On the actions that one nerve cell can have on another: Distinguishing “drivers” from “modulators”

When one nerve cell acts on another, its postsynaptic effect can vary greatly. In sensory systems, inputs from “drivers” can be differentiated from those of “modulators.” The driver can be identified as the transmitter of receptive field properties; the modulator can be identified as altering the probability of certain aspects of that transmission. Where receptive fields are not available, the distinction is more difficult and currently is undefined. We use the visual pathways, particularly the thalamic geniculate relay for which much relevant evidence is available, to explore ways in which drivers can be distinguished from modulators. The extent to which the distinction may apply first to other parts of the thalamus and then, possibly, to other parts of the brain is considered. We suggest the following distinctions: Cross-correlograms from driver inputs have sharper peaks than those from modulators; there are likely to be few drivers but many modulators for any one cell; and drivers are likely to act only through ionotropic receptors having a fast postsynaptic effect whereas modulators also are likely to activate metabotropic receptors having a slow and prolonged postsynaptic effect.

An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property

The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called “essential facilities doctrine,” which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an “essential facility” to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.