An Interleaved EPE-Immune PA-DPL Structure for Resisting Concentrated EM Side Channel Attacks on FPGA Implementation

Early propagation effect (EPE) is a critical problem in conventional dual-rail logic implementations against Side Channel Attacks (SCAs). Among previous EPE-resistant architectures, PA-DPL logic offers EPE-free capability at relatively low cost. However, its separate dual core structure is a weakness when facing concentrated EM attacks where a tiny EM probe can be precisely positioned closer to one of the two cores. In this paper, we present an PA-DPL dual-core interleaved structure to strengthen resistance against sophisticated EM attacks on Xilinx FPGA implementations. The main merit of the proposed structure is that every two routing in each signal pair are kept identical even the dual cores are interleaved together. By minimizing the distance between the complementary routings and instances of both cores, even the concentrated EM measurement cannot easily distinguish the minor EM field unbalance. In PA- DPL, EPE is avoided by compressing the evaluation phase to a small portion of the clock period, therefore, the speed is inevitably limited. Regarding this, we made an improvement to extend the duty cycle of evaluation phase to more than 40 percent, yielding a larger maximum working frequency. The detailed design flow is also presented. We validate the security improvement against EM attack by implementing a simplified AES co-processor in Virtex-5 FPGA.

Sophisticated security verification on routing repaired balanced cell-based dual-rail logic against side channel analysis

Conventional dual-rail precharge logic suffers from difficult implementations of dual-rail structure for obtaining strict compensation between the counterpart rails. As a light-weight and high-speed dual-rail style, balanced cell-based dual-rail logic (BCDL) uses synchronised compound gates with global precharge signal to provide high resistance against differential power or electromagnetic analyses. BCDL can be realised from generic field programmable gate array (FPGA) design flows with constraints. However, routings still exist as concerns because of the deficient flexibility on routing control, which unfavourably results in bias between complementary nets in security-sensitive parts. In this article, based on a routing repair technique, novel verifications towards routing effect are presented. An 8 bit simplified advanced encryption processing (AES)-co-processor is executed that is constructed on block random access memory (RAM)-based BCDL in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs. Since imbalanced routing are major defects in BCDL, the authors can rule out other influences and fairly quantify the security variants. A series of asymptotic correlation electromagnetic (EM) analyses are launched towards a group of circuits with consecutive routing schemes to be able to verify routing impact on side channel analyses. After repairing the non-identical routings, Mutual information analyses are executed to further validate the concrete security increase obtained from identical routing pairs in BCDL.