Abstract interpretation with specialized definitions

The relationship between abstract interpretation and partial evaluation has received considerable attention and (partial) integrations have been proposed starting from both the partial evaluation and abstract interpretation perspectives. In this work we present what we argüe is the first generic algorithm for efñcient and precise integration of abstract interpretation and partial evaluation from an abstract interpretation perspective. Taking as starting point state-of-the-art algorithms for context-sensitive, polyvariant abstract interpretation and (abstract) partial evaluation of logic programs, we present an algorithm which combines the best of both worlds. Key ingredients include the accurate success propagation inherent to abstract interpretation and the powerful program transformations achievable by partial deduction. In our algorithm, the calis which appear in the analysis graph are not analyzed w.r.t. the original definition of the procedure but w.r.t. specialized definitions of these procedures. Such specialized definitions are obtained by applying both unfolding and abstract executability. Also, our framework is parametric w.r.t. different control strategies and abstract domains. Different combinations of these parameters correspond to existing algorithms for program analysis and specialization. Our approach efficiently computes strictly more precise results than those achievable by each of the individual techniques. The algorithm is one of the key components of CiaoPP, the analysis and specialization system of the Ciao compiler.

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used