Formal Verification of Temporal Properties for Parametrized Concurrent Programs and Concurrent Data Structures

Los tipos de datos concurrentes son implementaciones concurrentes de las abstracciones de datos clásicas, con la diferencia de que han sido específicamente diseñados para aprovechar el gran paralelismo disponible en las modernas arquitecturas multiprocesador y multinúcleo. La correcta manipulación de los tipos de datos concurrentes resulta esencial para demostrar la completa corrección de los sistemas de software que los utilizan. Una de las mayores dificultades a la hora de diseñar y verificar tipos de datos concurrentes surge de la necesidad de tener que razonar acerca de un número arbitrario de procesos que invocan estos tipos de datos de manera concurrente. Esto requiere considerar sistemas parametrizados. En este trabajo estudiamos la verificación formal de propiedades temporales de sistemas concurrentes parametrizados, poniendo especial énfasis en programas que manipulan estructuras de datos concurrentes. La principal dificultad a la hora de razonar acerca de sistemas concurrentes parametrizados proviene de la interacción entre el gran nivel de concurrencia que éstos poseen y la necesidad de razonar al mismo tiempo acerca de la memoria dinámica. La verificación de sistemas parametrizados resulta en sí un problema desafiante debido a que requiere razonar acerca de estructuras de datos complejas que son accedidas y modificadas por un numero ilimitado de procesos que manipulan de manera simultánea el contenido de la memoria dinámica empleando métodos de sincronización poco estructurados. En este trabajo, presentamos un marco formal basado en métodos deductivos capaz de ocuparse de la verificación de propiedades de safety y liveness de sistemas concurrentes parametrizados que manejan estructuras de datos complejas. Nuestro marco formal incluye reglas de prueba y técnicas especialmente adaptadas para sistemas parametrizados, las cuales trabajan en colaboración con procedimientos de decisión especialmente diseñados para analizar complejas estructuras de datos concurrentes. Un aspecto novedoso de nuestro marco formal es que efectúa una clara diferenciación entre el análisis del flujo de control del programa y el análisis de los datos que se manejan. El flujo de control del programa se analiza utilizando reglas de prueba y técnicas de verificación deductivas especialmente diseñadas para lidiar con sistemas parametrizados. Comenzando a partir de un programa concurrente y la especificación de una propiedad temporal, nuestras técnicas deductivas son capaces de generar un conjunto finito de condiciones de verificación cuya validez implican la satisfacción de dicha especificación temporal por parte de cualquier sistema, sin importar el número de procesos que formen parte del sistema. Las condiciones de verificación generadas se corresponden con los datos manipulados. Estudiamos el diseño de procedimientos de decisión especializados capaces de lidiar con estas condiciones de verificación de manera completamente automática. Investigamos teorías decidibles capaces de describir propiedades de tipos de datos complejos que manipulan punteros, tales como implementaciones imperativas de pilas, colas, listas y skiplists. Para cada una de estas teorías presentamos un procedimiento de decisión y una implementación práctica construida sobre SMT solvers. Estos procedimientos de decisión son finalmente utilizados para verificar de manera automática las condiciones de verificación generadas por nuestras técnicas de verificación parametrizada. Para concluir, demostramos como utilizando nuestro marco formal es posible probar no solo propiedades de safety sino además de liveness en algunas versiones de protocolos de exclusión mutua y programas que manipulan estructuras de datos concurrentes. El enfoque que presentamos en este trabajo resulta ser muy general y puede ser aplicado para verificar un amplio rango de tipos de datos concurrentes similares. Abstract Concurrent data types are concurrent implementations of classical data abstractions, specifically designed to exploit the great deal of parallelism available in modern multiprocessor and multi-core architectures. The correct manipulation of concurrent data types is essential for the overall correctness of the software system built using them. A major difficulty in designing and verifying concurrent data types arises by the need to reason about any number of threads invoking the data type simultaneously, which requires considering parametrized systems. In this work we study the formal verification of temporal properties of parametrized concurrent systems, with a special focus on programs that manipulate concurrent data structures. The main difficulty to reason about concurrent parametrized systems comes from the combination of their inherently high concurrency and the manipulation of dynamic memory. This parametrized verification problem is very challenging, because it requires to reason about complex concurrent data structures being accessed and modified by threads which simultaneously manipulate the heap using unstructured synchronization methods. In this work, we present a formal framework based on deductive methods which is capable of dealing with the verification of safety and liveness properties of concurrent parametrized systems that manipulate complex data structures. Our framework includes special proof rules and techniques adapted for parametrized systems which work in collaboration with specialized decision procedures for complex data structures. A novel aspect of our framework is that it cleanly differentiates the analysis of the program control flow from the analysis of the data being manipulated. The program control flow is analyzed using deductive proof rules and verification techniques specifically designed for coping with parametrized systems. Starting from a concurrent program and a temporal specification, our techniques generate a finite collection of verification conditions whose validity entails the satisfaction of the temporal specification by any client system, in spite of the number of threads. The verification conditions correspond to the data manipulation. We study the design of specialized decision procedures to deal with these verification conditions fully automatically. We investigate decidable theories capable of describing rich properties of complex pointer based data types such as stacks, queues, lists and skiplists. For each of these theories we present a decision procedure, and its practical implementation on top of existing SMT solvers. These decision procedures are ultimately used for automatically verifying the verification conditions generated by our specialized parametrized verification techniques. Finally, we show how using our framework it is possible to prove not only safety but also liveness properties of concurrent versions of some mutual exclusion protocols and programs that manipulate concurrent data structures. The approach we present in this work is very general, and can be applied to verify a wide range of similar concurrent data types.

Strict and non-strict independent and-parallelism in logic programs: Correctness, efficiency, and compile-time conditions.

This paper presents some fundamental properties of independent and-parallelism and extends its applicability by enlarging the class of goals eligible for parallel execution. A simple model of (independent) and-parallel execution is proposed and issues of correctness and efficiency discussed in the light of this model. Two conditions, "strict" and "non-strict" independence, are defined and then proved sufficient to ensure correctness and efñciency of parallel execution: if goals which meet these conditions are executed in parallel the solutions obtained are the same as those produced by standard sequential execution. Also, in absence of failure, the parallel proof procedure does not genérate any additional work (with respect to standard SLD-resolution) while the actual execution time is reduced. Finally, in case of failure of any of the goals no slow down will occur. For strict independence the results are shown to hold independently of whether the parallel goals execute in the same environment or in sepárate environments. In addition, a formal basis is given for the automatic compile-time generation of independent and-parallelism: compile-time conditions to efficiently check goal independence at run-time are proposed and proved sufficient. Also, rules are given for constructing simpler conditions if information regarding the binding context of the goals to be executed in parallel is available to the compiler.

On the correctness and efficiency of independent and-parallelism in logic programs

This paper presents and proves some fundamental results for independent and-parallelism (IAP). First, the paper treats the issues of correctness and efficiency: after defining strict and non-strict goal independence, it is proved that if strictly independent goals are executed in parallel the solutions obtained are the same as those produced by standard sequential execution. It is also shown that, in the absence of failure, the parallel proof procedure doesn't genérate any additional work (with respect to standard SLDresolution) while the actual execution time is reduced. The same results hold even if non-strictly independent goals are executed in parallel, provided a trivial rewriting of such goals is performed. In addition, and most importantly, treats the issue of compile-time generation of IAP by proposing conditions, to be written at compile-time, to efficiently check strict and non-strict goal independence at run-time and proving the sufficiency of such conditions. It is also shown how simpler conditions can be constructed if some information regarding the binding context of the goals to be executed in parallel is available to the compiler trough either local or program-level analysis. These results therefore provide a formal basis for the automatic compile-time generation of IAP. As a corollary of such results, the paper also proves that negative goals are always non-strictly independent, and that goals which share a first occurrence of an existential variable are never independent.

A generic, context sensitive analysis framework for object oriented programs

Abstract interpreters rely on the existence of a nxpoint algorithm that calculates a least upper bound approximation of the semantics of the program. Usually, that algorithm is described in terms of the particular language in study and therefore it is not directly applicable to programs written in a different source language. In this paper we introduce a generic, block-based, and uniform representation of the program control flow graph and a language-independent nxpoint algorithm that can be applied to a variety of languages and, in particular, Java. Two major characteristics of our approach are accuracy (obtained through a topdown, context sensitive approach) and reasonable efficiency (achieved by means of memoization and dependency tracking techniques). We have also implemented the proposed framework and show some initial experimental results for standard benchmarks, which further support the feasibility of the solution adopted.

Approximate Relational Reasoning for Probabilistic Programs

La seguridad verificada es una metodología para demostrar propiedades de seguridad de los sistemas informáticos que se destaca por las altas garantías de corrección que provee. Los sistemas informáticos se modelan como programas probabilísticos y para probar que verifican una determinada propiedad de seguridad se utilizan técnicas rigurosas basadas en modelos matemáticos de los programas. En particular, la seguridad verificada promueve el uso de demostradores de teoremas interactivos o automáticos para construir demostraciones completamente formales cuya corrección es certificada mecánicamente (por ordenador). La seguridad verificada demostró ser una técnica muy efectiva para razonar sobre diversas nociones de seguridad en el área de criptografía. Sin embargo, no ha podido cubrir un importante conjunto de nociones de seguridad “aproximada”. La característica distintiva de estas nociones de seguridad es que se expresan como una condición de “similitud” entre las distribuciones de salida de dos programas probabilísticos y esta similitud se cuantifica usando alguna noción de distancia entre distribuciones de probabilidad. Este conjunto incluye destacadas nociones de seguridad de diversas áreas como la minería de datos privados, el análisis de flujo de información y la criptografía. Ejemplos representativos de estas nociones de seguridad son la indiferenciabilidad, que permite reemplazar un componente idealizado de un sistema por una implementación concreta (sin alterar significativamente sus propiedades de seguridad), o la privacidad diferencial, una noción de privacidad que ha recibido mucha atención en los últimos años y tiene como objetivo evitar la publicación datos confidenciales en la minería de datos. La falta de técnicas rigurosas que permitan verificar formalmente este tipo de propiedades constituye un notable problema abierto que tiene que ser abordado. En esta tesis introducimos varias lógicas de programa quantitativas para razonar sobre esta clase de propiedades de seguridad. Nuestra principal contribución teórica es una versión quantitativa de una lógica de Hoare relacional para programas probabilísticos. Las pruebas de correción de estas lógicas son completamente formalizadas en el asistente de pruebas Coq. Desarrollamos, además, una herramienta para razonar sobre propiedades de programas a través de estas lógicas extendiendo CertiCrypt, un framework para verificar pruebas de criptografía en Coq. Confirmamos la efectividad y aplicabilidad de nuestra metodología construyendo pruebas certificadas por ordendor de varios sistemas cuyo análisis estaba fuera del alcance de la seguridad verificada. Esto incluye, entre otros, una meta-construcción para diseñar funciones de hash “seguras” sobre curvas elípticas y algoritmos diferencialmente privados para varios problemas de optimización combinatoria de la literatura reciente. ABSTRACT The verified security methodology is an emerging approach to build high assurance proofs about security properties of computer systems. Computer systems are modeled as probabilistic programs and one relies on rigorous program semantics techniques to prove that they comply with a given security goal. In particular, it advocates the use of interactive theorem provers or automated provers to build fully formal machine-checked versions of these security proofs. The verified security methodology has proved successful in modeling and reasoning about several standard security notions in the area of cryptography. However, it has fallen short of covering an important class of approximate, quantitative security notions. The distinguishing characteristic of this class of security notions is that they are stated as a “similarity” condition between the output distributions of two probabilistic programs, and this similarity is quantified using some notion of distance between probability distributions. This class comprises prominent security notions from multiple areas such as private data analysis, information flow analysis and cryptography. These include, for instance, indifferentiability, which enables securely replacing an idealized component of system with a concrete implementation, and differential privacy, a notion of privacy-preserving data mining that has received a great deal of attention in the last few years. The lack of rigorous techniques for verifying these properties is thus an important problem that needs to be addressed. In this dissertation we introduce several quantitative program logics to reason about this class of security notions. Our main theoretical contribution is, in particular, a quantitative variant of a full-fledged relational Hoare logic for probabilistic programs. The soundness of these logics is fully formalized in the Coq proof-assistant and tool support is also available through an extension of CertiCrypt, a framework to verify cryptographic proofs in Coq. We validate the applicability of our approach by building fully machine-checked proofs for several systems that were out of the reach of the verified security methodology. These comprise, among others, a construction to build “safe” hash functions into elliptic curves and differentially private algorithms for several combinatorial optimization problems from the recent literature.