All-optical logic gates with 1550nm Fabry-Perot and distributed feedback semiconductor laser amplifiers

The optical bistability occurring in laser diode amplifiers is used to design an all-optical logic gate capable to provide the whole set of logic functions. The structure of the reported logic gate is based on two connected 1550nm laser amplifiers (Fabry-Perot and distributed feedback laser amplifiers).

Chaotic behaviour evaluation in optical logic gates with fractal concepts

A chaotic output was obtained previously by us, from an Optical Programmable Logic Cell when a feedback is added. Some time delay is given to the feedback in order to obtain the non-linear behavior. The working conditions of such a cell is obtained from a simple diagram with fractal properties. We analyze its properties as well as the influence of time delay on the characteristics of the working diagram. A further study of the chaotic obtained signal is presented.

Low-power vertical cavity NAND gate

The study of the Vertical-Cavity Semiconductor Optical Amplifiers (VCSOAs) for optical signal processing applications is increasing his interest. Due to their particular structure, the VCSOAs present some advantages when compared to their edge-emitting counterparts including low manufacturing costs, high coupling efficiency to optical fibers and the ease to fabricate 2-D arrays of this kind of devices. As a consequence, all-optical logic gates based on VCSOAs may be very promising devices for their use in optical computing and optical switching in communications. Moreover, since all the boolean logic functions can be implemented by combining NAND logic gates, the development of a Vertical-Cavity NAND gate would be of particular interest. In this paper, the characteristics of the dispersive optical bistability appearing on a VCSOA operated in reflection are studied. A progressive increment of the number of layers compounding the top Distributed Bragg Reflector (DBR) of the VCSOA results on a change on the shape of the appearing bistability from an S-shape to a clockwise bistable loop. This resulting clockwise bistability has high on-off contrast ratio and input power requirements one order of magnitude lower than those needed for edge-emitting devices. Based on these results, an all-optical vertical-cavity NAND gate with high on-off contrast ratio and an input power for operation of only 10|i\V will be reported in this paper.

Side-Channel Attack Protection Techniques in FPGA Systems using Enhanced Dual-Rail Solutions

Esta tesis doctoral se centra principalmente en técnicas de ataque y contramedidas relacionadas con ataques de canal lateral (SCA por sus siglas en inglés), que han sido propuestas dentro del campo de investigación académica desde hace 17 años. Las investigaciones relacionadas han experimentado un notable crecimiento en las últimas décadas, mientras que los diseños enfocados en la protección sólida y eficaz contra dichos ataques aún se mantienen como un tema de investigación abierto, en el que se necesitan iniciativas más confiables para la protección de la información persona de empresa y de datos nacionales. El primer uso documentado de codificación secreta se remonta a alrededor de 1700 B.C., cuando los jeroglíficos del antiguo Egipto eran descritos en las inscripciones. La seguridad de la información siempre ha supuesto un factor clave en la transmisión de datos relacionados con inteligencia diplomática o militar. Debido a la evolución rápida de las técnicas modernas de comunicación, soluciones de cifrado se incorporaron por primera vez para garantizar la seguridad, integridad y confidencialidad de los contextos de transmisión a través de cables sin seguridad o medios inalámbricos. Debido a las restricciones de potencia de cálculo antes de la era del ordenador, la técnica de cifrado simple era un método más que suficiente para ocultar la información. Sin embargo, algunas vulnerabilidades algorítmicas pueden ser explotadas para restaurar la regla de codificación sin mucho esfuerzo. Esto ha motivado nuevas investigaciones en el área de la criptografía, con el fin de proteger el sistema de información ante sofisticados algoritmos. Con la invención de los ordenadores se ha acelerado en gran medida la implementación de criptografía segura, que ofrece resistencia eficiente encaminada a obtener mayores capacidades de computación altamente reforzadas. Igualmente, sofisticados cripto-análisis han impulsado las tecnologías de computación. Hoy en día, el mundo de la información ha estado involucrado con el campo de la criptografía, enfocada a proteger cualquier campo a través de diversas soluciones de cifrado. Estos enfoques se han fortalecido debido a la unificación optimizada de teorías matemáticas modernas y prácticas eficaces de hardware, siendo posible su implementación en varias plataformas (microprocesador, ASIC, FPGA, etc.). Las necesidades y requisitos de seguridad en la industria son las principales métricas de conducción en el diseño electrónico, con el objetivo de promover la fabricación de productos de gran alcance sin sacrificar la seguridad de los clientes. Sin embargo, una vulnerabilidad en la implementación práctica encontrada por el Prof. Paul Kocher, et al en 1996 implica que un circuito digital es inherentemente vulnerable a un ataque no convencional, lo cual fue nombrado posteriormente como ataque de canal lateral, debido a su fuente de análisis. Sin embargo, algunas críticas sobre los algoritmos criptográficos teóricamente seguros surgieron casi inmediatamente después de este descubrimiento. En este sentido, los circuitos digitales consisten típicamente en un gran número de celdas lógicas fundamentales (como MOS - Metal Oxide Semiconductor), construido sobre un sustrato de silicio durante la fabricación. La lógica de los circuitos se realiza en función de las innumerables conmutaciones de estas células. Este mecanismo provoca inevitablemente cierta emanación física especial que puede ser medida y correlacionada con el comportamiento interno del circuito. SCA se puede utilizar para revelar datos confidenciales (por ejemplo, la criptografía de claves), analizar la arquitectura lógica, el tiempo e incluso inyectar fallos malintencionados a los circuitos que se implementan en sistemas embebidos, como FPGAs, ASICs, o tarjetas inteligentes. Mediante el uso de la comparación de correlación entre la cantidad de fuga estimada y las fugas medidas de forma real, información confidencial puede ser reconstruida en mucho menos tiempo y computación. Para ser precisos, SCA básicamente cubre una amplia gama de tipos de ataques, como los análisis de consumo de energía y radiación ElectroMagnética (EM). Ambos se basan en análisis estadístico y, por lo tanto, requieren numerosas muestras. Los algoritmos de cifrado no están intrínsecamente preparados para ser resistentes ante SCA. Es por ello que se hace necesario durante la implementación de circuitos integrar medidas que permitan camuflar las fugas a través de "canales laterales". Las medidas contra SCA están evolucionando junto con el desarrollo de nuevas técnicas de ataque, así como la continua mejora de los dispositivos electrónicos. Las características físicas requieren contramedidas sobre la capa física, que generalmente se pueden clasificar en soluciones intrínsecas y extrínsecas. Contramedidas extrínsecas se ejecutan para confundir la fuente de ataque mediante la integración de ruido o mala alineación de la actividad interna. Comparativamente, las contramedidas intrínsecas están integradas en el propio algoritmo, para modificar la aplicación con el fin de minimizar las fugas medibles, o incluso hacer que dichas fugas no puedan ser medibles. Ocultación y Enmascaramiento son dos técnicas típicas incluidas en esta categoría. Concretamente, el enmascaramiento se aplica a nivel algorítmico, para alterar los datos intermedios sensibles con una máscara de manera reversible. A diferencia del enmascaramiento lineal, las operaciones no lineales que ampliamente existen en criptografías modernas son difíciles de enmascarar. Dicho método de ocultación, que ha sido verificado como una solución efectiva, comprende principalmente la codificación en doble carril, que está ideado especialmente para aplanar o eliminar la fuga dependiente de dato en potencia o en EM. En esta tesis doctoral, además de la descripción de las metodologías de ataque, se han dedicado grandes esfuerzos sobre la estructura del prototipo de la lógica propuesta, con el fin de realizar investigaciones enfocadas a la seguridad sobre contramedidas de arquitectura a nivel lógico. Una característica de SCA reside en el formato de las fuentes de fugas. Un típico ataque de canal lateral se refiere al análisis basado en la potencia, donde la capacidad fundamental del transistor MOS y otras capacidades parásitas son las fuentes esenciales de fugas. Por lo tanto, una lógica robusta resistente a SCA debe eliminar o mitigar las fugas de estas micro-unidades, como las puertas lógicas básicas, los puertos I/O y las rutas. Las herramientas EDA proporcionadas por los vendedores manipulan la lógica desde un nivel más alto, en lugar de realizarlo desde el nivel de puerta, donde las fugas de canal lateral se manifiestan. Por lo tanto, las implementaciones clásicas apenas satisfacen estas necesidades e inevitablemente atrofian el prototipo. Por todo ello, la implementación de un esquema de diseño personalizado y flexible ha de ser tomado en cuenta. En esta tesis se presenta el diseño y la implementación de una lógica innovadora para contrarrestar SCA, en la que se abordan 3 aspectos fundamentales: I. Se basa en ocultar la estrategia sobre el circuito en doble carril a nivel de puerta para obtener dinámicamente el equilibrio de las fugas en las capas inferiores; II. Esta lógica explota las características de la arquitectura de las FPGAs, para reducir al mínimo el gasto de recursos en la implementación; III. Se apoya en un conjunto de herramientas asistentes personalizadas, incorporadas al flujo genérico de diseño sobre FPGAs, con el fin de manipular los circuitos de forma automática. El kit de herramientas de diseño automático es compatible con la lógica de doble carril propuesta, para facilitar la aplicación práctica sobre la familia de FPGA del fabricante Xilinx. En este sentido, la metodología y las herramientas son flexibles para ser extendido a una amplia gama de aplicaciones en las que se desean obtener restricciones mucho más rígidas y sofisticadas a nivel de puerta o rutado. En esta tesis se realiza un gran esfuerzo para facilitar el proceso de implementación y reparación de lógica de doble carril genérica. La viabilidad de las soluciones propuestas es validada mediante la selección de algoritmos criptográficos ampliamente utilizados, y su evaluación exhaustiva en comparación con soluciones anteriores. Todas las propuestas están respaldadas eficazmente a través de ataques experimentales con el fin de validar las ventajas de seguridad del sistema. El presente trabajo de investigación tiene la intención de cerrar la brecha entre las barreras de implementación y la aplicación efectiva de lógica de doble carril. En esencia, a lo largo de esta tesis se describirá un conjunto de herramientas de implementación para FPGAs que se han desarrollado para trabajar junto con el flujo de diseño genérico de las mismas, con el fin de lograr crear de forma innovadora la lógica de doble carril. Un nuevo enfoque en el ámbito de la seguridad en el cifrado se propone para obtener personalización, automatización y flexibilidad en el prototipo de circuito de bajo nivel con granularidad fina. Las principales contribuciones del presente trabajo de investigación se resumen brevemente a continuación: Lógica de Precharge Absorbed-DPL logic: El uso de la conversión de netlist para reservar LUTs libres para ejecutar la señal de precharge y Ex en una lógica DPL. Posicionamiento entrelazado Row-crossed con pares idénticos de rutado en redes de doble carril, lo que ayuda a aumentar la resistencia frente a la medición EM selectiva y mitigar los impactos de las variaciones de proceso. Ejecución personalizada y herramientas de conversión automática para la generación de redes idénticas para la lógica de doble carril propuesta. (a) Para detectar y reparar conflictos en las conexiones; (b) Detectar y reparar las rutas asimétricas. (c) Para ser utilizado en otras lógicas donde se requiere un control estricto de las interconexiones en aplicaciones basadas en Xilinx. Plataforma CPA de pruebas personalizadas para el análisis de EM y potencia, incluyendo la construcción de dicha plataforma, el método de medición y análisis de los ataques. Análisis de tiempos para cuantificar los niveles de seguridad. División de Seguridad en la conversión parcial de un sistema de cifrado complejo para reducir los costes de la protección. Prueba de concepto de un sistema de calefacción auto-adaptativo para mitigar los impactos eléctricos debido a la variación del proceso de silicio de manera dinámica. La presente tesis doctoral se encuentra organizada tal y como se detalla a continuación: En el capítulo 1 se abordan los fundamentos de los ataques de canal lateral, que abarca desde conceptos básicos de teoría de modelos de análisis, además de la implementación de la plataforma y la ejecución de los ataques. En el capítulo 2 se incluyen las estrategias de resistencia SCA contra los ataques de potencia diferencial y de EM. Además de ello, en este capítulo se propone una lógica en doble carril compacta y segura como contribución de gran relevancia, así como también se presentará la transformación lógica basada en un diseño a nivel de puerta. Por otra parte, en el Capítulo 3 se abordan los desafíos relacionados con la implementación de lógica en doble carril genérica. Así mismo, se describirá un flujo de diseño personalizado para resolver los problemas de aplicación junto con una herramienta de desarrollo automático de aplicaciones propuesta, para mitigar las barreras de diseño y facilitar los procesos. En el capítulo 4 se describe de forma detallada la elaboración e implementación de las herramientas propuestas. Por otra parte, la verificación y validaciones de seguridad de la lógica propuesta, así como un sofisticado experimento de verificación de la seguridad del rutado, se describen en el capítulo 5. Por último, un resumen de las conclusiones de la tesis y las perspectivas como líneas futuras se incluyen en el capítulo 6. Con el fin de profundizar en el contenido de la tesis doctoral, cada capítulo se describe de forma más detallada a continuación: En el capítulo 1 se introduce plataforma de implementación hardware además las teorías básicas de ataque de canal lateral, y contiene principalmente: (a) La arquitectura genérica y las características de la FPGA a utilizar, en particular la Xilinx Virtex-5; (b) El algoritmo de cifrado seleccionado (un módulo comercial Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)); (c) Los elementos esenciales de los métodos de canal lateral, que permiten revelar las fugas de disipación correlacionadas con los comportamientos internos; y el método para recuperar esta relación entre las fluctuaciones físicas en los rastros de canal lateral y los datos internos procesados; (d) Las configuraciones de las plataformas de pruebas de potencia / EM abarcadas dentro de la presente tesis. El contenido de esta tesis se amplia y profundiza a partir del capítulo 2, en el cual se abordan varios aspectos claves. En primer lugar, el principio de protección de la compensación dinámica de la lógica genérica de precarga de doble carril (Dual-rail Precharge Logic-DPL) se explica mediante la descripción de los elementos compensados a nivel de puerta. En segundo lugar, la lógica PA-DPL es propuesta como aportación original, detallando el protocolo de la lógica y un caso de aplicación. En tercer lugar, dos flujos de diseño personalizados se muestran para realizar la conversión de doble carril. Junto con ello, se aclaran las definiciones técnicas relacionadas con la manipulación por encima de la netlist a nivel de LUT. Finalmente, una breve discusión sobre el proceso global se aborda en la parte final del capítulo. El Capítulo 3 estudia los principales retos durante la implementación de DPLs en FPGAs. El nivel de seguridad de las soluciones de resistencia a SCA encontradas en el estado del arte se ha degenerado debido a las barreras de implantación a través de herramientas EDA convencionales. En el escenario de la arquitectura FPGA estudiada, se discuten los problemas de los formatos de doble carril, impactos parásitos, sesgo tecnológico y la viabilidad de implementación. De acuerdo con estas elaboraciones, se plantean dos problemas: Cómo implementar la lógica propuesta sin penalizar los niveles de seguridad, y cómo manipular un gran número de celdas y automatizar el proceso. El PA-DPL propuesto en el capítulo 2 se valida con una serie de iniciativas, desde características estructurales como doble carril entrelazado o redes de rutado clonadas, hasta los métodos de aplicación tales como las herramientas de personalización y automatización de EDA. Por otra parte, un sistema de calefacción auto-adaptativo es representado y aplicado a una lógica de doble núcleo, con el fin de ajustar alternativamente la temperatura local para equilibrar los impactos negativos de la variación del proceso durante la operación en tiempo real. El capítulo 4 se centra en los detalles de la implementación del kit de herramientas. Desarrollado sobre una API third-party, el kit de herramientas personalizado es capaz de manipular los elementos de la lógica de circuito post P&R ncd (una versión binaria ilegible del xdl) convertido al formato XDL Xilinx. El mecanismo y razón de ser del conjunto de instrumentos propuestos son cuidadosamente descritos, que cubre la detección de enrutamiento y los enfoques para la reparación. El conjunto de herramientas desarrollado tiene como objetivo lograr redes de enrutamiento estrictamente idénticos para la lógica de doble carril, tanto para posicionamiento separado como para el entrelazado. Este capítulo particularmente especifica las bases técnicas para apoyar las implementaciones en los dispositivos de Xilinx y su flexibilidad para ser utilizado sobre otras aplicaciones. El capítulo 5 se enfoca en la aplicación de los casos de estudio para la validación de los grados de seguridad de la lógica propuesta. Se discuten los problemas técnicos detallados durante la ejecución y algunas nuevas técnicas de implementación. (a) Se discute el impacto en el proceso de posicionamiento de la lógica utilizando el kit de herramientas propuesto. Diferentes esquemas de implementación, tomando en cuenta la optimización global en seguridad y coste, se verifican con los experimentos con el fin de encontrar los planes de posicionamiento y reparación optimizados; (b) las validaciones de seguridad se realizan con los métodos de correlación y análisis de tiempo; (c) Una táctica asintótica se aplica a un núcleo AES sobre BCDL estructurado para validar de forma sofisticada el impacto de enrutamiento sobre métricas de seguridad; (d) Los resultados preliminares utilizando el sistema de calefacción auto-adaptativa sobre la variación del proceso son mostrados; (e) Se introduce una aplicación práctica de las herramientas para un diseño de cifrado completa. Capítulo 6 incluye el resumen general del trabajo presentado dentro de esta tesis doctoral. Por último, una breve perspectiva del trabajo futuro se expone, lo que puede ampliar el potencial de utilización de las contribuciones de esta tesis a un alcance más allá de los dominios de la criptografía en FPGAs. ABSTRACT This PhD thesis mainly concentrates on countermeasure techniques related to the Side Channel Attack (SCA), which has been put forward to academic exploitations since 17 years ago. The related research has seen a remarkable growth in the past decades, while the design of solid and efficient protection still curiously remain as an open research topic where more reliable initiatives are required for personal information privacy, enterprise and national data protections. The earliest documented usage of secret code can be traced back to around 1700 B.C., when the hieroglyphs in ancient Egypt are scribed in inscriptions. Information security always gained serious attention from diplomatic or military intelligence transmission. Due to the rapid evolvement of modern communication technique, crypto solution was first incorporated by electronic signal to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and non-repudiation of the transmitted contexts over unsecure cable or wireless channels. Restricted to the computation power before computer era, simple encryption tricks were practically sufficient to conceal information. However, algorithmic vulnerabilities can be excavated to restore the encoding rules with affordable efforts. This fact motivated the development of modern cryptography, aiming at guarding information system by complex and advanced algorithms. The appearance of computers has greatly pushed forward the invention of robust cryptographies, which efficiently offers resistance relying on highly strengthened computing capabilities. Likewise, advanced cryptanalysis has greatly driven the computing technologies in turn. Nowadays, the information world has been involved into a crypto world, protecting any fields by pervasive crypto solutions. These approaches are strong because of the optimized mergence between modern mathematical theories and effective hardware practices, being capable of implement crypto theories into various platforms (microprocessor, ASIC, FPGA, etc). Security needs from industries are actually the major driving metrics in electronic design, aiming at promoting the construction of systems with high performance without sacrificing security. Yet a vulnerability in practical implementation found by Prof. Paul Kocher, et al in 1996 implies that modern digital circuits are inherently vulnerable to an unconventional attack approach, which was named as side-channel attack since then from its analysis source. Critical suspicions to theoretically sound modern crypto algorithms surfaced almost immediately after this discovery. To be specifically, digital circuits typically consist of a great number of essential logic elements (as MOS - Metal Oxide Semiconductor), built upon a silicon substrate during the fabrication. Circuit logic is realized relying on the countless switch actions of these cells. This mechanism inevitably results in featured physical emanation that can be properly measured and correlated with internal circuit behaviors. SCAs can be used to reveal the confidential data (e.g. crypto-key), analyze the logic architecture, timing and even inject malicious faults to the circuits that are implemented in hardware system, like FPGA, ASIC, smart Card. Using various comparison solutions between the predicted leakage quantity and the measured leakage, secrets can be reconstructed at much less expense of time and computation. To be precisely, SCA basically encloses a wide range of attack types, typically as the analyses of power consumption or electromagnetic (EM) radiation. Both of them rely on statistical analyses, and hence require a number of samples. The crypto algorithms are not intrinsically fortified with SCA-resistance. Because of the severity, much attention has to be taken into the implementation so as to assemble countermeasures to camouflage the leakages via "side channels". Countermeasures against SCA are evolving along with the development of attack techniques. The physical characteristics requires countermeasures over physical layer, which can be generally classified into intrinsic and extrinsic vectors. Extrinsic countermeasures are executed to confuse the attacker by integrating noise, misalignment to the intra activities. Comparatively, intrinsic countermeasures are built into the algorithm itself, to modify the implementation for minimizing the measurable leakage, or making them not sensitive any more. Hiding and Masking are two typical techniques in this category. Concretely, masking applies to the algorithmic level, to alter the sensitive intermediate values with a mask in reversible ways. Unlike the linear masking, non-linear operations that widely exist in modern cryptographies are difficult to be masked. Approved to be an effective counter solution, hiding method mainly mentions dual-rail logic, which is specially devised for flattening or removing the data-dependent leakage in power or EM signatures. In this thesis, apart from the context describing the attack methodologies, efforts have also been dedicated to logic prototype, to mount extensive security investigations to countermeasures on logic-level. A characteristic of SCA resides on the format of leak sources. Typical side-channel attack concerns the power based analysis, where the fundamental capacitance from MOS transistors and other parasitic capacitances are the essential leak sources. Hence, a robust SCA-resistant logic must eliminate or mitigate the leakages from these micro units, such as basic logic gates, I/O ports and routings. The vendor provided EDA tools manipulate the logic from a higher behavioral-level, rather than the lower gate-level where side-channel leakage is generated. So, the classical implementations barely satisfy these needs and inevitably stunt the prototype. In this case, a customized and flexible design scheme is appealing to be devised. This thesis profiles an innovative logic style to counter SCA, which mainly addresses three major aspects: I. The proposed logic is based on the hiding strategy over gate-level dual-rail style to dynamically overbalance side-channel leakage from lower circuit layer; II. This logic exploits architectural features of modern FPGAs, to minimize the implementation expenses; III. It is supported by a set of assistant custom tools, incorporated by the generic FPGA design flow, to have circuit manipulations in an automatic manner. The automatic design toolkit supports the proposed dual-rail logic, facilitating the practical implementation on Xilinx FPGA families. While the methodologies and the tools are flexible to be expanded to a wide range of applications where rigid and sophisticated gate- or routing- constraints are desired. In this thesis a great effort is done to streamline the implementation workflow of generic dual-rail logic. The feasibility of the proposed solutions is validated by selected and widely used crypto algorithm, for thorough and fair evaluation w.r.t. prior solutions. All the proposals are effectively verified by security experiments. The presented research work attempts to solve the implementation troubles. The essence that will be formalized along this thesis is that a customized execution toolkit for modern FPGA systems is developed to work together with the generic FPGA design flow for creating innovative dual-rail logic. A method in crypto security area is constructed to obtain customization, automation and flexibility in low-level circuit prototype with fine-granularity in intractable routings. Main contributions of the presented work are summarized next: Precharge Absorbed-DPL logic: Using the netlist conversion to reserve free LUT inputs to execute the Precharge and Ex signal in a dual-rail logic style. A row-crossed interleaved placement method with identical routing pairs in dual-rail networks, which helps to increase the resistance against selective EM measurement and mitigate the impacts from process variations. Customized execution and automatic transformation tools for producing identical networks for the proposed dual-rail logic. (a) To detect and repair the conflict nets; (b) To detect and repair the asymmetric nets. (c) To be used in other logics where strict network control is required in Xilinx scenario. Customized correlation analysis testbed for EM and power attacks, including the platform construction, measurement method and attack analysis. A timing analysis based method for quantifying the security grades. A methodology of security partitions of complex crypto systems for reducing the protection cost. A proof-of-concept self-adaptive heating system to mitigate electrical impacts over process variations in dynamic dual-rail compensation manner. The thesis chapters are organized as follows: Chapter 1 discusses the side-channel attack fundamentals, which covers from theoretic basics to analysis models, and further to platform setup and attack execution. Chapter 2 centers to SCA-resistant strategies against generic power and EM attacks. In this chapter, a major contribution, a compact and secure dual-rail logic style, will be originally proposed. The logic transformation based on bottom-layer design will be presented. Chapter 3 is scheduled to elaborate the implementation challenges of generic dual-rail styles. A customized design flow to solve the implementation problems will be described along with a self-developed automatic implementation toolkit, for mitigating the design barriers and facilitating the processes. Chapter 4 will originally elaborate the tool specifics and construction details. The implementation case studies and security validations for the proposed logic style, as well as a sophisticated routing verification experiment, will be described in Chapter 5. Finally, a summary of thesis conclusions and perspectives for future work are included in Chapter 5. To better exhibit the thesis contents, each chapter is further described next: Chapter 1 provides the introduction of hardware implementation testbed and side-channel attack fundamentals, and mainly contains: (a) The FPGA generic architecture and device features, particularly of Virtex-5 FPGA; (b) The selected crypto algorithm - a commercially and extensively used Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) module - is detailed; (c) The essentials of Side-Channel methods are profiled. It reveals the correlated dissipation leakage to the internal behaviors, and the method to recover this relationship between the physical fluctuations in side-channel traces and the intra processed data; (d) The setups of the power/EM testing platforms enclosed inside the thesis work are given. The content of this thesis is expanded and deepened from chapter 2, which is divided into several aspects. First, the protection principle of dynamic compensation of the generic dual-rail precharge logic is explained by describing the compensated gate-level elements. Second, the novel DPL is originally proposed by detailing the logic protocol and an implementation case study. Third, a couple of custom workflows are shown next for realizing the rail conversion. Meanwhile, the technical definitions that are about to be manipulated above LUT-level netlist are clarified. A brief discussion about the batched process is given in the final part. Chapter 3 studies the implementation challenges of DPLs in FPGAs. The security level of state-of-the-art SCA-resistant solutions are decreased due to the implementation barriers using conventional EDA tools. In the studied FPGA scenario, problems are discussed from dual-rail format, parasitic impact, technological bias and implementation feasibility. According to these elaborations, two problems arise: How to implement the proposed logic without crippling the security level; and How to manipulate a large number of cells and automate the transformation. The proposed PA-DPL in chapter 2 is legalized with a series of initiatives, from structures to implementation methods. Furthermore, a self-adaptive heating system is depicted and implemented to a dual-core logic, assumed to alternatively adjust local temperature for balancing the negative impacts from silicon technological biases on real-time. Chapter 4 centers to the toolkit system. Built upon a third-party Application Program Interface (API) library, the customized toolkit is able to manipulate the logic elements from post P&R circuit (an unreadable binary version of the xdl one) converted to Xilinx xdl format. The mechanism and rationale of the proposed toolkit are carefully convoyed, covering the routing detection and repairing approaches. The developed toolkit aims to achieve very strictly identical routing networks for dual-rail logic both for separate and interleaved placement. This chapter particularly specifies the technical essentials to support the implementations in Xilinx devices and the flexibility to be expanded to other applications. Chapter 5 focuses on the implementation of the case studies for validating the security grades of the proposed logic style from the proposed toolkit. Comprehensive implementation techniques are discussed. (a) The placement impacts using the proposed toolkit are discussed. Different execution schemes, considering the global optimization in security and cost, are verified with experiments so as to find the optimized placement and repair schemes; (b) Security validations are realized with correlation, timing methods; (c) A systematic method is applied to a BCDL structured module to validate the routing impact over security metric; (d) The preliminary results using the self-adaptive heating system over process variation is given; (e) A practical implementation of the proposed toolkit to a large design is introduced. Chapter 6 includes the general summary of the complete work presented inside this thesis. Finally, a brief perspective for the future work is drawn which might expand the potential utilization of the thesis contributions to a wider range of implementation domains beyond cryptography on FPGAs.

Using combined static analysis and profiling for logic program execution time estimation

Predicting statically the running time of programs has many applications ranging from task scheduling in parallel execution to proving the ability of a program to meet strict time constraints. A starting point in order to attack this problem is to infer the computational complexity of such programs (or fragments thereof). This is one of the reasons why the development of static analysis techniques for inferring cost-related properties of programs (usually upper and/or lower bounds of actual costs) has received considerable attention.

Combined static and dynamic assertion-based debugging of constraint logic programs

We propose a general framework for assertion-based debugging of constraint logic programs. Assertions are linguistic constructions for expressing properties of programs. We define several assertion schemas for writing (partial) specifications for constraint logic programs using quite general properties, including user-defined programs. The framework is aimed at detecting deviations of the program behavior (symptoms) with respect to the given assertions, either at compile-time (i.e., statically) or run-time (i.e., dynamically). We provide techniques for using information from global analysis both to detect at compile-time assertions which do not hold in at least one of the possible executions (i.e., static symptoms) and assertions which hold for all possible executions (i.e., statically proved assertions). We also provide program transformations which introduce tests in the program for checking at run-time those assertions whose status cannot be determined at compile-time. Both the static and the dynamic checking are provably safe in the sense that all errors flagged are definite violations of the pecifications. Finally, we report briefly on the currently implemented instances of the generic framework.

Towards execution time estimation for logic programs via static analysis and profiling

Effective static analyses have been proposed which infer bounds on the number of resolutions or reductions. These have the advantage of being independent from the platform on which the programs are executed and have been shown to be useful in a number of applications, such as granularity control in parallel execution. On the other hand, in distributed computation scenarios where platforms with different capabilities come into play, it is necessary to express costs in metrics that include the characteristics of the platform. In particular, it is specially interesting to be able to infer upper and lower bounds on actual execution times. With this objective in mind, we propose an approach which combines compile-time analysis for cost bounds with a one-time profiling of the platform in order to determine the valúes of certain parameters for a given platform. These parameters calíbrate a cost model which, from then on, is able to compute statically time bound functions for procedures and to predict with a significant degree of accuracy the execution times of such procedures in the given platform. The approach has been implemented and integrated in the CiaoPP system.

Combining static analysis and profiling for estimating execution times in logic programs

Effective static analyses have been proposed which allow inferring functions which bound the number of resolutions or reductions. These have the advantage of being independent from the platform on which the programs are executed and such bounds have been shown useful in a number of applications, such as granularity control in parallel execution. On the other hand, in certain distributed computation scenarios where different platforms come into play, with each platform having different capabilities, it is more interesting to express costs in metrics that include the characteristics of the platform. In particular, it is specially interesting to be able to infer upper and lower bounds on actual execution time. With this objective in mind, we propose a method which allows inferring upper and lower bounds on the execution times of procedures of a program in a given execution platform. The approach combines compile-time cost bounds analysis with a one-time profiling of the platform in order to determine the values of certain constants for that platform. These constants calibrate a cost model which from then on is able to compute statically time bound functions for procedures and to predict with a significant degree of accuracy the execution times of such procedures in the given platform. The approach has been implemented and integrated in the CiaoPP system.

A methodology for granularity-based control of parallelism in logic programs

Several types of parallelism can be exploited in logic programs while preserving correctness and efficiency, i.e. ensuring that the parallel execution obtains the same results as the sequential one and the amount of work performed is not greater. However, such results do not take into account a number of overheads which appear in practice, such as process creation and scheduling, which can induce a slow-down, or, at least, limit speedup, if they are not controlled in some way. This paper describes a methodology whereby the granularity of parallel tasks, i.e. the work available under them, is efficiently estimated and used to limit parallelism so that the effect of such overheads is controlled. The run-time overhead associated with the approach is usually quite small, since as much work is done at compile time as possible. Also,a number of run-time optimizations are proposed. Moreover, a static analysis of the overhead associated with the granularity control process is performed in order to decide its convenience. The performance improvements resulting from the incorporation of grain size control are shown to be quite good, specially for systems with medium to large parallel execution overheads.

User-definable resource bounds analysis for logic programs

We present a static analysis that infers both upper and lower bounds on the usage that a logic program makes of a set of user-definable resources. The inferred bounds will in general be functions of input data sizes. A resource in our approach is a quite general, user-defined notion which associates a basic cost function with elementary operations. The analysis then derives the related (upper- and lower-bound) resource usage functions for all predicates in the program. We also present an assertion language which is used to define both such resources and resourcerelated properties that the system can then check based on the results of the analysis. We have performed some preliminary experiments with some concrete resources such as execution steps, bytes sent or received by an application, number of files left open, number of accesses to a datábase, number of calis to a procedure, number of asserts/retracts, etc. Applications of our analysis include resource consumption verification and debugging (including for mobile code), resource control in parallel/distributed computing, and resource-oriented specialization.

A framework for assertion-based debugging in constraint logic programming

We propose a general framework for assertion-based debugging of constraint logic programs. Assertions are linguistic constructions which allow expressing properties of programs. We define assertion schemas which allow writing (partial) specifications for constraint logic programs using quite general properties, including user-defined programs. The framework is aimed at detecting deviations of the program behavior (symptoms) with respect to the given assertions, either at compile-time or run-time. We provide techniques for using information from global analysis both to detect at compile-time assertions which do not hold in at least one of the possible executions (i.e., static symptoms) and assertions which hold for all possible executions (i.e., statically proved assertions). We also provide program transformations which introduce tests in the program for checking at run-time those assertions whose status cannot be determined at compile-time. Both the static and the dynamic checking are provably safe in the sense that all errors flagged are definite violations of the specifications. Finally, we report on an implemented instance of the assertion language and framework.

Towards granularity based control of parallelism in logic programs

Several types of parallelism can be exploited in logic programs while preserving correctness and efficiency, i.e. ensuring that the parallel execution obtains the same results as the sequential one and the amount of work performed is not greater. However, such results do not take into account a number of overheads which appear in practice, such as process creation and scheduling, which can induce a slow-down, or, at least, limit speedup, if they are not controlled in some way. This paper describes a methodology whereby the granularity of parallel tasks, i.e. the work available under them, is efficiently estimated and used to limit parallelism so that the effect of such overheads is controlled. The run-time overhead associated with the approach is usually quite small, since as much work is done at compile time as possible. Also, a number of run-time optimizations are proposed. Moreover, a static analysis of the overhead associated with the granularity control process is performed in order to decide its convenience. The performance improvements resulting from the incorporation of grain size control are shown to be quite good, specially for systems with médium to large parallel execution overheads.

Estimating the computational cost of logic programs

Information about the computational cost of programs is potentially useful for a variety of purposes, including selecting among different algorithms, guiding program transformations, in granularity control and mapping decisions in parallelizing compilers, and query optimization in deductive databases. Cost analysis of logic programs is complicated by nondeterminism: on the one hand, procedures can return múltiple Solutions, making it necessary to estímate the number of solutions in order to give nontrivial upper bound cost estimates; on the other hand, the possibility of failure has to be taken into account while estimating lower bounds. Here we discuss techniques to address these problems to some extent.

Strange attractor in optical logic cells

Optical logic cells, employed in several tasks as optical computing or optically controlled switches for photonic switching, offer a very particular behavior when the working conditions are slightly modified. One of the more striking changes occurs when some delayed feedback is applied between one of the possible output gates and a control input. Some of these new phenomena have been studied by us and reported in previous papers. A chaotic behavior is one of the more characteristic results and its possible applications range from communications to cryptography. But the main problem related with this behavior is the binary character of the resulting signal. Most of the nowadays-employed techniques to analyze chaotic signals concern to analogue signals where algebraic equations are possible to obtain. There are no specific tools to study digital chaotic signals. Some methods have been proposed. One of the more used is equivalent to the phase diagram in analogue chaos. The binary signal is converted to hexadecimal and then analyzed. We represented the fractal characteristics of the signal. It has the characteristics of a strange attractor and gives more information than the obtained from previous methods. A phase diagram, as the one obtained by previous techniques, may fully cover its surface with the trajectories and almost no information may be obtained from it. Now, this new method offers the evolution around just a certain area being this lines the strange attractor.

Logic cells as basic structures to add/drop WDM information signals

Nowadays, in order to take advantage of fiber optic bandwidth, any optical communications system tends to be WDM. The way to extract a channel, characterized by a wavelength, from the optical fiber is to filter the specific wavelength. This gives the systems a low degree of freedom due to the fact of the static character of most of the employed devices. In this paper we will present a different way to extract channels from an optical fiber with WDM transmission. The employed method is based on an Optically Programmable Logic Cells (OPLC) previously published by us, for other applications as a chaotic generator or as basic element for optical computing. In this paper we will describe the configuration of the OPLC to be employed as a dropping device. It acts as a filter because it will extract the data carried by a concrete wavelength. It does depend, internally, on the wavelength. We will show how the intensity of the signal is able to select the chosen information from the line. It will be also demonstrated that a new idea of redundant information it is the way of selecting the concrete wavelength. As a matter of fact this idea is apparently the only way to use the OPLC as a dropping device. Moreover, based on these concepts, a similar way to route signals to different routes is reported. The basis is the use of photonic switching configurations, namely Batcher or Bayan structures, where the unit switching cells are the above indicated OPLCs.