Cooperation between the activin and Wnt pathways in the spatial control of organizer gene expression

The normal expression pattern of the Wnt responsive homeobox gene Siamois is restricted to the dorso-vegetal region of the Xenopus embryo. Because the Wnt signaling pathway (via β-catenin) is active on the entire dorsal side of the early embryo, we have asked why Siamois expression is not seen in the dorsal ectoderm. Only Wnt signaling, via activation of β-catenin, can induce directly Siamois, and signaling via the SMAD1 (BMP2/4) or SMAD2 (activin/Vg-1) pathways cannot. We now directly show that the SMAD2 pathway can cooperate with the Wnt pathway to induce expression of Siamois much more strongly than the Wnt pathway alone, in normal embryos. We demonstrate the significance of this cooperation in normal embryos by blocking the SMAD2 signaling pathway with a dominant negative activin receptor. The activin dominant negative receptor blocks this cooperative effect and reduces the expression of Siamois by threefold in early embryos. Furthermore, we find that this cooperative relationship between the SMAD2 and Wnt pathways is reciprocal. Thus, in normal embryos, the Wnt pathway can enhance induction, by the SMAD 2 pathway, of the organizer genes Gsc and Chd but not the pan-mesodermal marker genes Xbra and Eomes. We conclude that the Wnt and SMAD2 signaling pathways cooperate to induce the expression of Spemann-organizer specific genes and so help to localize their spatial expression.

Population dynamics, demographic stochasticity, and the evolution of cooperation

A basic evolutionary problem posed by the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is to understand when the paradigmatic cooperative strategy Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of pure defectors. Deterministically, this is impossible. We consider the role of demographic stochasticity by embedding the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma into a population dynamic framework. Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of defectors when their dynamics exhibit short episodes of high population densities with subsequent crashes and long low density periods with strong genetic drift. Such dynamics tend to have reddened power spectra and temporal distributions of population size that are asymmetric and skewed toward low densities. The results indicate that ecological dynamics are important for evolutionary shifts between adaptive peaks.

Working memory constrains human cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Many problems in human society reflect the inability of selfish parties to cooperate. The “Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma” has been used widely as a model for the evolution of cooperation in societies. Axelrod’s computer tournaments and the extensive simulations of evolution by Nowak and Sigmund and others have shown that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Rigorous empirical tests, however, lag behind the progress made by theorists. Clear predictions differ depending on the players’ capacity to remember previous rounds of the game. To test whether humans use the kind of cooperative strategies predicted, we asked students to play the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game either continuously or interrupted after each round by a secondary memory task (i.e., playing the game “Memory”) that constrained the students’ working-memory capacity. When playing without interruption, most students used “Pavlovian” strategies, as predicted, for greater memory capacity, and the rest used “generous tit-for-tat” strategies. The proportion of generous tit-for-tat strategies increased when games of Memory interfered with the subjects’ working memory, as predicted. Students who continued to use complex Pavlovian strategies were less successful in the Memory game, but more successful in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which indicates a trade-off in memory capacity for the two tasks. Our results suggest that the set of strategies predicted by game theorists approximates human reality.

Hypoxic Regulation of Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor mRNA Stability Requires the Cooperation of Multiple RNA Elements

Vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) is a key regulator of developmental, physiological, and tumor angiogenesis. Upregulation of VEGF expression by hypoxia appears to be a critical step in the neovascularization of solid cancers. The VEGF mRNA is intrinsically labile, but in response to hypoxia the mRNA is stabilized. We have systematically analyzed the regions in the VEGF mRNA that are responsible for its lability under normoxic conditions and for stabilization in response to hypoxia. We find that the VEGF mRNA not only contains destabilizing elements in its 3′ untranslated region (3′UTR), but also contains destabilizing elements in the 5′UTR and coding region. Each region can independently promote mRNA degradation, and together they act additively to effect rapid degradation under normoxic conditions. Stabilization of the mRNA in response to hypoxia is completely dependent on the cooperation of elements in each of the 5′UTR, coding region, and 3′UTR. Combinations of any of two of these three regions were completely ineffective in responding to hypoxia, whereas combining all three regions allowed recapitulation of the hypoxic stabilization seen with the endogenous VEGF mRNA. We conclude that multiple regions in the VEGF mRNA cooperate both to ensure the rapid degradation of the mRNA under normoxic conditions and to allow stabilization of the mRNA in response to hypoxia. Our findings highlight the complexity of VEGF gene expression and also reveal a mechanism of gene regulation that could become the target for strategies of therapeutic intervention.

Functional cooperation between T helper cell determinants

The immune response to T helper (Th) cell determinants of a variety of antigens is often poor and limits severely the potential efficacy of current therapeutic measures through vaccination. Here, we report that an immunologically silent tumor determinant can be rendered immunogenic if linked with a dominant determinant of a parasite antigen, suggesting the existence of functional Th–Th cooperation in vivo. This phenomenon could be mimicked in part by signaling either through CD40 to the antigen-presenting cells or through OX40 to the tumor-determinant reactive T cells, with maximal effects obtained by combined anti-CD40 and anti-OX40 treatment in vivo. The data suggest that CD4 T cells reactive with a dominant determinant provide help to other CD4 T cells through up-regulating the costimulatory ability of antigen-presenting cells, in much the same way as help for CD8 cells. CD4 help for CD4 T cells represents a new immunological principle and offers new practical solutions for vaccine therapy against cancer and other diseases in which antigenic help is limiting.

Role of the J-domain in the cooperation of Hsp40 with Hsp70

The Escherichia coli Hsp40 DnaJ and Hsp70 DnaK cooperate in the binding of proteins at intermediate stages of folding, assembly, and translocation across membranes. Binding of protein substrates to the DnaK C-terminal domain is controlled by ATP binding and hydrolysis in the N-terminal ATPase domain. The interaction of DnaJ with DnaK is mediated at least in part by the highly conserved N-terminal J-domain of DnaJ that includes residues 2–75. Heteronuclear NMR experiments with uniformly 15N-enriched DnaJ2–75 indicate that the chemical environment of residues located in helix II and the flanking loops is perturbed on interaction with DnaK or a truncated DnaK molecule, DnaK2–388. NMR signals corresponding to these residues broaden and exhibit changes in chemical shifts in the presence of DnaK(MgADP). Addition of MgATP largely reversed the broadening, indicating that NMR signals of DnaJ2–75 respond to ATP-dependent changes in DnaK. The J-domain interaction is localized to the ATPase domain of DnaK and is likely to be dominated by electrostatic interactions. The results suggest that the J-domain tethers DnaK to DnaJ-bound substrates, which DnaK then binds with its C-terminal peptide-binding domain.

Glucocorticoid and progestin receptors are differently involved in the cooperation with a structural element of the mouse mammary tumor virus promoter.

We have previously characterized a regulatory element located between -294 and -200 within the mouse mammary tumor virus (MMTV) long terminal repeat (LTR). This element termed AA element cooperates with the glucocorticoid response elements (GREs) for glucocorticoid activation. Here we show that in a MMTV LTR wild type context, the deletion of this element significantly reduces both glucocorticoid and progestin activation of the promoter. Deletion of the two most distal GREs forces the glucocorticoid receptor (GR) and the progestin receptor (PR) to bind the same response elements and results in a dramatic decrease in the inducibility of the MMTV promoter by the two hormones. The simultaneous deletion of the two distal GREs and of the AA element abolishes completely the glucocorticoid-induced activation of the promoter. In contrast it restores a significant level of progestin-induced activation. This different effect of the double deletion on glucocorticoid- and progestin-induced MMTV promoter activation is not cell specific because it is also observed, and is even stronger, when either GR or PR is expressed in the same cell line (NIH 3T3). This is the first description of a mutated MMTV promoter that, although retaining GREs, is activated by progestins and not by glucocorticoids. This suggests a different functional cooperation between protein(s) interacting with the AA element and GR or PR. Cotransfections with constructs containing wild-type or mutated MMTV LTR with either PR lacking its C-terminal domain or GR/PR chimeras in which the N-terminal domains have been exchanged demonstrate that the N-terminal domains of the receptors specify the different behavior of GR and PR regarding the AA element.

Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat.

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. Since Axelrod's classic computer tournaments and Nowak and Sigmund's extensive simulations of evolution, we know that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. According to recent developments of theory the last champion strategy of "win--stay, lose--shift" ("Pavlov") is the winner only if the players act simultaneously. In the more natural situation of players alternating the roles of donor and recipient a strategy of "Generous Tit-for-Tat" wins computer simulations of short-term memory strategies. We show here by experiments with humans that cooperation dominated in both the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. Subjects were consistent in their strategies: 30% adopted a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy, whereas 70% used a Pavlovian strategy in both the alternating and the simultaneous game. As predicted for unconditional strategies, Pavlovian players appeared to be more successful in the simultaneous game whereas Generous Tit-for-Tat-like players achieved higher payoffs in the alternating game. However, the Pavlovian players were smarter than predicted: they suffered less from defectors and exploited cooperators more readily. Humans appear to cooperate either with a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy or with a strategy that appreciates Pavlov's advantages but minimizes its handicaps.

Reproductive cooperation between queens and their mated workers: the complex life history of an ant with a valuable nest.

The life history of Harpegnathos saltator is exceptional among ants because both queens and workers reproduce sexually. Recently mated queens start new colonies alone, but later some of the offspring workers also become inseminated and take over the egg-laying role. This alternation seems associated with the existence of very complex underground nests, which are designed to survive floods. Longevity of ponerine queens is low (a consequence of limited caste dimorphism in this "primitive" subfamily), and upon the death of an H. saltator foundress, the nest represents a substantial investment. The queen's progeny should thus be strongly selected to retain the valuable nests. Unlike the flying queens, the workers copulate with males from their own colonies, and, thus, their offspring are expected to be highly related to the foundress. Colony fission appears not to occur because a daughter fragment would lack an adequate nest for protection. Thus, the annual production of queens in colonies with reproductive workers remains essential for the establishment of new colonies. This contrasts with various other ponerine species in which the queens no longer exist.

Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

The evolutionary stability of cooperation is a problem of fundamental importance for the biological and social sciences. Different claims have been made about this issue: whereas Axelrod and Hamilton's [Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981) Science 211, 1390-1398] widely recognized conclusion is that cooperative rules such as "tit for tat" are evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD), Boyd and Lorberbaum [Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59] have claimed that no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in this game. Here we explain why these claims are not contradictory by showing in what sense strategies in the IPD can and cannot be stable and by creating a conceptual framework that yields the type of evolutionary stability attainable in the IPD and in repeated games in general. Having established the relevant concept of stability, we report theorems on some basic properties of strategies that are stable in this sense. We first show that the IPD has "too many" such strategies, so that being stable does not discriminate among behavioral rules. Stable strategies differ, however, on a property that is crucial for their evolutionary survival--the size of the invasion they can resist. This property can be interpreted as a strategy's evolutionary robustness. Conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit for tat are the most robust. Cooperative behavior supported by these strategies is the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hardest to disrupt.