Mutational analysis of NM23-H2/NDP kinase identifies the structural domains critical to recognition of a c-myc regulatory element.

NM23-H2, a presumed regulator of tumor metastasis in humans, is a hexameric protein with both enzymatic (NDP kinase) and regulatory (transcriptional activation) activity. While the structure and catalytic mechanisms have been well characterized, the mode of DNA binding is not known. We examined this latter function in a site-directed mutational study and identified residues and domains essential for the recognition of a c-myc regulatory sequence. Three amino acids, Arg-34, Asn-69, and Lys-135, were found among 30 possibilities to be critical for DNA binding. Two of these, Asn-69 and Lys-135, are not conserved between NM23 variants differing in DNA-binding potential, suggesting that DNA recognition resides partly in nonconserved amino acids. All three DNA-binding defective mutant proteins are active enzymatically and appear to be stable hexamers, suggesting that they perform at the level of DNA recognition and that separate functional domains exist for enzyme catalysis and DNA binding. In the context of the known crystal structure of NM23-H2, the DNA-binding residues are located within distinct structural motifs in the monomer, which are exposed to the surface near the 2-fold axis of adjacent subunits in the hexamer. These findings are explained by a model in which NM23-H2 binds DNA with a combinatorial surface consisting of the "outer" face of the dimer. Chemical crosslinking data support a dimeric DNA-binding mode by NM23-H2.

Molecular basis for the recognition of two structurally different major histocompatibility complex/peptide complexes by a single T-cell���receptor

2C is a typical alloreactive cytotoxic T lymphocyte clone that recognizes two different ligands. These ligands are adducts of the allo-major histocompatibility complex (MHC) molecule H-2Ld and an endogenous octapeptide, and of the self-MHC molecule H-2Kb and another peptide. MHC-binding and T-cell assays with synthetic peptides in combination with molecular modeling studies were employed to analyze the structural basis for this crossreactivity. The molecular surfaces of the two complexes differ greatly in densities and distributions of positive and negative charges. However, modifications of the peptides that increase similarity decrease the capacities of the resulting MHC peptide complexes to induce T-cell responses. Moreover, the roles of the peptides in ligand recognition are different for self- and allo-MHC-restricted T-cell responses. The self-MHC-restricted T-cell responses were finely tuned to recognition of the peptide. The allo-MHC-restricted responses, on the other hand, largely ignore modifications of the peptide. The results strongly suggest that adaptation of the T-cell receptor to the different ligand structures, rather than molecular mimicry by the ligands, is the basis for the crossreactivity of 2C. This conclusion has important implications for T-cell immunology and for the understanding of immunological disorders.

An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual��� property

The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called ���essential facilities doctrine,��� which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an ���essential facility��� to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.