Population dynamics, demographic stochasticity, and the evolution of cooperation

A basic evolutionary problem posed by the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is to understand when the paradigmatic cooperative strategy Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of pure defectors. Deterministically, this is impossible. We consider the role of demographic stochasticity by embedding the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma into a population dynamic framework. Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of defectors when their dynamics exhibit short episodes of high population densities with subsequent crashes and long low density periods with strong genetic drift. Such dynamics tend to have reddened power spectra and temporal distributions of population size that are asymmetric and skewed toward low densities. The results indicate that ecological dynamics are important for evolutionary shifts between adaptive peaks.

Unraveling principles of lead discovery: from unfrustrated energy landscapes to novel molecular anchors.

The search for novel leads is a critical step in the drug discovery process. Computational approaches to identify new lead molecules have focused on discovering complete ligands by evaluating the binding affinity of a large number of candidates, a task of considerable complexity. A new computational method is introduced in this work based on the premise that the primary molecular recognition event in the protein binding site may be accomplished by small core fragments that serve as molecular anchors, providing a structurally stable platform that can be subsequently tailored into complete ligands. To fulfill its role, we show that an effective molecular anchor must meet both the thermodynamic requirement of relative energetic stability of a single binding mode and its consistent kinetic accessibility, which may be measured by the structural consensus of multiple docking simulations. From a large number of candidates, this technique is able to identify known core fragments responsible for primary recognition by the FK506 binding protein (FKBP-12), along with a diverse repertoire of novel molecular cores. By contrast, absolute energetic criteria for selecting molecular anchors are found to be promiscuous. A relationship between a minimum frustration principle of binding energy landscapes and receptor-specific molecular anchors in their role as "recognition nuclei" is established, thereby unraveling a mechanism of lead discovery and providing a practical route to receptor-biased computational combinatorial chemistry.

Principles of protein-protein interactions.

This review examines protein complexes in the Brookhaven Protein Databank to gain a better understanding of the principles governing the interactions involved in protein-protein recognition. The factors that influence the formation of protein-protein complexes are explored in four different types of protein-protein complexes--homodimeric proteins, heterodimeric proteins, enzyme-inhibitor complexes, and antibody-protein complexes. The comparison between the complexes highlights differences that reflect their biological roles.

Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

The evolutionary stability of cooperation is a problem of fundamental importance for the biological and social sciences. Different claims have been made about this issue: whereas Axelrod and Hamilton's [Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981) Science 211, 1390-1398] widely recognized conclusion is that cooperative rules such as "tit for tat" are evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD), Boyd and Lorberbaum [Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59] have claimed that no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in this game. Here we explain why these claims are not contradictory by showing in what sense strategies in the IPD can and cannot be stable and by creating a conceptual framework that yields the type of evolutionary stability attainable in the IPD and in repeated games in general. Having established the relevant concept of stability, we report theorems on some basic properties of strategies that are stable in this sense. We first show that the IPD has "too many" such strategies, so that being stable does not discriminate among behavioral rules. Stable strategies differ, however, on a property that is crucial for their evolutionary survival--the size of the invasion they can resist. This property can be interpreted as a strategy's evolutionary robustness. Conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit for tat are the most robust. Cooperative behavior supported by these strategies is the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hardest to disrupt.