Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.

Computationally Guided Monomerization of Red Fluorescent Proteins of the Class Anthozoa

Red fluorescent proteins (RFPs) have attracted significant engineering focus because of the promise of near infrared fluorescent proteins, whose light penetrates biological tissue, and which would allow imaging inside of vertebrate animals. The RFP landscape, which numbers ~200 members, is mostly populated by engineered variants of four native RFPs, leaving the vast majority of native RFP biodiversity untouched. This is largely due to the fact that native RFPs are obligate tetramers, limiting their usefulness as fusion proteins. Monomerization has imposed critical costs on these evolved tetramers, however, as it has invariably led to loss of brightness, and often to many other adverse effects on the fluorescent properties of the derived monomeric variants. Here we have attempted to understand why monomerization has taken such a large toll on Anthozoa class RFPs, and to outline a clear strategy for their monomerization. We begin with a structural study of the far-red fluorescence of AQ143, one of the furthest red emitting RFPs. We then try to separate the problem of stable and bright fluorescence from the design of a soluble monomeric β-barrel surface by engineering a hybrid protein (DsRmCh) with an oligomeric parent that had been previously monomerized, DsRed, and a pre-stabilized monomeric core from mCherry. This allows us to use computational design to successfully design a stable, soluble, fluorescent monomer. Next we took HcRed, which is a previously unmonomerized RFP that has far-red fluorescence (λemission = 633 nm) and attempted to monomerize it making use of lessons learned from DsRmCh. We engineered two monomeric proteins by pre-stabilizing HcRed’s core, then monomerizing in stages, making use of computational design and directed evolution techniques such as error-prone mutagenesis and DNA shuffling. We call these proteins mGinger0.1 (λem = 637 nm / Φ = 0.02) and mGinger0.2 (λem = 631 nm Φ = 0.04). They are the furthest red first generation monomeric RFPs ever developed, are significantly thermostabilized, and add diversity to a small field of far-red monomeric FPs. We anticipate that the techniques we describe will be facilitate future RFP monomerization, and that further core optimization of the mGingers may allow significant improvements in brightness.

A comparison of the costs of operation of the motor bus, Birney safety car, and trolley bus on the local transportation routes in Pasadena

With the installation by the Pacific Electric Railway of a bus system in Pasadena to supplant most of its trolley lines, the problem of the comparison of the costs of the two systems naturally presented itself. The study here undertaken was originally started as just a comparison of the motor bus and Birney Safety Car, but as the work progressed it seemed advisable to include the trolley bus as well - a method of transportation that is comparatively new as far as development is concerned, but which seems to be finding increasing favor in the East.