Working memory constrains human cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Many problems in human society reflect the inability of selfish parties to cooperate. The “Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma” has been used widely as a model for the evolution of cooperation in societies. Axelrod’s computer tournaments and the extensive simulations of evolution by Nowak and Sigmund and others have shown that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Rigorous empirical tests, however, lag behind the progress made by theorists. Clear predictions differ depending on the players’ capacity to remember previous rounds of the game. To test whether humans use the kind of cooperative strategies predicted, we asked students to play the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game either continuously or interrupted after each round by a secondary memory task (i.e., playing the game “Memory”) that constrained the students’ working-memory capacity. When playing without interruption, most students used “Pavlovian” strategies, as predicted, for greater memory capacity, and the rest used “generous tit-for-tat” strategies. The proportion of generous tit-for-tat strategies increased when games of Memory interfered with the subjects’ working memory, as predicted. Students who continued to use complex Pavlovian strategies were less successful in the Memory game, but more successful in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which indicates a trade-off in memory capacity for the two tasks. Our results suggest that the set of strategies predicted by game theorists approximates human reality.

A Cell Signal Pathway Involving Laminin-5, α3β1 Integrin, and Mitogen-activated Protein Kinase Can Regulate Epithelial Cell Proliferation

Laminin-5 (LN5) is a matrix component of epithelial tissue basement membranes and plays an important role in the initiation and maintenance of epithelial cell anchorage to the underlying connective tissue. Here we show that two distinct LN5 function-inhibitory antibodies, both of which bind the globular domain of the α3 subunit, inhibit proliferation of epithelial cells. These same antibodies also induce a decrease in mitogen-activated protein kinase activity. Inhibition of proliferation by the function-perturbing LN5 antibodies is reversed upon removal of the antibodies and can be overcome by providing the antibody-treated cells with exogenous LN5 and rat tail collagen. Because epithelial cells use the integrin receptor α3β1 to interact with both LN5 and rat tail collagen, we next investigated the possibility that integrin α3β1 is involved in mediating the proliferative impact of LN5. Proliferation of human epithelial cells is significantly inhibited by a function-perturbing α3 integrin antibody. In addition, antibody activation of β1 integrin restores the proliferation of epithelial cells treated with LN5 function-perturbing antibodies. These data indicate that a complex comprising LN5 and α3β1 integrin is multifunctional and contributes not only to epithelial cell adhesion but also to the regulation of cell growth via a signaling pathway involving mitogen-activated protein kinase. We discuss our study in light of recent evidence that LN5 expression is up-regulated at the leading tips of tumors, where it may play a role in tumor cell proliferation.

Antisense-mediated depletion of p300 in human cells leads to premature G1 exit and up-regulation of c-MYC

The cAMP-response element-binding protein (CREB)-binding protein and p300 are two highly conserved transcriptional coactivators and histone acetyltransferases that integrate signals from diverse signal transduction pathways in the nucleus and also link chromatin remodeling with transcription. In this report, we have examined the role of p300 in the control of the G1 phase of the cell cycle in nontransformed immortalized human breast epithelial cells (MCF10A) and fibroblasts (MSU) by using adenovirus vectors expressing p300-specific antisense sequences. Quiescent MCF10A and MSU cells expressing p300-specific antisense sequences synthesized p300 at much reduced levels and exited G1 phase without serum stimulation. These cells also showed an increase in cyclin A and cyclin A- and E-associated kinase activities characteristic of S phase induction. Further analysis of the p300-depleted quiescent MCF10A cells revealed a 5-fold induction of c-MYC and a 2-fold induction of c-JUN. A direct target of c-MYC, CAD, which is required for DNA synthesis, was also found to be up-regulated, indicating that up-regulation of c-MYC functionally contributed to DNA synthesis. Furthermore, S phase induction in p300-depleted cells was reversed when antisense c-MYC was expressed in these cells, indicating that up-regulation of c-MYC may directly contribute to S phase induction. Adenovirus E1A also induced DNA synthesis and increased the levels of c-MYC and c-JUN in serum-starved MCF10A cells in a p300-dependent manner. Our results suggest an important role of p300 in cell cycle regulation at G1 and raise the possibility that p300 may negatively regulate early response genes, including c-MYC and c-JUN, thereby preventing DNA synthesis in quiescent cells.

Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat.

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. Since Axelrod's classic computer tournaments and Nowak and Sigmund's extensive simulations of evolution, we know that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. According to recent developments of theory the last champion strategy of "win--stay, lose--shift" ("Pavlov") is the winner only if the players act simultaneously. In the more natural situation of players alternating the roles of donor and recipient a strategy of "Generous Tit-for-Tat" wins computer simulations of short-term memory strategies. We show here by experiments with humans that cooperation dominated in both the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. Subjects were consistent in their strategies: 30% adopted a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy, whereas 70% used a Pavlovian strategy in both the alternating and the simultaneous game. As predicted for unconditional strategies, Pavlovian players appeared to be more successful in the simultaneous game whereas Generous Tit-for-Tat-like players achieved higher payoffs in the alternating game. However, the Pavlovian players were smarter than predicted: they suffered less from defectors and exploited cooperators more readily. Humans appear to cooperate either with a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy or with a strategy that appreciates Pavlov's advantages but minimizes its handicaps.