Quantitative insight into proliferation and differentiation of oligodendrocyte type 2 astrocyte progenitor cells in vitro

As part of our attempts at understanding fundamental principles that underlie the generation of nondividing terminally differentiated progeny from dividing precursor cells, we have developed approaches to a quantitative analysis of proliferation and differentiation of oligodendrocyte type 2 astrocyte (O-2A) progenitor cells at the clonal level. Owing to extensive previous studies of clonal differentiation in this lineage, O-2A progenitor cells represent an excellent system for such an analysis. Previous studies have resulted in two competing hypotheses; one of them suggests that progenitor cell differentiation is symmetric, the other hypothesis introduces an asymmetric process of differentiation. We propose a general model that incorporates both such extreme hypotheses as special cases. Our analysis of experimental data has shown, however, that neither of these extreme cases completely explains the observed kinetics of O-2A progenitor cell proliferation and oligodendrocyte generation in vitro. Instead, our results indicate that O-2A progenitor cells become competent for differentiation after they complete a certain number of critical mitotic cycles that represent a period of symmetric development. This number varies from clone to clone and may be thought of as a random variable; its probability distribution was estimated from experimental data. Those O-2A cells that have undergone the critical divisions then may differentiate into an oligodendrocyte in each of the subsequent mitotic cycles with a certain probability, thereby exhibiting the asymmetric type of differentiation.

Complete Cytolysis and Neonatal Lethality in Keratin 5 Knockout Mice Reveal Its Fundamental Role in Skin Integrity and in Epidermolysis Bullosa Simplex

In human patients, a wide range of mutations in keratin (K) 5 or K14 lead to the blistering skin disorder epidermolysis bullosa simplex. Given that K14 deficiency does not lead to the ablation of a basal cell cytoskeleton because of a compensatory role of K15, we have investigated the requirement for the keratin cytoskeleton in basal cells by inactivating the K5 gene in mice. We report that the K5−/− mice die shortly after birth, lack keratin filaments in the basal epidermis, and are more severely affected than K14−/− mice. In contrast to the K14−/− mice, we detected a strong induction of the wound-healing keratin K6 in the suprabasal epidermis of cytolyzed areas of postnatal K5−/− mice. In addition, K5 and K14 mice differed with respect to tongue lesions. Moreover, we show that in the absence of K5 and other type II keratins, residual K14 and K15 aggregated along hemidesmosomes, demonstrating that individual keratins without a partner are stable in vivo. Our data indicate that K5 may be the natural partner of K15 and K17. We suggest that K5 null mutations may be lethal in human epidermolysis bullosa simplex patients.

Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

The evolutionary stability of cooperation is a problem of fundamental importance for the biological and social sciences. Different claims have been made about this issue: whereas Axelrod and Hamilton's [Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981) Science 211, 1390-1398] widely recognized conclusion is that cooperative rules such as "tit for tat" are evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD), Boyd and Lorberbaum [Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59] have claimed that no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in this game. Here we explain why these claims are not contradictory by showing in what sense strategies in the IPD can and cannot be stable and by creating a conceptual framework that yields the type of evolutionary stability attainable in the IPD and in repeated games in general. Having established the relevant concept of stability, we report theorems on some basic properties of strategies that are stable in this sense. We first show that the IPD has "too many" such strategies, so that being stable does not discriminate among behavioral rules. Stable strategies differ, however, on a property that is crucial for their evolutionary survival--the size of the invasion they can resist. This property can be interpreted as a strategy's evolutionary robustness. Conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit for tat are the most robust. Cooperative behavior supported by these strategies is the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hardest to disrupt.