Are the returns to technological change in health care declining?

Whether the U.S. health care system supports too much technological change—so that new technologies of low value are adopted, or worthwhile technologies become overused—is a controversial question. This paper analyzes the marginal value of technological change for elderly heart attack patients in 1984–1990. It estimates the additional benefits and costs of treatment by hospitals that are likely to adopt new technologies first or use them most intensively. If the overall value of the additional treatments is declining, then the benefits of treatment by such intensive hospitals relative to other hospitals should decline, and the additional costs of treatment by such hospitals should rise. To account for unmeasured changes in patient mix across hospitals that might bias the results, instrumental–variables methods are used to estimate the incremental mortality benefits and costs. The results do not support the view that the returns to technological change are declining. However, the incremental value of treatment by intensive hospitals is low throughout the study period, supporting the view that new technologies are overused.

The challenge of contracting for technological information

Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to “give away the secret.” This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw information. (iv) Sellers’ superior knowledge about TI’s value make buyers wary of overpaying. (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more than marginal cost. These contracting difficulties affect the way TI is produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to large firms. However, small research and development firms spend more per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major producers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly between universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI. Implicit barter—money for guidance—is common. Property rights for TI are hard to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inadequate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented, and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations. New organizational forms are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up firms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in facilitating the production and spread of TI.

Fixing human factor IX (fIX): correction of a cryptic RNA splice enables the production of biologically active fIX in the mammary gland of transgenic mice.

Transgenic mice and sheep secrete only low levels of human factor IX in their milk because of an aberrant splicing of the transgene RNA in the mammary gland. Removal of the cryptic 3' splice site prevents this splicing and leads to the production of relatively high levels of factor IX. The purified protein is fully active showing that the mammary gland is capable of the efficient post-translational modification of this protein and that transgenic animals are a suitable means of its production.