The Expression of Light-Regulated Genes in the High-Pigment-1 Mutant of Tomato1

Three light-regulated genes, chlorophyll a/b-binding protein (CAB), ribulose-1,5-bisphosphate carboxylase/oxygenase small subunit, and chalcone synthase (CHS), are demonstrated to be up-regulated in the high-pigment-1 (hp-1) mutant of tomato (Lycopersicon esculentum Mill.) compared with wild type (WT). However, the pattern of up-regulation of the three genes depends on the light conditions, stage of development, and tissue studied. Compared with WT, the hp-1 mutant showed higher CAB gene expression in the dark after a single red-light pulse and in the pericarp of immature fruits. However, in vegetative tissues of light-grown seedlings and adult plants, CAB mRNA accumulation did not differ between WT and the hp-1 mutant. The ribulose-1,5-bisphosphate carboxylase/oxygenase small subunit mRNA accumulated to a higher level in the hp-1 mutant than WT under all light conditions and tissues studied, whereas CHS gene expression was up-regulated in de-etiolated vegetative hp-1-mutant tissues only. The CAB and CHS genes were shown to be phytochrome regulated and both phytochrome A and B1 play a role in CAB gene expression. These observations support the hypothesis that the HP-1 protein plays a general repressive role in phytochrome signal transduction.

Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat.

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. Since Axelrod's classic computer tournaments and Nowak and Sigmund's extensive simulations of evolution, we know that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. According to recent developments of theory the last champion strategy of "win--stay, lose--shift" ("Pavlov") is the winner only if the players act simultaneously. In the more natural situation of players alternating the roles of donor and recipient a strategy of "Generous Tit-for-Tat" wins computer simulations of short-term memory strategies. We show here by experiments with humans that cooperation dominated in both the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. Subjects were consistent in their strategies: 30% adopted a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy, whereas 70% used a Pavlovian strategy in both the alternating and the simultaneous game. As predicted for unconditional strategies, Pavlovian players appeared to be more successful in the simultaneous game whereas Generous Tit-for-Tat-like players achieved higher payoffs in the alternating game. However, the Pavlovian players were smarter than predicted: they suffered less from defectors and exploited cooperators more readily. Humans appear to cooperate either with a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy or with a strategy that appreciates Pavlov's advantages but minimizes its handicaps.