The evolution of begging: Signaling and sibling competition

In many species, young solicit food from their parents, which respond by feeding them. Because of the difference in genetic make-up between parents and their offspring and the consequent conflict, this interaction is often studied as a paradigm for the evolution of communication. Existent theoretical models demonstrate that chick signaling and parent responding can be stable if solicitation is a costly signal. The marginal cost of producing stronger signals allows the system to converge to an equilibrium: young beg with intensity that reflects their need, and parents use this information to maximize their own inclusive fitness. However, we show that there is another equilibrium where chicks do not beg and parents’ provisioning effort is optimal with respect to the statistically probable distribution of chicks’ states. Expected fitness for parents and offspring at the nonsignaling equilibrium is higher than at the signaling equilibrium. Because nonsignaling is stable and it is likely to be the ancestral condition, we would like to know how natural systems evolved from nonsignaling to signaling. We suggest that begging may have evolved through direct sibling fighting before the establishment of a parental response, that is, that nonsignaling squabbling leads to signaling. In multiple-offspring broods, young following a condition-dependent strategy in the contest for resources provide information about their condition. Parents can use this information even though it is not an adaptation for communication, and evolution will lead the system to the signaling equilibrium. This interpretation implies that signaling evolved in multiple-offspring broods, but given that signaling is evolutionarily stable, it would also be favored in species which secondarily evolved single-chick broods.

The challenge of contracting for technological information

Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to “give away the secret.” This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw information. (iv) Sellers’ superior knowledge about TI’s value make buyers wary of overpaying. (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more than marginal cost. These contracting difficulties affect the way TI is produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to large firms. However, small research and development firms spend more per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major producers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly between universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI. Implicit barter—money for guidance—is common. Property rights for TI are hard to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inadequate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented, and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations. New organizational forms are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up firms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in facilitating the production and spread of TI.

An endogenous rate of time preference, the Penrose effect, and dynamic optimality of environmental quality.

In the present paper, the endogenous theory of time preference is extended to analyze those processes of capital accumulation and changes in environmental quality that are dynamically optimum with respect to the intertemporal preference ordering of the representative individual of the society in question. The analysis is carried out within the conceptual framework of the dynamic analysis of environmental quality, as has been developed by a number of economists for specific cases of the fisheries and forestry commons. The duality principles on intertemporal preference ordering and capital accumulation are extended to the situation where processes of capital accumulation are subject to the Penrose effect, which exhibit the marginal decrease in the effect of investment in private and social overhead capital upon the rate at which capital is accumulated. The dynamically optimum time-path of economic activities is characterized by the proportionality of two systems of imputed, or efficient, prices, one associated with the given intertemporal ordering and another associated with processes of accumulation of private and social overhead capital. It is particularly shown that the dynamically optimality of the processes of capital accumulation involving both private and social overhead capital is characterized by the conditions that are identical with those involving private capital, with the role of social overhead capital only indirectly exhibited.