Is blindsight like normal, near-threshold vision?

Blindsight is the rare and paradoxical ability of some human subjects with occipital lobe brain damage to discriminate unseen stimuli in their clinically blind field defects when forced-choice procedures are used, implying that lesions of striate cortex produce a sharp dissociation between visual performance and visual awareness. Skeptics have argued that this is no different from the behavior of normal subjects at the lower limits of conscious vision, at which such dissociations could arise trivially by using different response criteria during clinical and forced-choice tests. We tested this claim explicitly by measuring the sensitivity of a hemianopic patient independently of his response criterion in yes-no and forced-choice detection tasks with the same stimulus and found that, unlike normal controls, his sensitivity was significantly higher during the forced-choice task. Thus, the dissociation by which blindsight is defined is not simply due to a difference in the patients’ response bias between the two paradigms. This result implies that blindsight is unlike normal, near-threshold vision and that information about the stimulus is processed in blindsighted patients in an unusual way.

Localization of visual stimuli after striate cortex damage in monkeys: parallels with human blindsight.

Blindsight is a phenomenon in which human patients with damage to striate cortex deny any visual sensation in the resultant visual field defect but can nonetheless detect and localize stimuli when persuaded to guess. Although monkeys with striate lesions have also been shown to exhibit some residual vision, it is not yet clear to what extent the residual capacities in monkeys parallel the phenomenon of human blindsight. To clarify this issue, we trained two monkeys with unilateral lesions of striate cortex to make saccadic eye movements to visual targets in both hemifields under two conditions. In the condition analogous to clinical perimetry, they failed to initiate saccades to targets presented in the contralateral hemifield and thus appeared "blind." Only in the condition where the fixation point was turned off simultaneously with the onset of the target--signaling the animal to respond at the appropriate time--were monkeys able to localize targets contralateral to the striate lesion. These results indicate that the conditions under which residual vision is demonstrable are similar for monkeys with striate cortex damage and humans with blindsight.

Parameters affecting conscious versus unconscious visual discrimination with damage to the visual cortex (V1).

When the visual (striate) cortex (V1) is damaged in human subjects, cortical blindness results in the contralateral visual half field. Nevertheless, under some experimental conditions, subjects demonstrate a capacity to make visual discriminations in the blind hemifield (blindsight), even though they have no phenomenal experience of seeing. This capacity must, therefore, be mediated by parallel projections to other brain areas. It is also the case that some subjects have conscious residual vision in response to fast moving stimuli or sudden changes in light flux level presented to the blind hemifield, characterized by a contentless kind of awareness, a feeling of something happening, albeit not normal seeing. The relationship between these two modes of discrimination has never been studied systematically. We examine, in the same experiment, both the unconscious discrimination and the conscious visual awareness of moving stimuli in a subject with unilateral damage to V1. The results demonstrate an excellent capacity to discriminate motion direction and orientation in the absence of acknowledged perceptual awareness. Discrimination of the stimulus parameters for acknowledged awareness apparently follows a different functional relationship with respect to stimulus speed, displacement, and stimulus contrast. As performance in the two modes can be quantitatively matched, the findings suggest that it should be possible to image brain activity and to identify the active areas involved in the same subject performing the same discrimination task, both with and without conscious awareness, and hence to determine whether any structures contribute uniquely to conscious perception.