Regulation of product chain length by isoprenyl diphosphate synthases

An analysis of the x-ray structure of homodimeric avian farnesyl diphosphate synthase (geranyltransferase, EC 2.5.1.10) coupled with information about conserved amino acids obtained from a sequence alignment of 35 isoprenyl diphosphate synthases that synthesize farnesyl (C15), geranylgeranyl (C20), and higher chain length isoprenoid diphosphates suggested that the side chains of residues corresponding to F112 and F113 in the avian enzyme were important for determining the ultimate length of the hydrocarbon chains. This hypothesis was supported by site-directed mutagenesis to transform wild-type avian farnesyl diphosphate synthase (FPS) into synthases capable of producing geranylgeranyl diphosphate (F112A), geranylfarnesyl (C25) diphosphate (F113S), and longer chain prenyl diphosphates (F112A/F113S). An x-ray analysis of the structure of the F112A/F113S mutant in the apo state and with allylic substrates bound produced the strongest evidence that these mutations caused the observed change in product specificity by directly altering the size of the binding pocket for the growing isoprenoid chain in the active site of the enzyme. The proposed binding pocket in the apo mutant structure was increased in depth by 5.8 Å as compared with that for the wild-type enzyme. Allylic diphosphates were observed in the holo structures, bound through magnesium ions to the aspartates of the first of two conserved aspartate-rich sequences (D117–D121), with the hydrocarbon tails of all the ligands growing down the hydrophobic pocket toward the mutation site. A model was constructed to show how the growth of a long chain prenyl product may proceed by creation of a hydrophobic passageway from the FPS active site to the outside surface of the enzyme.

Thermostable and site-specific DNA binding of the gene product ORF56 from the Sulfolobus islandicus plasmid pRN1, a putative archael plasmid copy control protein

There is still a lack of information on the specific characteristics of DNA-binding proteins from hyperthermophiles. Here we report on the product of the gene orf56 from plasmid pRN1 of the acidophilic and thermophilic archaeon Sulfolobus islandicus. orf56 has not been characterised yet but low sequence similarily to several eubacterial plasmid-encoded genes suggests that this 6.5 kDa protein is a sequence-specific DNA-binding protein. The DNA-binding properties of ORF56, expressed in Escherichia coli, have been investigated by EMSA experiments and by fluorescence anisotropy measurements. Recombinant ORF56 binds to double-stranded DNA, specifically to an inverted repeat located within the promoter of orf56. Binding to this site could down-regulate transcription of the orf56 gene and also of the overlapping orf904 gene, encoding the putative initiator protein of plasmid replication. By gel filtration and chemical crosslinking we have shown that ORF56 is a dimeric protein. Stoichiometric fluorescence anisotropy titrations further indicate that ORF56 binds as a tetramer to the inverted repeat of its target binding site. CD spectroscopy points to a significant increase in ordered secondary structure of ORF56 upon binding DNA. ORF56 binds without apparent cooperativity to its target DNA with a dissociation constant in the nanomolar range. Quantitative analysis of binding isotherms performed at various salt concentrations and at different temperatures indicates that approximately seven ions are released upon complex formation and that complex formation is accompanied by a change in heat capacity of –6.2 kJ/mol. Furthermore, recombinant ORF56 proved to be highly thermostable and is able to bind DNA up to 85°C.

The challenge of contracting for technological information

Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to “give away the secret.” This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw information. (iv) Sellers’ superior knowledge about TI’s value make buyers wary of overpaying. (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more than marginal cost. These contracting difficulties affect the way TI is produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to large firms. However, small research and development firms spend more per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major producers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly between universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI. Implicit barter—money for guidance—is common. Property rights for TI are hard to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inadequate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented, and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations. New organizational forms are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up firms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in facilitating the production and spread of TI.