Impact of the Economic Recession on Toll Highway Concessions in Spain

After joining the European Union in 1986, Spain experienced steady economic growth that enabled the country to grow at a greater pace than other European countries. During this period, the government of Spain opted for major investments in public infrastructure by taking advantage both of the funding provided by the European Union and of several types of public-private-partnership (PPP) approaches. Within this framework, the government of Spain between 1996 and 2004 procured a series of toll highway concessions. These concessions entered into operation a few years before the global economic recession made itself felt in Spain. The concession contracts signed between the government and some private consortia allocated most of the risks (expropriation, construction, and traffic) to the private sector. In this paper the impact that the economic recession has had on the business performance of the concessionaires is assessed, and the effectiveness of the measures adopted by the government to help the concessionaire to avoid bankruptcy is analyzed. It was found that some of the guarantees offered by the legal framework to the concessionaires in case of bankruptcy are prompting an outcome that could negatively affect the users. In addition to that, some suggestions as to how to better allocate risk in toll highway concessions in the future are provided.

Traffic uncertainty in toll motorway concessions in Spain

This study assessed the inaccuracy of the traffic estimates for toll motorway concessions in Spain. It was found that the estimates conducted by both the government and the concessionaire showed a significant bias towards overestimating traffic. The level of overestimation in Spain is even greater than that reported by other studies based on worldwide data. The notorious levels of overestimation entail severe burdens to the economics of the concessionaires that often prompt renegotiations of the contracts, which are often accepted by the government. These renegotiations usually end up with toll changes or extension of the concession terms, which have to be ultimately borne by future motorway users. It is postulated herein that the bias towards overestimating traffic in toll motorways in Spain is mostly caused by strategic issues rather than by modelling errors.

Risk Allocation in Toll Highway Concessions in Spain: Lessons from Economic Recession

Spain has a long tradition of encouraging toll highways by granting concessions to private companies. Concessions in Spain have been characterized by a willingness to transfer considerable risk to the private sector. Traffic demand, acquisition of the right-of-way, and financial risk have often been allocated to the private sector. From 1996 to 2011, 16 toll highway concessions, covering a total distance of 835 km, were awarded by the central government of Spain with this approach. Some of those highways started their operations just before the economic recession began. The recession had negative consequences for Spain's economy. The gross domestic product per capita plummeted, and the unemployment rate increased from 9% to 20% of the working population in just 2 years. The recession also had severe consequences for the economic performance of toll highway concessions. Traffic levels declined at a much greater rate than did the gross domestic product. In addition, the conditions imposed by the financial markets on borrowers became much stricter because of the liquidity crisis. This study analyzes the impact that the economic recession ultimately had on the performance of toll highway concessions in Spain and the actions that the government adopted to avoid the bankruptcy of the concessionaires. It was found that the economic recession helped identify some deficiencies in how risk had been allocated in Spain. The measures that both Spain and the European Union are adopting so as to improve risk allocation are discussed.

Analysis of road safety incentives in highway concessions in Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, encourage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. These performance based standards often refer to different aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high capacity network in 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

The influence of economic incentives linked to road safety indicators on accidents: The case of toll concessions in Spain

The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether the incentives incorporated in toll highway concession contracts in order to encourage private operators to adopt measures to reduce accidents are actually effective at improving safety. To this end, we implemented negative binomial regression models using information about highway characteristics and accident data from toll highway concessions in Spain from 2007 to 2009. Our results show that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not managed by the contractor, such as the annual average daily traffic (AADT), the percentage of heavy vehicles on the highway, number of lanes, number of intersections and average speed; the implementation of these incentives has a positive influence on the reduction of accidents and injuries. Consequently, this measure seems to be an effective way of improving safety performance in road networks.

Analysis of road safety incentives in highway concessions in Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, encourage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. These performance based standards often refer to different aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high capacity network in 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Do Public Private Partnerships Improve Road Safety? The Case of Toll Concessions in Spain

El Transportation Research Board es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte. Aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to evaluate whether PPPs lead to an improvement in road safety, when compared with other infrastructure management systems. Second, is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPP contracts in Spain have been effective at improving safety performance. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high-capacity network covering years 2007-2009. The results showed that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not manageable by the private concessionaire such as the average annual daily traffic, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of accidents.

Empirical analysis of traffic volume for the application of the options theory to highway concessions

*************************************************************************************** EL WCTR es un Congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte que hasta el 2010 publicaba sus libros de abstracts con ISBN. Por ello consideramos que debería seguir teníendose en cuenta para los indicadores de calidad ******************************************************************************************* Investment projects in the field of transportation infrastructures have a high degree of uncertainty and require an important amount of resources. In highway concessions in particular, the calculation of the Net Present Value (NPV) of the project by means of the discount of cash flows, may lead to erroneous results when the project incorporates certain flexibility. In these cases, the theory of real options is an alternative tool for the valuation of concessions. When the variable that generates uncertainty (in our case, the traffic) follows a random walk (or Geometric Brownian Motion), we can calculate the value of the options embedded in the contract starting directly from the process followed by that variable. This procedure notably simplifies the calculation method. In order to test the hypothesis of the evolution of traffic as a Geometric Brownian Motion, we have used the available series of traffic in Spanish highways, and we have applied the Augmented Dickey-Fuller approach, which is the most widely used test for this kind of study. The main result of the analysis is that we cannot reject the hypothesis that traffic follows a Geometric Brownian Motion in the majority of both toll highways and free highways in Spain.

Desarrollo de una metodología de integración paisajística de las autopistas

El presente trabajo se enmarca dentro del proyecto “Operación de Autopistas Seguras, Inteligentes y Sostenibles (OASIS)”, cuyo principal objetivo es definir la autopista del futuro, aquella que en su operación presentará niveles notablemente altas de seguridad, servicio al usuario y sostenibilidad. Para lograrlo, uno de los parámetros a tener en cuenta es la conservación y optimización del paisaje por el que discurren. Esta tesis desarrolla una metodología de valoración del paisaje de las autopistas, aplicando dicha metodología a diversos tramos de las autopistas gestionadas por empresas del proyecto (OHL Concesiones, Iridium y Abertis). El estudio se ha llevado a cabo en más de 2.000 km de autopistas, identificando los diferentes paisajes vistos desde la carretera y elaborando un catálogo de fotografías digitalizadas y georreferenciadas de los paisajes; desarrollando y aplicando una novedosa metodología de valoración de la calidad del paisaje; determinando las diferencias entre el paisaje percibido desde las autopistas por medio de fotografías y mediante la utilización de mapas representativos de paisaje; identificando los elementos de diseño paisajístico (puentes, estaciones de servicio, etc.) y estableciendo alternativas para su mejor adecuación paisajística; y estimando el impacto que provocan estas infraestructuras al observarse desde fuera. Es de esperar que las conclusiones extraídas de este proyecto permitan una mejor integración paisajística de las autopistas del futuro, convirtiéndose en instrumentos para mostrar paisajes de mayor calidad, y reduciendo el impacto como elementos modificadores del territorio. Summary This work is within the framework of the project "Operation of Safe, Intelligent and Sustainable Highways (OASIS)," whose main objective is to define the highway of the future, which in its operation will present significantly high levels of safety, customer service and sustainability. To achieve this, one of the parameters to consider is landscape conservation and improvement along highways. This thesis develops a methodology for assessing the landscape of highways, applying the model to different stretches of highway managed by project companies (OHL Concessions, Iridium and Abertis). The study was carried out in more than 2.000 km of highways, identifying the different landscapes seen from the road and developing a catalog of digitized and georeferenced photographs of landscapes; developing and applying a new methodology for assessing the quality of the landscape; determining the differences between the landscape seen from highways through photographs and use of landscape maps; identifying the landscape design elements (bridges, service area, etc.) and providing alternatives for better landscape; and integration estimating the impact that cause these infrastructures when viewed from outside. It is expected that the conclusions extract from this project allow to better landscape integrate of the future highways, become instruments to show higher quality landscapes, reducing the impact as modifiers´ elements of the territory.

Infrastructure Finance in Developing Countries by State and Multilateral Development Banks

Infrastructure concession is an alternative widely used by governments to increase investment. In the case of the road sector, the main characteristics of the concessions are: long-term projects, high investments in the early years of the contract and high risks. A viability analysis must be carried out for each concession and consider the characteristics of the project. When the infrastructure is located in a developing country, political and market growth uncertainties should be add in the concession project analysis, as well as economic instability, because they present greater risks. This paper is an analysis of state bank participation in road infrastructure finance in developing countries. For this purpose, we studied road infrastructure financing and its associated risks, and also the features of developing countries. Furthermore, we considered the issue of state banks and multilateral development banks that perform an important role by offering better credit lines than the private banks, in terms of cost, interest and grace period. Based on this study, we analyzed the Brazilian Development Bank - BNDES – and their credit supply to road infrastructure concessions. The results show that BNDES is the main financing agent for long-term investment in the sector, offering loans with low interest rates in Brazilian currency. From this research we argue that a single state bank should not alone support the increasing demand for finance in Brazil. Therefore, we conclude that there is a need to expand the supply of credit in Brazil, by strengthening private banks in the long-term lending market.

Unit Root Analysis of Traffic Time Series in Toll Highways

Concession contracts in highways often include some kind of clauses (for example, a minimum traffic guarantee) that allow for better management of the business risks. The value of these clauses may be important and should be added to the total value of the concession. However, in these cases, traditional valuation techniques, like the NPV (net present value) of the project, are insufficient. An alternative methodology for the valuation of highway concession is one based on the real options approach. This methodology is generally built on the assumption of the evolution of traffic volume as a GBM (geometric Brownian motion), which is the hypothesis analyzed in this paper. First, a description of the methodology used for the analysis of the existence of unit roots (i.e., the hypothesis of non-stationarity) is provided. The Dickey-Fuller approach has been used, which is the most common test for this kind of analysis. Then this methodology is applied to perform a statistical analysis of traffic series in Spanish toll highways. For this purpose, data on the AADT (annual average daily traffic) on a set of highways have been used. The period of analysis is around thirty years in most cases. The main outcome of the research is that the hypothesis that traffic volume follows a GBM process in Spanish toll highways cannot be rejected. This result is robust, and therefore it can be used as a starting point for the application of the real options theory to assess toll highway concessions.

Dealing with traffic risk in Latin American toll roads

Análisis de los sistemas de mitigación del riesgo de tráfico en autopistas de peaje en diferentes países de Latinoamérica. This paper presents a cross-country analysis of traffic risk allocation in road concessions of Latin America. It shows that some countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru have been greatly concerned with mitigating traffic risk, either by putting into practice public guarantees, implementing flexible term concessions, or through availability payment concessions; whereas other countries such as Mexico and Brazil have assigned traffic risk to the private concessionaire by using fixed-term concession contracts without any traffic guarantees. Based on an analysis of data from 1990 to 2010, the paper finds that shifting traffic risk from the concessionaire to the government or users was not confined to the riskiest projects, as one might expect. The analysis also suggests that the implementation of traffic risk mitigation mechanisms in Latin American toll roads has not been very successful in reducing renegotiation rates or in increasing the number of bidders in the tenders

Analysis of road safety incentives applied in PPP road = Análisis de incentivos a la seguridad aplicados en concesiones de carreteras

En este artículo se recoge cómo se ha regulado este aspecto tradicionalmente en concesiones y cómo se viene haciendo más recientemente, comparando para tres concesiones europeas puestas en servicio en los últimos años, las bonificaciones con el beneficio social que corresponden a cada nivel de reducción de la accidentalidad en la carretera. Los resultados arrojan que los incentivos aplicados, tanto antiguamente como los más recientes, son anodinos por dos motivos: porque son muy inferiores al beneficio social derivado de ellos y porque aparentemente son muy inferiores al coste de las actuaciones de mejora de la seguridad vial. Road safety is one of the most important issues in PPP roads. At this respect, to achieve a property regulation it is necessary to introduce objective and explicit incentives in the contracts. Besides, these incentives must be focused at the net social benefit. This paper explains how road safety has been introduced traditionally in PPP road contracts and how it is been doing it nowadays, comparing for three recent concessions of Europe, the bonuses and the social benefit associated to each reduction of accidents in the roads. As a result, it can be affirmed that the incentives applied, both traditional and the most ones, are unremarkable for two reasons: because they are much lower than the social benefit derived from them and because they apparently are well below the cost of measures to improve road safety.

Optimal safety incentives in road concession contracts

Changes in the roles of the government and the private sector in the provision of public services along with budget constraints are resulting in an increasing use of the concession approach for financing and managing roads. In the last few years, many of these contracts set up incentives linked to bonuses to encourage the concessionaire to render a better service to the users. Road safety is one the aspects on the basis of which concessionaires can be rewarded according to their performance. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether road safety incentives are being defined in the right way nowadays in different European countries and also identify what incentives would need to be implemented to achieve a socially optimal road safety level. To that end, we develop a specific incentive for road concession contracts that encourages companies to achieve the optimal level. We apply this methodology to three case studies of concessions recently awarded in order to determine to what extend the incentives they set up are closer or farther to the optimum.

Formulación de incentivos óptimos y viables para la mejora de la seguridad vial en concesiones de carreteras

La evolución de los roles de la Administración y empresas en la prestación de servicios públicos, así como las crecientes restricciones presupuestarias para financiarlos, están propiciando una cada vez mayor utilización del sistema concesional para la financiación y gestión de carreteras. Ante esta situación, cabe cuestionarse si la regulación de las prestaciones a obtener se está introduciendo de forma adecuada en los contratos. Uno de los aspectos más relevantes en este sentido es el relacionado con la seguridad de la infraestructura, sobre el cual la empresa concesionaria tiene capacidad de actuación pero, en un sentido económico estricto, pocos incentivos para mejorarla. Todo ello a pesar de los elevados costes sociales derivados de la accidentalidad. Esta tesis analiza la idoneidad de los indicadores e incentivos de seguridad vial que se vienen aplicando en concesiones de carreteras, encontrándose una gran heterogeneidad e incluso incorrecciones técnicas en su formulación. Además se pone de manifiesto la poca vinculación que tienen con la estructura de costes y beneficios de las actuaciones de mejora de seguridad vial, por lo que su introducción en los contratos resulta anodina. Con el objeto de superar esta situación, en esta tesis se analizan en profundidad los aspectos que intervienen en la formulación de indicadores e incentivos de seguridad vial. De este análisis se deduce la ecuación que liga, por tipología de carretera, el beneficio social derivado del nivel de seguridad de la carretera y el coste para alcanzarlo. A través de esta ecuación se determina el nivel de seguridad óptimo desde el punto de vista económico‐social. La investigación continúa extrapolando métodos de la teoría microeconómica de incentivos al campo de las concesiones de carreteras, a fin de determinar la formulación del incentivo de seguridad vial teóricamente óptimo. Asimismo, la tesis toma en consideración la experiencia en la aplicación práctica de incentivos en concesiones vigentes, realizándose una propuesta para superar las controversias que se están produciendo actualmente en España. Además, se ha simulado la aplicación de la formulación propuesta a diversas concesiones con un doble objetivo: verificar la viabilidad económica de su aplicación y corroborar en qué medida se adecua mejor al óptimo económico‐social. Como resultado, se proponen un indicador y un incentivo concretos que inducen a las concesionarias a orientar su gestión hacia la consecución del nivel de seguridad vial óptimo desde el punto de vista económico‐social, todo ello dentro de un marco de viabilidad presupuestaria. Changes in the roles of Government and the Private Sector in the provision of public services along with the budget constraints to finance them are resulting in an increasing use of the concession system for financing and managing roads. Taking this into account, the question is whether the regulation of quality criteria is being properly introduced in the contracts or not. One of the most important aspects at this respect is the road safety. On the one hand, concessionaires are able to manage this aspect up to a point. On the other hand, from an strict economic point of view, they have little incentive to improve it, despite the high social costs of accidents. This thesis has analyzed the suitability of indicators and incentives usually introduced in road concession contracts, finding high heterogeneity, and even technical inaccuracies on their formulation. It has also been found the lack of connection between these incentives and the costs of measures to improve road safety, therefore they are not expected to fulfil their purpose. In order to overcome this situation, this thesis firstly analyzes in depth the issues involved in the development of road safety indicators and incentives. This analysis yields the equation which links the social benefit derived from the level of road safety and the cost to achieve it. In its turn, through this equation it is possible to meet the optimal road safety level from the socio‐economic point of view. Secondly, this thesis extrapolates microeconomic methods to the field of highway concessions, with the aim of determining the formulation of the optimal road safety incentive. Furthermore, the thesis takes into account the experience in the practical application of incentives on existing concessions, performing a proposal to settle the disputes between concessionaires and the Public Administrations. Finally, the thesis simulates the implementation of the proposed indicator and incentive to real concessions with the aim of verifying the economic feasibility of their application and confirming how they match the socio‐economic optimum. As a result, this thesis proposes an indicator and incentive that induce companies to drive the management of the concession towards achieving the optimal road safety level, all within a framework of the budgetary feasibility.