Governance Structure Choices in Supply Chain Management Evidence from Spanish and Chinese Pork Chain Cases

The author participated in the 6 th EU Framework Project ―Q-pork Chains (FP6-036245-2)‖ from 2007 to 2009. With understanding of work reports from China and other countries, it is found that compared with other countries, China has great problems in pork quality and safety. By comparing the pork chain management between China and Spain, It is found that the difference in governance structure is one of the main differences in pork chain management between Spain and China. In China, spot-market relationship still dominates governance structure of pork chain, especially between the numerous house-hold pig holders and the great number of small slaughters. While in Spain, chain agents commonly apply cooperatives or integrations to cooperate. It also has been proven by recent studies, that in quality management at the chain level that supply chain integration has a direct effect on quality management practices (Han, 2010). Therefore, the author started to investigate the governance structure choices in supply chain management. And it has been set as the first research objective, which is to explain the governance structure choices process and the influencing factors in supply chain management, analyzing the pork chains cases in Spain and in China. During the further investigation, the author noticed the international trade of pork between Spain and China is not smooth since the signature of bi-lateral agreement on pork trade in 2007. Thus, another objective of the research is to find and solve the problems exist in the international pork chain between Spain and China. For the first objective, to explain the governance structure choices in supply chain management, the thesis conducts research in three main sections. 10 First of all, the thesis gives a literature overview in chapter two on Supply Chain Management (SCM), agri-food chain management and pork chain management. It concludes that SCM is a systems approach to view the supply chains as a whole, and to manage the total flow of goods inventory from the supplier to the ultimate customer. It includes the bi-directional flow of products (materials and services) and information, and the associated managerial and operational activities. And it also is a customer focus to create unique and individual source of customer value with an appropriate use of resources, leading to customer satisfaction and building competitive chain advantages. Agri-food chain management and pork chain management are applications of SCM in agri-food sector and pork sector respectively. Then, the research gives a comparative study in chapter three in the pork chain and pork chain management between Spain and China. Many differences are found, while the main difference is governance structure in pork chain management. Furthermore, the author gives an empirical study on governance structure choice in chapter five. It is concluded that governance structure of supply chain consists of a collection of rules/institutions/constraints structuring the transactions between the various stakeholders. Based on the overview on literatures closely related with governance structure, such as transaction cost economics, transaction value analysis and resource-based view theories, seven hypotheses are proposed, which are: Hypothesis 1: Transaction cost has positive relationship with governance structure choice Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty has positive relationship with transaction cost; higher uncertainty exerts high transaction cost Hypothesis 3: The relationship between asset specificity and transaction cost is positive Hypothesis 4: Collaboration advantages and governance structure choice have positive relationship11 Hypothesis 5: Willingness to collaborate has positive relationship with collaboration advantages Hypothesis 6: Capability to collaborate has positive relationship with collaboration advantages Hypothesis 7: Uncertainty has negative effect on collaboration advantages It is noted that as transaction cost value is negative, the transaction cost mentioned in the hypotheses is its absolute value. To test the seven hypotheses, Structural Equation Model (SEM) is applied and data collected from 350 pork slaughtering and processing companies in Jiangsu, Shandong and Henan Provinces in China is used. Based on the empirical SEM model and its results, the seven hypotheses are proved. The author generates several conclusions accordingly. It is found that the governance structure choice of the chain not only depends on transaction cost, it also depends on collaboration advantages. Exchange partners establish more stable and more intense relationship to reduce transaction cost and to maximize collaboration advantages. ―Collaboration advantages‖ in this thesis is defined as the joint value achieved through transaction (mutual activities) of agents in supply chains. This value forms as improvements, mainly in mutual logistics systems, cash response, information exchange, technological improvements and innovative improvements and quality management improvements, etc. Governance structure choice is jointly decided by transaction cost and collaboration advantages. Chain agents take different governance structures to coordinate in order to decrease their transaction cost and to increase their collaboration advantages. In China´s pork chain case, spot market relationship dominates the governance structure among the numerous backyard pig farmer and small family slaughterhouse 12 as they are connected by acquaintance relationship and the transaction cost in turn is low. Their relationship is reliable as they know each other in the neighborhood; as a result, spot market relationship is suitable for their exchange. However, the transaction between large-scale slaughtering and processing industries and small-scale pig producers is becoming difficult. The information hold back behavior and hold-up behavior of small-scale pig producers increase transaction cost between them and large-scale slaughtering and processing industries. Thus, through the more intense and stable relationship between processing industries and pig producers, processing industries reduce the transaction cost and improve the collaboration advantages with their chain partners, in which quality and safety collaboration advantages be increased, meaning that processing industries are able to provide consumers products with better quality and higher safety. It is also drawn that transaction cost is influenced mainly by uncertainty and asset specificity, which is in line with new institutional economics theories developed by Williamson O. E. In China´s pork chain case, behavioral uncertainty is created by the hold-up behaviors of great numbers of small pig producers, while big slaughtering and processing industries having strong asset specificity. On the other hand, ―collaboration advantages‖ is influenced by chain agents´ willingness to collaborate and chain agents´ capabilities to cooperate. With the fast growth of big scale slaughtering and processing industries, they are more willing to know and make effort to cooperate with their chain members, and they are more capable to create joint value together with other chain agents. Therefore, they are now the main chain agents who drive more intense and stable governance structure in China‘s pork chain. For the other objective, to find and solve the problems in the international pork chain between Spain and China, the research gives an analysis in chapter four on the 13 international pork chain. This study gives explanations why the international trade of pork between Spain and China is not sufficient from the chain perspective. It is found that the first obstacle is the high quality and safety requirement set by Chinese government. It makes the Spanish companies difficult to get authorities to export. Other aspects, such as Spanish pork is not competitive in price compared with other countries such as Denmark, United States, Canada, etc., Chinese consumers do not have sufficient information on Spanish pork products, are also important reasons that Spain does not export great quantity of pork products to China. It is concluded that China´s government has too much concern on the quality and safety requirements to Spanish pork products, which makes trade difficult to complete. The two countries need to establish a more stable and intense trade relationship. They also should make the information exchange sufficient and efficient and try to break trade barriers. Spanish companies should consider proper price strategies to win the Chinese pork market

Gobernar la complejidad urbana desde la sostenibilidad. Evaluación del gobierno de la gestión visible utilizando indicadores de gobernanza (Venezuela)

Se evalúa con indicadores de gobernanza urbana la sostenibilidad de las formas de hacer ciudad hibrida compleja del gobierno de la gestión visible (GGV). Argumenta que el GGV hace ciudad para legitimarse por desempeño y fortalecer la gobernanza local, en un contexto de mutaciones múltiples y radicales que tienden a diluir y centralizar el poder local y fractalizar la ciudad, profundizando la segregación sociopolítica-territorial y la ingobernabilidad genética de la ciudad hibrida, poniendo en riesgo el Estado federal descentralizado, el derecho a la ciudad, al gobierno local y la gobernanza urbana y multinivel (hipótesis). La estrategia de evaluación de gobernanza innovadora (EEG+i) diseñada para evaluar la relación entre las formas de hacer ciudad hibrida (variables espaciales) y gobernanza (variable a-espacial) es transversal, multidimensional y se construye desde la complejidad, el análisis de escenarios, formulación de constructos, modelos e indicadores de gobernanza, entretejiendo tres campos de conocimiento, gobierno, ciudad y sostenibilidad, en cuatro fases. La Fase 1, contextualiza la gobernanza en la dramática del siglo XXI. La Fase 2, desarrolla la fundamentación teórico-práctica, nuevos conceptos y un abordaje analítico propio ‘genética territorial’, para analizar y comprehender la complejidad de la ciudad hibrida de países en desarrollo, tejiendo ontogenética territorial y el carácter autopoiético del gen informal. En la Fase 3, se caracterizan las formas de hacer ciudad desde la genética del territorio, se formulan modelos e indicadores de gobernanza con los que se evalúan, aplicando un delphi y cuestionarios, los genes tipológicos-formas de hacer ciudad y validan las conclusiones. En la Fase 4, se correlacionan los resultados de los instrumentos aplicados con la praxis urbana del GGV, durante cuatro periodos de gobierno (1996-2010). Concluyendo que, la estrategia de evaluación comprobó las hipótesis y demostró la correlación transversal y multinivel existente entre, las mutaciones en curso que contradicen el modelo de gobernanza constitucional, el paisaje de gobernanza latinoamericano y venezolano, la praxis de los regímenes híbridos ricos en recursos naturales, las perspectivas de desarrollo globales y se expresa sociopolíticamente en déficit de gobernanza, Estado de derecho y cohesión-capital social y, espaciolocalmente, en la ciudad hibrida dispersa y diluida (compleja) y en el gobierno del poder diluido centralizado. La confrontación de flujos de poder centrípetos y centrífugos en la ciudad profundiza la fragmentación socioespacial y política y el deterioro de la calidad de vida, incrementando las protestas ciudadanas e ingobernabilidad que obstaculiza la superación de la pobreza y gobernanza urbana y multinivel. La evaluación de la praxis urbana del GGV evidenció que la correlación entre gobernanza, la producción de genes formales y la ciudad por iniciativa privada tiende a ser positiva y entre gobernanza, genes y producción de ciudad informal negativa, por el carácter autopoiético-autogobernable del gen informal y de los nuevos gobiernos sublocales que dificulta gobernar en gobernanza. La praxis del GGV es contraria al modelo de gobernanza formulado y la disolución centralizada del gobierno local y de la ciudad hibrida-dispersa es socio-espacial y políticamente insostenible. Se proponen estrategias y tácticas de gobernanza multinivel para recuperar la cohesión social y de planificación de la gestión innovadora (EG [PG] +i) para orquestar, desde el Consejo Local de Gobernanza (CLG) y con la participación de los espacios y gobiernos sublocales, un proyecto de ciudad compartido y sostenible. ABSTRACT The sustainability of the forms of making the hybrid-complex city by the visible management government (VMG) is evaluated using urban governance indicators. Argues that the VMG builds city to legitimate itself by performance and to strengthen local governance in a context of multiple and radical mutations that tend to dilute and centralize local power and fractalize the city, deepening the socio-spatial and political segregation, the genetic ingovernability of the hybrid city and placing the decentralized federal State, the right to city, local government and urban governance at risk (hypothesis). The innovative governance evaluation strategy (GES+i) designed to assess the relationship between the forms of making the hybrid city (spatial variables) and governance (a-spatial variable) is transversal, multidimensional; is constructed from complexity, scenario analysis, the formulation of concepts, models and governance indicators, weaving three fields of knowledge, government, city and sustainability in four phases. Phase 1, contextualizes governance in the dramatic of the twenty-first century. Phase 2, develops the theoretical and practical foundations, new concepts and a proper analytical approach to comprehend the complexity of the hybrid city from developing countries, weaving territorial ontogenetic with the autopiethic character of the informal city gen. In Phase 3, the ways of making city are characterized from the genetics of territory; governance indicators and models are formulated to evaluate, using delphi and questionnaires, the ways of making city and validate the conclusions. In Phase 4, the results of the instruments applied are correlated with the urban praxis of the VMG during the four periods of government analyzed (1996-2010). Concluding that, the evaluation strategy proved the hypothesis and showed the transversal and multilevel correlation between, mutations that contradict the constitutional governance model, the governance landscape of Latinamerica and the country, the praxis of the hybrid regimes rich in natural resources, the perspectives of the glocal economy and expresses socio-politically the governance and rule of law and social capital-cohesion deficit and spatial-temporarily the hybrid disperse and diluted city (complex) and the diluted-centralized local government. The confrontation of flows of power centripetal and centrifugal in the city deepens the socio-spatial and political fragmentation and deterioration of the quality of life, increasing citizens' protests and ingovernability which hinders poverty eradication and, multilevel and urban governance. The evaluation of the VMG urban praxis showed the correlation between governance, the production of formal genes and city by private initiative tended to be positive and, between informal genes-city production and governance negative, due to its autopiethic-self governable character that hinders governance. The urban praxis of the VMG contradicts the formulated governance model and thecentralized dissolution of the local government and hybrid city are socio-spatial and politically unsustainable. Multiscale governance strategies are proposed to recreate social cohesion and a management planning innovative method (EG [PG] + i) to orchestrate, from the Local Governance Council (LGC) and with the participation of sublocal governments and spaces, a shared and sustainable city project.

Dynamics in the governance of collective irrigation systems: Evidence from field experiments in Nicaragua.

In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection when the purely individual perspective of existing revealed preference studies is relaxed. This is achieved in two treatments; first, we determine the information subjects receive about the demand revealed by other subjects in a similar decision making situation, second, collective action is implemented whereby all subjects are required to purchase the group?s median quantity at a given price. Participants in the experiment were offered the opportunity to contribute to climate protection by purchasing European Union Allowances. Allowances purchased were withdrawn from the European Emissions Trading Scheme. In our experiment, information about other subjects? behaviour has no treatment effect on the demand for climate protection. Under collective action however, the probability of purchasing allowances is higher compared to the reference treatment situation, an individual contribution mechanism. Furthermore, we observe a strong correlation between subjects? demand and their expectations about other participants? behaviour. When collective action is not available, subjects? e xpectations are consistent with free rider behaviour.