The challenge of contracting for technological information

Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to “give away the secret.” This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw information. (iv) Sellers’ superior knowledge about TI’s value make buyers wary of overpaying. (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more than marginal cost. These contracting difficulties affect the way TI is produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to large firms. However, small research and development firms spend more per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major producers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly between universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI. Implicit barter—money for guidance—is common. Property rights for TI are hard to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inadequate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented, and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations. New organizational forms are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up firms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in facilitating the production and spread of TI.

Global and local implications of biotechnology and climate change for future food supplies

The development of improved technology for agricultural production and its diffusion to farmers is a process requiring investment and time. A large number of studies of this process have been undertaken. The findings of these studies have been incorporated into a quantitative policy model projecting supplies of commodities (in terms of area and crop yields), equilibrium prices, and international trade volumes to the year 2020. These projections show that a “global food crisis,” as would be manifested in high commodity prices, is unlikely to occur. The same projections show, however, that in many countries, “local food crisis,” as manifested in low agricultural incomes and associated low food consumption in the presence of low food prices, will occur. Simulations show that delays in the diffusion of modern biotechnology research capabilities to developing countries will exacerbate local food crises. Similarly, global climate change will also exacerbate these crises, accentuating the importance of bringing strengthened research capabilities to developing countries.