Cooperative properties of lipid bilayers : collective director fluctuations and the effects of hydrophobic mismatch in protein/lipid membrane systems

Cooperative director fluctuations in lipid bilayers have been postulated for many years. ^2H-NMR T_1^(-1), T_(1P)^(-1) , and T_2^(-1); measurements have been used identify these motions and to determine the origin of increased slow bilayer motion upon addition of unlike lipids or proteins to a pure lipid bilayer.

The contribution of cooperative director fluctuations to NMR relaxation in lipid bilayers has been expressed mathematically using the approach of Doane et al.^1 and Pace and Chan.^2 The T_2^(-1)’s of pure dimyristoyllecithin (DML) bilayers deuterated at the 2, 9 and 10, and all positions on both lipid hydrocarbon chains have been measured. Several characteristics of these measurements indicate the presence of cooperative director fluctuations. First of all, T_2^(-1) exhibits a linear dependence on S2/CD. Secondly, T_2^(-1) varies across the ^2H-NMR powder pattern as sin^2 (2, β), where , β is the angle between the average bilayer director and the external magnetic field. Furthermore, these fluctuations are restricted near the lecithin head group suggesting that the head group does not participate in these motions but, rather, anchors the hydrocarbon chains in the bilayer.

T_2^(-1)has been measured for selectively deuterated liquid crystalline DML hilayers to which a host of other lipids and proteins have been added. The T_2^(-1) of the DML bilayer is found to increase drastically when chlorophyll a (chl a) and Gramicidin A' (GA') are added to the bilayer. Both these molecules interfere with the lecithin head group spacing in the bilayer. Molecules such as myristic acid, distearoyllecithin (DSL), phytol, and cholesterol, whose hydrocarbon regions are quite different from DML but which have small,neutral polar head groups, leave cooperative fluctuations in the DML bilayer unchanged.

The effect of chl a on cooperative fluctuations in the DML bilayer has been examined in detail using ^2H-NMR T_1^(-1), T_(1P)^(-1) , and T_2^(-1); measurements. Cooperative fluctuations have been modelled using the continuum theory of the nematic state of liquid crystals. Chl a is found to decrease both the correlation length and the elastic constants in the DML bilayer.

A mismatch between the hydrophobic length of a lipid bilayer and that of an added protein has also been found to change the cooperative properties of the lecithin bilayer. Hydrophobic mismatch has been studied in a series GA' / lecithin bilayers. The dependence of 2H-NMR order parameters and relaxation rates on GA' concentration has been measured in selectively deuterated DML, dipalmitoyllecithin (DPL), and DSL systems. Order parameters, cooperative lengths, and elastic constants of the DML bilayer are most disrupted by GA', while the DSL bilayer is the least perturbed by GA'. Thus, it is concluded that the hydrophobic length of GA' best matches that of the DSL bilayer. Preliminary Raman spectroscopy and Differential Scanning Calorimetry experiments of GA' /lecithin systems support this conclusion. Accommodation of hydrophobic mismatch is used to rationalize the absence of H_(II) phase formation in GA' /DML systems and the observation of H_(II) phase in GA' /DPL and GA' /DSL systems.

1. J. W. Doane and D. L. Johnson, Chem. Phy3. Lett., 6, 291-295 (1970). 2. R. J. Pace and S. I. Chan, J. Chem. Phy3., 16, 4217-4227 (1982).

Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.