26 resultados para Lytle, Robert Bruce Jr.
Resumo:
In 1948, the U.S.S.R. began a global campaign of illegal whaling that lasted for three decades and, together with the poorly managed “legal” whaling of other nations, seriously depleted whale populations. Although the general story of this whaling has been told and the catch record largely corrected for the Southern Hemisphere, major gaps remain in the North Pacific. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the details of this system or its economic context. Using interviews with former Soviet whalers and biologists as well as previously unavailable reports and other material in Russian, our objective is to describe how the Soviet whaling industry was structured and how it worked, from the largest scale of state industrial planning down to the daily details of the ways in which whales were caught and processed, and how data sent to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics were falsified. Soviet whaling began with the factory ship Aleut in 1933, but by 1963 the industry had a truly global reach, with seven factory fleets (some very large). Catches were driven by a state planning system that set annual production targets. The system gave bonuses and honors only when these were met or exceeded, and it frequently increased the following year’s targets to match the previous year’s production; scientific estimates of the sustainability of the resource were largely ignored. Inevitably, this system led to whale populations being rapidly reduced. Furthermore, productivity was measured in gross output (weights of whales caught), regardless of whether carcasses were sound or rotten, or whether much of the animal was unutilized. Whaling fleets employed numerous people, including women (in one case as the captain of a catcher boat). Because of relatively high salaries and the potential for bonuses, positions in the whaling industry were much sought-after. Catching and processing of whales was highly mechanized and became increasingly efficient as the industry gained more experience. In a single day, the largest factory ships could process up to 200 small sperm whales, Physeter macrocephalus; 100 humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae; or 30–35 pygmy blue whales, Balaenoptera musculus brevicauda. However, processing of many animals involved nothing more than stripping the carcass of blubber and then discarding the rest. Until 1952, the main product was whale oil; only later was baleen whale meat regularly utilized. Falsified data on catches were routinely submitted to the Bureau of International Whaling Statistics, but the true catch and biological data were preserved for research and administrative purposes. National inspectors were present at most times, but, with occasional exceptions, they worked primarily to assist fulfillment of plan targets and routinely ignored the illegal nature of many catches. In all, during 40 years of whaling in the Antarctic, the U.S.S.R. reported 185,778 whales taken but at least 338,336 were actually killed. Data for the North Pacific are currently incomplete, but from provisional data we estimate that at least 30,000 whales were killed illegally in this ocean. Overall, we judge that, worldwide, the U.S.S.R. killed approximately 180,000 whales illegally and caused a number of population crashes. Finally, we note that Soviet illegal catches continued after 1972 despite the presence of international observers on factory fleets.
Resumo:
From 1947 to 1973, the U.S.S.R. conducted a huge campaign of illegal whaling worldwide. We review Soviet catches of humpback whales, Megaptera novaeangliae, in the Southern Ocean during this period, with an emphasis on the International Whaling Commission’s Antarctic Management Areas IV, V, and VI (the principal regions of illegal Soviet whaling on this species, south of Australia and western Oceania). Where possible, we summarize legal and illegal Soviet catches by year, Management Area, and factory fleet, and also include information on takes by other nations. Soviet humpback catches between 1947 and 1973 totaled 48,702 and break down as follows: 649 (Area I), 1,412 (Area II), 921 (Area III), 8,779 (Area IV), 22,569 (Area V), and 7,195 (Area VI), with 7,177 catches not currently assignable to area. In all, at least 72,542 humpback whales were killed by all operations (Soviet plus other nations) after World War II in Areas IV (27,201), V (38,146), and VI (7,195). More than one-third of these (25,474 whales, of which 25,192 came from Areas V and VI) were taken in just two seasons, 1959–60 and 1960–61. The impact of these takes, and of those from Area IV in the late 1950’s, is evident in the sometimes dramatic declines in catches at shore stations in Australia, New Zealand, and at Norfolk Island. When compared to recent estimates of abundance and initial population size, the large removals from Areas IV and V indicate that the populations in these regions remain well below pre-exploitation levels despite reported strong growth rates off eastern and western Australia. Populations in many areas of Oceania continue to be small, indicating that the catches from Area VI and eastern Area V had long-term impacts on recovery.
Resumo:
The abundance of the common starfish, Asterias forbesi, fluctuates widely over time. The starfish is a predator of pre-recruit northern quahogs, Mercenaria mercenaria. During the 1990’s, starfish became scarce in Raritan Bay and Long Island Sound. Quahog populations concurrently erupted in abundance and quahog landings have risen sharply in both locations. The extensive scale of this observation would seem to imply a cause and effect; at the least, both populations may be responding differently to a large scale exogenous factor.
Resumo:
Charles Henry Gilbert (1859-1928) was a pioneering ichthyologist who made major contributions to the study of fishes of the American West. As chairman of the Department ofZoology at Leland Stanford Junior University in Palo Alto, Calif., during 1891-1925, Gilbert was extremely devoted to his work and showed little patience with those ofa different mindset. While serving as Naturalist-in-Charge of the U.S. Fish Commission Steamer Albatross during her exploratory expedition to the Hawaiian Islands in 1902, Gilbert engaged in an acrimonious feud with the ship's captain, Chauncey Thomas, Jr. (1850-1919), U.S.N., over what Gilbert perceived to be an inadequate effort by the captain. This essay focuses on the conflict between two strong figures, each operatingf rom different world views, and each vying for authority. Despite the difficulties these two men faced, the voyage of the Albatross in 1902 must be considered a success, as reflected by the extensive biological samples collected, the many new species of animals discovered, and the resulting publication of important scientific papers.
Resumo:
Among the papers of Dr. Charles M. Breder bequeathed to the Mote Marine Laboratory by the Breder family are a series of drawings of larval fish and eggs done from 1917 through 1929. The drawings were made with pencil on half and full sheets of buff colored paper. The half sheet drawings are of larval fish, most of which are not identified. The full sheet drawings often contain comments and notes related to laboratory work on fish egg development, and made during the summer of 1929 when Breder was working in the Dry Tortugas.
Resumo:
This report is the second in a series from a project to assess land-based sources of pollution (LBSP) and effects in the St. Thomas East End Reserves (STEER) in St. Thomas, USVI, and is the result of a collaborative effort between NOAA’s National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science, the USVI Department of Planning and Natural Resources, the University of the Virgin Islands, and The Nature Conservancy. Passive water samplers (POCIS) were deployed in the STEER in February 2012. Developed by the US Geological Survey (USGS) as a tool to detect the presence of water soluble contaminants in the environment, POCIS samplers were deployed in the STEER at five locations. In addition to the February 2012 deployment, the results from an earlier POCIS deployment in May 2010 in Turpentine Gut, a perennial freshwater stream which drains to the STEER, are also reported. A total of 26 stormwater contaminants were detected at least once during the February 2012 deployment in the STEER. Detections were high enough to estimate ambient water concentrations for nine contaminants using USGS sampling rate values. From the May 2010 deployment in Turpentine Gut, 31 stormwater contaminants were detected, and ambient water concentrations could be estimated for 17 compounds. Ambient water concentrations were estimated for a number of contaminants including the detergent/surfactant metabolite 4-tert-octylphenol, phthalate ester plasticizers DEHP and DEP, bromoform, personal care products including menthol, indole, n,n-diethyltoluamide (DEET), along with the animal/plant sterol cholesterol, and the plant sterol beta-sitosterol. Only DEHP appeared to have exceeded a water quality guideline for the protection of aquatic organisms.
Resumo:
This report contains a chemical and biological characterization of sediments from the St. Thomas East End Reserves (STEER) in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). The STEER Management Plan (published in 2011) identified chemical contaminants and habitat loss as high or very high threats and called for a characterization of chemical contaminants as well as an assessment of their effects on natural resources. The baseline information contained in this report on chemical contaminants, toxicity and benthic infaunal community composition can be used to assess current conditions, as well as the efficacy of future restoration activities. In this phase of the project, 185 chemical contaminants, including a number of organic (e.g., hydrocarbons and pesticides) and inorganic (e.g., metals) compounds, were analyzed from 24 sites in the STEER. Sediments were also analyzed using a series of toxicity bioassays, including amphipod mortality, sea urchin fertilization impairment, and the cytochrome P450 Human Reporter Gene System (HRGS), along with a characterization of the benthic infaunal community. Higher levels of chemical contaminants were found in Mangrove Lagoon and Benner Bay in the western portion of the study area than in the eastern area. The concentrations of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane), chlordane, zinc, copper, lead and mercury were above a NOAA sediment quality guideline at one or more sites, indicating impacts may be present in more sensitive species or life stages in the benthic environment. Copper at one site in Benner Bay, however, was above a NOAA guideline indicating that effects on benthic organisms were likely. The antifoulant boat hull ingredient tributyltin, or TBT, was found at the third highest concentration in the history of NOAA’s National Status and Trends (NS&T) Program, which monitors the Nation’s coastal and estuarine waters for chemical contaminants and bioeffects. Unfortunately, there do not appear to be any established sediment quality guidelines for TBT. Results of the bioassays indicated significant sediment toxicity in Mangrove Lagoon and Benner Bay using multiple tests. The benthic infaunal communities in Mangrove Lagoon and Benner Bay appeared severely diminished.
Resumo:
Coastal ecosystems and the services they provide are adversely affected by a wide variety of human activities. In particular, seagrass meadows are negatively affected by impacts accruing from the billion or more people who live within 50 km of them. Seagrass meadows provide important ecosystem services, including an estimated $1.9 trillion per year in the form of nutrient cycling; an order of magnitude enhancement of coral reef fish productivity; a habitat for thousands of fish, bird, and invertebrate species; and a major food source for endangered dugong, manatee, and green turtle. Although individual impacts from coastal development, degraded water quality, and climate change have been documented, there has been no quantitative global assessment of seagrass loss until now. Our comprehensive global assessment of 215 studies found that seagrasses have been disappearing at a rate of 110 square kilometers per year since 1980 and that 29% of the known areal extent has disappeared since seagrass areas were initially recorded in 1879. Furthermore, rates of decline have accelerated from a median of 0.9% per year before 1940 to 7% per year since 1990. Seagrass loss rates are comparable to those reported for mangroves, coral reefs, and tropical rainforests and place seagrass meadows among the most threatened ecosystems on earth.