird bycatch was albatrosses (Diomedea, Phoebastria, Thalassarche, Phoebetria spp.). This mortality is at a level to cause concern for the smaller and more vulnerable albatross populations in the region. Variation in annual seabird bycatch was caused by variation in total fishing effort, and movement of effort away from areas of higher seabird bycatch rates.