Nas–Walras equilibria of a large economy

Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash–Walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not quasi-concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.

Roles of a Fimbrin and an α-Actinin-like Protein in Fission Yeast Cell Polarization and Cytokinesis

Eukaryotic cells contain many actin-interacting proteins, including the α-actinins and the fimbrins, both of which have actin cross-linking activity in vitro. We report here the identification and characterization of both an α-actinin-like protein (Ain1p) and a fimbrin (Fim1p) in the fission yeast Schizosaccharomyces pombe. Ain1p localizes to the actomyosin-containing medial ring in an F-actin–dependent manner, and the Ain1p ring contracts during cytokinesis. ain1 deletion cells have no obvious defects under normal growth conditions but display severe cytokinesis defects, associated with defects in medial-ring and septum formation, under certain stress conditions. Overexpression of Ain1p also causes cytokinesis defects, and the ain1 deletion shows synthetic effects with other mutations known to affect medial-ring positioning and/or organization. Fim1p localizes both to the cortical actin patches and to the medial ring in an F-actin–dependent manner, and several lines of evidence suggest that Fim1p is involved in polarization of the actin cytoskeleton. Although a fim1 deletion strain has no detectable defect in cytokinesis, overexpression of Fim1p causes a lethal cytokinesis defect associated with a failure to form the medial ring and concentrate actin patches at the cell middle. Moreover, an ain1 fim1 double mutant has a synthetical-lethal defect in medial-ring assembly and cell division. Thus, Ain1p and Fim1p appear to have an overlapping and essential function in fission yeast cytokinesis. In addition, protein-localization and mutant-phenotype data suggest that Fim1p, but not Ain1p, plays important roles in mating and in spore formation.

The challenge of contracting for technological information

Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to “give away the secret.” This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw information. (iv) Sellers’ superior knowledge about TI’s value make buyers wary of overpaying. (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more than marginal cost. These contracting difficulties affect the way TI is produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to large firms. However, small research and development firms spend more per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major producers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly between universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI. Implicit barter—money for guidance—is common. Property rights for TI are hard to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inadequate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented, and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations. New organizational forms are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up firms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in facilitating the production and spread of TI.

Gardenification of tropical conserved wildlands: Multitasking, multicropping, and multiusers

Tropical wildlands and their biodiversity will survive in perpetuity only through their integration into human society. One protocol for integration is to explicitly recognize conserved tropical wildlands as wildland gardens. A major way to facilitate the generation of goods and services by a wildland garden is to generate a public-domain Yellow Pages for its organisms. Such a Yellow Pages is part and parcel of high-quality search-and-delivery from wildland gardens. And, as they and their organisms become better understood, they become higher quality biodiversity storage devices than are large freezers. One obstacle to wildland garden survival is that specific goods and services, such as biodiversity prospecting, lack development protocols that automatically shunt the profits back to the source. Other obstacles are that environmental services contracts have the unappealing trait of asking for the payment of environmental credit card bills and implying delegation of centralized governmental authority to decentralized social structures. Many of the potential conflicts associated with wildland gardens may be reduced by recognizing two sets of social rules for perpetuating biodiversity and ecosystems, one set for the wildland garden and one set for the agroscape. In the former, maintaining wildland biodiversity and ecosystem survival in perpetuity through minimally damaging use is paramount, while in the agroscape, wild biodiversity and ecosystems are tools for a healthy and productive agroecosystem, and the loss of much of the original is acceptable.