Social stress results in altered glucocorticoid regulation and shorter survival in simian acquired immune deficiency syndrome

From early in the AIDS epidemic, psychosocial stressors have been proposed as contributors to the variation in disease course. To test this hypothesis, rhesus macaques were assigned to stable or unstable social conditions and were inoculated with the simian immunodeficiency virus. Animals in the unstable condition displayed more agonism and less affiliation, shorter survival, and lower basal concentrations of plasma cortisol compared with stable animals. Early after inoculation, but before the emergence of group differences in cortisol levels, animals receiving social threats had higher concentrations of simian immunodeficiency virus RNA in plasma, and those engaging in affiliation had lower concentrations. The results indicate that social factors can have a significant impact on the course of immunodeficiency disease. Socially induced changes in pituitary–adrenal hormones may be one mechanism mediating this relationship.

Instability of signaling resolution models of parent–offspring conflict

Recent signaling resolution models of parent–offspring conflict have provided an important framework for theoretical and empirical studies of communication and parental care. According to these models, signaling of need is stabilized by its cost. However, our computer simulations of the evolutionary dynamics of chick begging and parental investment show that in Godfray’s model the signaling equilibrium is evolutionarily unstable: populations that start at the signaling equilibrium quickly depart from it. Furthermore, the signaling and nonsignaling equilibria are linked by a continuum of equilibria where chicks above a certain condition do not signal and we show that, contrary to intuition, fitness increases monotonically as the proportion of young that signal decreases. This result forces us to reconsider much of the current literature on signaling of need and highlights the need to investigate the evolutionary stability of signaling equilibria based on the handicap principle.