A Cost-Benefit analysis model for technical debt management considering uncertainty and time

In the last few years, technical debt has been used as a useful means for making the intrinsic cost of the internal software quality weaknesses visible. This visibility is made possible by quantifying this cost. Specifically, technical debt is expressed in terms of two main concepts: principal and interest. The principal is the cost of eliminating or reducing the impact of a, so called, technical debt item in a software system; whereas the interest is the recurring cost, over a time period, of not eliminating a technical debt item. Previous works about technical debt are mainly focused on estimating principal and interest, and on performing a cost-benefit analysis. This cost-benefit analysis allows one to determine if to remove technical debt is profitable and to prioritize which items incurring in technical debt should be fixed first. Nevertheless, for these previous works technical debt is flat along the time. However the introduction of new factors to estimate technical debt may produce non flat models that allow us to produce more accurate predictions. These factors should be used to estimate principal and interest, and to perform cost-benefit analysis related to technical debt. In this paper, we take a step forward introducing the uncertainty about the interest, and the time frame factors so that it becomes possible to depict a number of possible future scenarios. Estimations obtained without considering the possible evolution of the interest over time may be less accurate as they consider simplistic scenarios without changes.

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used