Numbers and Organization of RNA Polymerases, Nascent Transcripts, and Transcription Units in HeLa Nuclei

Using HeLa cells, we have developed methods to determine 1) the number of RNA polymerases that are active at any moment, 2) the number of transcription sites, and 3) the number of polymerases associated with one transcription unit. To count engaged polymerases, cells were encapsulated in agarose, permeabilized, treated with ribonuclease, and the now-truncated transcripts extended in [32P]uridine triphosphate; then, the number of growing transcripts was calculated from the total number of nucleotides incorporated and the average increment in length of the transcripts. Approximately 15,000 transcripts were elongated by polymerase I, and ∼75,000 were elongated by polymerases II and III. Transcription sites were detected after the cells were grown in bromouridine for <2.5 min, after which the resulting bromo-RNA was labeled with gold particles; electron microscopy showed that most extranucleolar transcripts were concentrated in ∼2400 sites with diameters of ∼80 nm. The number of polymerases associated with a transcription unit was counted after templates were spread over a large area; most extranucleolar units were associated with one elongating complex. These results suggest that many templates are attached in a “cloud” of loops around a site; each site, or transcription “factory,” would contain ∼30 active polymerases and associated transcripts.

Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat.

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. Since Axelrod's classic computer tournaments and Nowak and Sigmund's extensive simulations of evolution, we know that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. According to recent developments of theory the last champion strategy of "win--stay, lose--shift" ("Pavlov") is the winner only if the players act simultaneously. In the more natural situation of players alternating the roles of donor and recipient a strategy of "Generous Tit-for-Tat" wins computer simulations of short-term memory strategies. We show here by experiments with humans that cooperation dominated in both the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. Subjects were consistent in their strategies: 30% adopted a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy, whereas 70% used a Pavlovian strategy in both the alternating and the simultaneous game. As predicted for unconditional strategies, Pavlovian players appeared to be more successful in the simultaneous game whereas Generous Tit-for-Tat-like players achieved higher payoffs in the alternating game. However, the Pavlovian players were smarter than predicted: they suffered less from defectors and exploited cooperators more readily. Humans appear to cooperate either with a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy or with a strategy that appreciates Pavlov's advantages but minimizes its handicaps.