A novel method for simultaneous high resolution identification of HLA-A, HLA-B, and HLA-Cw alleles.

We describe a novel high resolution DNA based typing approach for HLA class I alleles, which identifies the recombinational motifs present in exons 2 and 3 of the HLA class I genes. Unique identification patterns for 201 known HLA-A, HLA-B, and HLA-Cw alleles were generated by the use of only 40 probes, which were targeted at these common motifs. The unambiguous identification of the alleles was achieved by the development of a new and powerful allelic separation technique that allows isolation of single alleles after amplification. To validate the method, we have used locus-specific primers to amplify exons 2 and 3 of HLA-A, HLA-B, and HLA-Cw loci from 22 heterozygous and 41 homozygous cell lines. After amplification, the allelic fragments from each locus were separated, blotted, and hybridized with the 40 probes. In all cases, the allelic products could be separated and 81 different class I alleles, 33 HLA-A, 30 HLA-B, and 18 HLA-Cw, were identified according to the predicted probe hybridization patterns.

Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat.

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. Since Axelrod's classic computer tournaments and Nowak and Sigmund's extensive simulations of evolution, we know that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. According to recent developments of theory the last champion strategy of "win--stay, lose--shift" ("Pavlov") is the winner only if the players act simultaneously. In the more natural situation of players alternating the roles of donor and recipient a strategy of "Generous Tit-for-Tat" wins computer simulations of short-term memory strategies. We show here by experiments with humans that cooperation dominated in both the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. Subjects were consistent in their strategies: 30% adopted a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy, whereas 70% used a Pavlovian strategy in both the alternating and the simultaneous game. As predicted for unconditional strategies, Pavlovian players appeared to be more successful in the simultaneous game whereas Generous Tit-for-Tat-like players achieved higher payoffs in the alternating game. However, the Pavlovian players were smarter than predicted: they suffered less from defectors and exploited cooperators more readily. Humans appear to cooperate either with a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy or with a strategy that appreciates Pavlov's advantages but minimizes its handicaps.