The evolution of begging: Signaling and sibling competition

In many species, young solicit food from their parents, which respond by feeding them. Because of the difference in genetic make-up between parents and their offspring and the consequent conflict, this interaction is often studied as a paradigm for the evolution of communication. Existent theoretical models demonstrate that chick signaling and parent responding can be stable if solicitation is a costly signal. The marginal cost of producing stronger signals allows the system to converge to an equilibrium: young beg with intensity that reflects their need, and parents use this information to maximize their own inclusive fitness. However, we show that there is another equilibrium where chicks do not beg and parents’ provisioning effort is optimal with respect to the statistically probable distribution of chicks’ states. Expected fitness for parents and offspring at the nonsignaling equilibrium is higher than at the signaling equilibrium. Because nonsignaling is stable and it is likely to be the ancestral condition, we would like to know how natural systems evolved from nonsignaling to signaling. We suggest that begging may have evolved through direct sibling fighting before the establishment of a parental response, that is, that nonsignaling squabbling leads to signaling. In multiple-offspring broods, young following a condition-dependent strategy in the contest for resources provide information about their condition. Parents can use this information even though it is not an adaptation for communication, and evolution will lead the system to the signaling equilibrium. This interpretation implies that signaling evolved in multiple-offspring broods, but given that signaling is evolutionarily stable, it would also be favored in species which secondarily evolved single-chick broods.

Instability of signaling resolution models of parent–offspring conflict

Recent signaling resolution models of parent–offspring conflict have provided an important framework for theoretical and empirical studies of communication and parental care. According to these models, signaling of need is stabilized by its cost. However, our computer simulations of the evolutionary dynamics of chick begging and parental investment show that in Godfray’s model the signaling equilibrium is evolutionarily unstable: populations that start at the signaling equilibrium quickly depart from it. Furthermore, the signaling and nonsignaling equilibria are linked by a continuum of equilibria where chicks above a certain condition do not signal and we show that, contrary to intuition, fitness increases monotonically as the proportion of young that signal decreases. This result forces us to reconsider much of the current literature on signaling of need and highlights the need to investigate the evolutionary stability of signaling equilibria based on the handicap principle.

Signaling of need, sibling competition, and the cost of honesty

Young birds and mammals frequently solicit food by means of extravagant and apparently costly begging displays. Much attention has been devoted to the idea that these displays are honest signals of need, and that their apparent cost serves to maintain their honesty. Recent analyses, however, have shown that the cost needed to maintain a fully informative, honest signal may often be so great that both offspring (signaler) and parent (receiver) would do better to refrain from communication. This apparently calls into question the relevance of the costly signaling hypothesis. Here, I show that this argument overlooks the impact of sibling competition. When multiple signalers must compete for the attention of a receiver (as is commonly the case in parent–offspring interactions), I show that (all other things being equal) individual equilibrium signal costs will typically be lower. The greater the number of competitors, the smaller the mean cost, though the maximum level of signal intensity employed by very needy signalers may actually increase with the number of competitors. At the same time, costs become increasingly sensitive to relatedness among signalers as opposed to relatedness between signalers and receivers. As a result of these trends, signaling proves profitable for signalers under a much wider range of conditions when there is competition (though it is still likely to be unprofitable for receivers).

A preference for own-subspecies' song guides vocal learning in a song bird

In many song birds, males develop their songs as adults by imitating the songs of one or more tutors, memorized previously during a sensitive phase early in life. Previous work using two assays, the production of imitations by adult males and playback-induced calling by young birds during the sensitive phase for memorization, has shown that song birds can discriminate between their own and other species' songs. Herein I use both assays to show that male mountain white-crowned sparrows, Zonotrichia leucophrys oriantha, must learn to sing but have a genetic predisposition to memorize and learn the songs of their own subspecies. Playback tests to young naive birds before they even begin to sing reveal that birds give begging calls more in response to oriantha song than to songs of another species. After 10 days of tutoring with songs of either their own or another subspecies, birds continue to give stronger call responses to songs of their own subspecies, irrespective of whether they were tutored with them, and are more discriminating in distinguishing between different dialects of their own subspecies. The memory processes that facilitate recognition and discrimination of own-subspecies' song may also mediate the preferential imitation of song of a bird's own subspecies. Such perceptual biases could constrain the direction and rate of cultural evolution of learned songs.