A low-level geographic information system for coastal zone management with applications to Brunei Darussalam: Part III:: simulation and tracking oil spills

B:RUN is a low-level GIS software designed to help formulate options for the management of the coastal zone of Brunei Darussalam. This contribution presents the oil spill simulation module of B:RUN. This simple module, based largely on wind and sea surface current vector parameters, may be helpful in formulating relevant oil spill contingency plans. It can be easily adapted to other areas, as can the B:RUN software itself.

Soviet Illegal Whaling: The Devil and the Details

In 1948, the U.S.S.R. began a global campaign of illegal whaling that lasted for three decades and, together with the poorly managed “legal” whaling of other nations, seriously depleted whale populations. Although the general story of this whaling has been told and the catch record largely corrected for the Southern Hemisphere, major gaps remain in the North Pacific. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the details of this system or its economic context. Using interviews with former Soviet whalers and biologists as well as previously unavailable reports and other material in Russian, our objective is to describe how the Soviet whaling industry was structured and how it worked, from the largest scale of state industrial planning down to the daily details of the ways in which whales were caught and processed, and how data sent to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics were falsified. Soviet whaling began with the factory ship Aleut in 1933, but by 1963 the industry had a truly global reach, with seven factory fleets (some very large). Catches were driven by a state planning system that set annual production targets. The system gave bonuses and honors only when these were met or exceeded, and it frequently increased the following year’s targets to match the previous year’s production; scientific estimates of the sustainability of the resource were largely ignored. Inevitably, this system led to whale populations being rapidly reduced. Furthermore, productivity was measured in gross output (weights of whales caught), regardless of whether carcasses were sound or rotten, or whether much of the animal was unutilized. Whaling fleets employed numerous people, including women (in one case as the captain of a catcher boat). Because of relatively high salaries and the potential for bonuses, positions in the whaling industry were much sought-after. Catching and processing of whales was highly mechanized and became increasingly efficient as the industry gained more experience. In a single day, the largest factory ships could process up to 200 small sperm whales, Physeter macrocephalus; 100 humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae; or 30–35 pygmy blue whales, Balaenoptera musculus brevicauda. However, processing of many animals involved nothing more than stripping the carcass of blubber and then discarding the rest. Until 1952, the main product was whale oil; only later was baleen whale meat regularly utilized. Falsified data on catches were routinely submitted to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics, but the true catch and biological data were preserved for research and administrative purposes. National inspectors were present at most times, but, with occasional exceptions, they worked primarily to assist fulfillment of plan targets and routinely ignored the illegal nature of many catches. In all, during 40 years of whaling in the Antarctic, the U.S.S.R. reported 185,778 whales taken but at least 338,336 were actually killed. Data for the North Pacific are currently incomplete, but from provisional data we estimate that at least 30,000 whales were killed illegally in this ocean. Overall, we judge that, worldwide, the U.S.S.R. killed approximately 180,000 whales illegally and caused a number of population crashes. Finally, we note that Soviet illegal catches continued after 1972 despite the presence of international observers on factory fleets.

Effects of the Santa Barbara, Calif., Oil Spill on the Apparent Abundance of Pelagic Fishery Resources

Many studies have been made of the effects of oil on marine invertebrates, plants (marine algae and phytoplankton), and vertebrates such as seabirds and marine mammals. An excellent review of these findings, which includes some references to fish and pathological effects of aromatic hydrocarbons, has been published by the Royal Society, London (Clark, 1982). That review dealt with the environmental effects of such major oil spills or releases such as those by the tankers Torry Canyon (119,000 t) on the south coast of England, Metula (50-56,000 t) in the Straits of Magellan, Argo Merchant (26,000 t) off Cape Cod, and the super tanker Amoco Cadiz (223,000 t) on the coast of northern Brittany. Those spills were studied to determine their effect on living resources. In contrast there are few references on the impact of oil spills on pelagic fishery resources.

Historical knowledge of sharks: ancient science, earliest American encounters, and American science, fisheries, and utilization

In western civilization, the knowledge of the elasmobranch or selachian fishes (sharks and rays) begins with Aristotle (384–322 B.C.). Two of his extant works, the “Historia Animalium” and the “Generation of Animals,” both written about 330 B.C., demonstrate knowledge of elasmobranch fishes acquired by observation. Roman writers of works on natural history, such as Aelian and Pliny, who followed Aristotle, were compilers of available information. Their contribution was that they prevented the Greek knowledge from being lost, but they added few original observations. The fall of Rome, around 476 A.D., brought a period of economic regression and political chaos. These in turn brought intellectual thought to a standstill for nearly one thousand years, the period known as the Dark Ages. It would not be until the middle of the sixteenth century, well into the Renaissance, that knowledge of elasmobranchs would advance again. The works of Belon, Salviani, Rondelet, and Steno mark the beginnings of ichthyology, including the study of sharks and rays. The knowledge of sharks and rays increased slowly during and after the Renaissance, and the introduction of the Linnaean System of Nomenclature in 1735 marks the beginning of modern ichthyology. However, the first major work on sharks would not appear until the early nineteenth century. Knowledge acquired about sea animals usually follows their economic importance and exploitation, and this was also true with sharks. The first to learn about sharks in North America were the native fishermen who learned how, when, and where to catch them for food or for their oils. The early naturalists in America studied the land animals and plants; they had little interest in sharks. When faunistic works on fishes started to appear, naturalists just enumerated the species of sharks that they could discern. Throughout the U.S. colonial period, sharks were seldom utilized for food, although their liver oil or skins were often utilized. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Spiny Dogfish, Squalus acanthias, was the only shark species utilized in a large scale on both coasts. It was fished for its liver oil, which was used as a lubricant, and for lighting and tanning, and for its skin which was used as an abrasive. During the early part of the twentieth century, the Ocean Leather Company was started to process sea animals (primarily sharks) into leather, oil, fertilizer, fins, etc. The Ocean Leather Company enjoyed a monopoly on the shark leather industry for several decades. In 1937, the liver of the Soupfin Shark, Galeorhinus galeus, was found to be a rich source of vitamin A, and because the outbreak of World War II in 1938 interrupted the shipping of vitamin A from European sources, an intensive shark fishery soon developed along the U.S. West Coast. By 1939 the American shark leather fishery had transformed into the shark liver oil fishery of the early 1940’s, encompassing both coasts. By the late 1940’s, these fisheries were depleted because of overfishing and fishing in the nursery areas. Synthetic vitamin A appeared on the market in 1950, causing the fishery to be discontinued. During World War II, shark attacks on the survivors of sunken ships and downed aviators engendered the search for a shark repellent. This led to research aimed at understanding shark behavior and the sensory biology of sharks. From the late 1950’s to the 1980’s, funding from the Office of Naval Research was responsible for most of what was learned about the sensory biology of sharks.

Deepwater Horizon oil spill: assessment of potential impacts on the deep soft-bottom benthos; interim data summary report

A study was initiated in May 2011, under the direction of the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) Deepwater Benthic Communities Technical Working Group (NRDA Deep Benthic TWG), to assess potential impacts of the DWH oil spill on sediments and resident benthic fauna in deepwater (> 200 meters) areas of the Gulf. Key objectives of the study were to complete the analysis of samples from 65 priority stations sampled in September-October 2010 on two DWH Response cruises (Gyre and Ocean Veritas) and from 38 long-term monitoring sites (including a subset of 35 of the original 65) sampled on a follow-up NRDA cruise in May-June 2011. The present progress report provides a brief summary of results from the initial processing of samples from fall 2010 priority sites (plus three additional historical sites). Data on key macrofaunal, meiofaunal, and abiotic environmental variables are presented for each of these samples and additional maps are included to depict spatial patterns in these variables throughout the study region. The near-field zone within about 3 km of the wellhead, where many of the stations showed evidence of impaired benthic condition (e.g. low taxa richness, high nematode/harpacticoid-copepod ratios), also is an area that contained some of the highest concentrations of total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), total polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (total PAHs), and barium in sediments (as possible indicators of DWH discharges). There were similar co-occurrences at other sites outside this zone, especially to the southwest of the wellhead out to about 15 km. However, there also were exceptions to this pattern, for example at several farther-field sites in deeper-slope and canyon locations where there was low benthic species richness but no evidence of exposure to DWH discharges. Such cases are consistent with historical patterns of benthic distributions in relation to natural controlling factors such as depth, position within canyons, and availability of organic matter derived from surface-water primary production.