5 resultados para untrusted
em Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
Resumo:
Current approaches to mobile code safety – inspired by the technique of Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [4] – associate safety information (in the form of a certificate) to programs. The certificate (or proof) is created by the code supplier at compile time, and packaged along with the untrusted code. The consumer who receives the code+certificate package can then run a checker which, by a straightforward inspection of the code and the certificate, is able to verify the validity of the certificate and thus compliance with the safety policy. The main practical difficulty of PCC techniques is in generating safety certificates which at the same time: i) allow expressing interesting safety properties, ii) can be generated automatically and, iii) are easy and efficient to check.
Resumo:
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) is a general approach to mobile code safety in which the code supplier augments the program with a certifícate (or proof). The intended benefit is that the program consumer can locally validate the certifícate w.r.t. the "untrusted" program by means of a certifícate checker—a process which should be much simpler, eíñcient, and automatic than generating the original proof. Abstraction Carrying Code (ACC) is an enabling technology for PCC in which an abstract model of the program plays the role of certifícate. The generation of the certifícate, Le., the abstraction, is automatically carried out by an abstract interpretation-based analysis engine, which is parametric w.r.t. different abstract domains. While the analyzer on the producer side typically has to compute a semantic fixpoint in a complex, iterative process, on the receiver it is only necessary to check that the certifícate is indeed a fixpoint of the abstract semantics equations representing the program. This is done in a single pass in a much more efficient process. ACC addresses the fundamental issues in PCC and opens the door to the applicability of the large body of frameworks and domains based on abstract interpretation as enabling technology for PCC. We present an overview of ACC and we describe in a tutorial fashion an application to the problem of resource-aware security in mobile code. Essentially the information computed by a cost analyzer is used to genérate cost certificates which attest a safe and efficient use of a mobile code. A receiving side can then reject code which brings cost certificates (which it cannot validate or) which have too large cost requirements in terms of computing resources (in time and/or space) and accept mobile code which meets the established requirements.
Resumo:
Proof carrying code is a general methodology for certifying that the execution of an untrusted mobile code is safe, according to a predefined safety policy. The basic idea is that the code supplier attaches a certifícate (or proof) to the mobile code which, then, the consumer checks in order to ensure that the code is indeed safe. The potential benefit is that the consumer's task is reduced from the level of proving to the level of checking, a much simpler task. Recently, the abstract interpretation techniques developed in logic programming have been proposed as a basis for proof carrying code [1]. To this end, the certifícate is generated from an abstract interpretation-based proof of safety. Intuitively, the verification condition is extracted from a set of assertions guaranteeing safety and the answer table generated during the analysis. Given this information, it is relatively simple and fast to verify that the code does meet this proof and so its execution is safe. This extended abstract reports on experiments which illustrate several issues involved in abstract interpretation-based code certification. First, we describe the implementation of our system in the context of CiaoPP: the preprocessor of the Ciao multi-paradigm (constraint) logic programming system. Then, by means of some experiments, we show how code certification is aided in the implementation of the framework. Finally, we discuss the application of our method within the área of pervasive systems which may lack the necessary computing resources to verify safety on their own. We herein illustrate the relevance of the information inferred by existing cost analysis to control resource usage in this context. Moreover, since the (rather complex) analysis phase is replaced by a simpler, efficient checking process at the code consumer side, we believe that our abstract interpretation-based approach to proof-carrying code becomes practically applicable to this kind of systems.
Resumo:
Recent approaches to mobile code safety, like proof- arrying code, involve associating safety information to programs. The code supplier provides a program and also includes with it a certifícate (or proof) whose validity entails compliance with a predefined safety policy. The intended benefit is that the program consumer can locally validate the certifícate w.r.t. the "untrusted" program by means of a certifícate checker—a process which should be much simpler, eflicient, and automatic than generating the original proof. We herein introduce a novel approach to mobile code safety which follows a similar scheme, but which is based throughout on the use of abstract interpretation techniques. In our framework the safety policy is specified by using an expressive assertion language defined over abstract domains. We identify a particular slice of the abstract interpretation-based static analysis results which is especially useful as a certifícate. We propose an algorithm for checking the validity of the certifícate on the consumer side which is itself in fact a very simplified and eflicient specialized abstract-interpreter. Our ideas are illustrated through an example implemented in the CiaoPP system. Though further experimentation is still required, we believe the proposed approach is of interest for bringing the automation and expressiveness which is inherent in the abstract interpretation techniques to the área of mobile code safety.
Resumo:
The security of a passive plug-and-play QKD arrangement in the case of finite (resources) key lengths is analysed. It is assumed that the eavesdropper has full access to the channel so an unknown and untrusted source is assumed. To take into account the security of the BB84 protocol under collective attacks within the framework of quantum adversaries, a full treatment provides the well-known equations for the secure key rate. A numerical simulation keeping a minimum number of initial parameters constant as the total error sought and the number of pulses is carried out. The remaining parameters are optimized to produce the maximum secure key rate. Two main strategies are addressed: with and without two-decoy-states including the optimization of signal to decoy relationship.