3 resultados para Unconscious guilt-feeling

em National Center for Biotechnology Information - NCBI


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Following striate cortex damage in monkeys and humans there can be residual function mediated by parallel visual pathways. In humans this can sometimes be associated with a “feeling” that something has happened, especially with rapid movement or abrupt onset. For less transient events, discriminative performance may still be well above chance even when the subject reports no conscious awareness of the stimulus. In a previous study we examined parameters that yield good residual visual performance in the “blind” hemifield of a subject with unilateral damage to the primary visual cortex. With appropriate parameters we demonstrated good discriminative performance, both with and without conscious awareness of a visual event. These observations raise the possibility of imaging the brain activity generated in the “aware” and the “unaware” modes, with matched levels of discrimination performance, and hence of revealing patterns of brain activation associated with visual awareness. The intact hemifield also allows a comparison with normal vision. Here we report the results of a functional magnetic resonance imaging study on the same subject carried out under aware and unaware stimulus conditions. The results point to a shift in the pattern of activity from neocortex in the aware mode, to subcortical structures in the unaware mode. In the aware mode prestriate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (area 46) are active. In the unaware mode the superior colliculus is active, together with medial and orbital prefrontal cortical sites.

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When the visual (striate) cortex (V1) is damaged in human subjects, cortical blindness results in the contralateral visual half field. Nevertheless, under some experimental conditions, subjects demonstrate a capacity to make visual discriminations in the blind hemifield (blindsight), even though they have no phenomenal experience of seeing. This capacity must, therefore, be mediated by parallel projections to other brain areas. It is also the case that some subjects have conscious residual vision in response to fast moving stimuli or sudden changes in light flux level presented to the blind hemifield, characterized by a contentless kind of awareness, a feeling of something happening, albeit not normal seeing. The relationship between these two modes of discrimination has never been studied systematically. We examine, in the same experiment, both the unconscious discrimination and the conscious visual awareness of moving stimuli in a subject with unilateral damage to V1. The results demonstrate an excellent capacity to discriminate motion direction and orientation in the absence of acknowledged perceptual awareness. Discrimination of the stimulus parameters for acknowledged awareness apparently follows a different functional relationship with respect to stimulus speed, displacement, and stimulus contrast. As performance in the two modes can be quantitatively matched, the findings suggest that it should be possible to image brain activity and to identify the active areas involved in the same subject performing the same discrimination task, both with and without conscious awareness, and hence to determine whether any structures contribute uniquely to conscious perception.