Optimization of the irrigation time and irrigation frequency by using Hydrus-2D and a capacitance FDR sensor

The evolution of water content on a sandy soil during the sprinkler irrigation campaign, in the summer of 2010, of a field of sugar beet crop located at Valladolid (Spain) is assessed by a capacitive FDR (Frequency Domain Reflectometry) EnviroScan. This field is one of the experimental sites of the Spanish research center for the sugar beet development (AIMCRA). The objective of the work focus on monitoring the soil water content evolution of consecutive irrigations during the second two weeks of July (from the 12th to the 28th). These measurements will be used to simulate water movement by means of Hydrus-2D. The water probe logged water content readings (m3/m3) at 10, 20, 40 and 60 cm depth every 30 minutes. The probe was placed between two rows in one of the typical 12 x 15 m sprinkler irrigation framework. Furthermore, a texture analysis at the soil profile was also conducted. The irrigation frequency in this farm was set by the own personal farmer 0 s criteria that aiming to minimizing electricity pumping costs, used to irrigate at night and during the weekend i.e. longer irrigation frequency than expected. However, the high evapotranspiration rates and the weekly sugar beet water consumption—up to 50mm/week—clearly determined the need for lower this frequency. Moreover, farmer used to irrigate for six or five hours whilst results from the EnviroScan probe showed the soil profile reaching saturation point after the first three hours. It must be noted that AIMCRA provides to his members with a SMS service regarding weekly sugar beet water requirement; from the use of different meteorological stations and evapotranspiration pans, farmers have an idea of the weekly irrigation needs. Nevertheless, it is the farmer 0 s decision to decide how to irrigate. Thus, in order to minimize water stress and pumping costs, a suitable irrigation time and irrigation frequency was modeled with Hydrus-2D. Results for the period above mentioned showed values of water content ranging from 35 and 30 (m3/m3) for the first 10 and 20cm profile depth (two hours after irrigation) to the minimum 14 and 13 (m3/m3) ( two hours before irrigation). For the 40 and 60 cm profile depth, water content moves steadily across the dates: The greater the root activity the greater the water content variation. According to the results in the EnviroScan probe and the modeling in Hydrus-2D, shorter frequencies and irrigation times are suggested.

Prototype emitter for use in subsurface drip irrigation: Manufacturing, hydraulic evaluation and experimental analyses

The current research aims to analyse theoretically and evaluate a self-manufactured simple design for subsurface drip irrigation (SDI) emitter to avoid root and soil intrusion. It was composed of three concentric cylindrical elements: an elastic silicone membrane; a polyethylene tube with two holes drilled on its wall for water discharge; and a vinyl polychloride protector system to wrap the other elements. The discharge of the emitter depends on the change in the membrane diameter when it is deformed by the water pressure. The study of the operation of this emitter is a new approach that considers mechanical and hydraulic principles. Thus, the estimation on the membrane deformation was based on classical mechanical stress theories in composite cylinders. The hydraulic principles considered the solid deformation due to force based on water pressure and the general Darcy–Weisbach head-loss equation. Twenty emitter units, with the selected design, were handcrafted in a lathe and were used in this study. The measured pressure/discharge relationship for the emitters showed good agreement with that calculated by the theoretical approach. The variation coefficient of the handcrafted emitters was high compared to commercial emitters. Results from field evaluations showed variable values for the relative flow variation, water emission uniformity and relative flow rate coefficients, but no emitter was obstructed. Therefore, the current emitter design could be suitable for SDI following further studies to develop a final prototype.

Investigación sobre las causas que pudieron originar el hundimiento de la cubierta del tercer depósito del Canal de Isabel II en 1905

En la presente investigación se analiza la causa del hundimiento del cuarto compartimento del Tercer Depósito del Canal de Isabel II el 8 de abril de 1905, uno de los más graves de la historia de la construcción en España: fallecieron 30 personas y quedaron heridas otras 60. El Proyecto y Construcción de esta estructura era de D. José Eugenio Ribera, una de las grandes figuras de la ingeniería civil en nuestro país, cuya carrera pudo haber quedado truncada como consecuencia del siniestro. Dado el tiempo transcurrido desde la ocurrencia de este accidente, la investigación ha partido de la recopilación de la información relativa al Proyecto y a la propia construcción de la estructura, para revisar a continuación la información disponible sobre el hundimiento. De la construcción de la cubierta es interesante destacar la atrevida configuración estructural, cubriéndose una inmensa superficie de 74.000 m2 mediante una sucesión de bóvedas de hormigón armado de tan sólo 5 cm de espesor y un rebajamiento de 1/10 para salvar una luz de 6 m, que apoyaban en pórticos del mismo material, con pilares también muy esbeltos: 0,25 m de lado para 8 m de altura. Y todo ello en una época en la que la tecnología y conocimiento de las estructuras con este "nuevo" material se basaban en buena medida en el desarrollo de patentes. En cuanto a la información sobre el hundimiento, llama la atención en primer lugar la relevancia de los técnicos, peritos y letrados que intervinieron en el juicio y en el procedimiento administrativo posterior, poniéndose de manifiesto la trascendencia que el accidente tuvo en su momento y que, sin embargo, no ha trascendido hasta nuestros días. Ejemplo de ello es el papel de Echegaray -primera figura intelectual de la época- como perito en la defensa de Ribera, de D. Melquiades Álvarez -futuro presidente del Congreso- como abogado defensor, el General Marvá -uno de los máximos exponentes del papel de los ingenieros militares en la introducción del hormigón armado en nuestro país-, que presidiría la Comisión encargada del peritaje por parte del juzgado, o las opiniones de reconocidas personalidades internacionales del "nuevo" material como el Dr. von Emperger o Hennebique. Pero lo más relevante de dicha información es la falta de uniformidad sobre lo que pudo ocasionar el hundimiento: fallos en los materiales, durante la construcción, defectos en el diseño de la estructura, la realización de unas pruebas de carga cuando se concluyó ésta, etc. Pero la que durante el juicio y en los Informes posteriores se impuso como causa del fallo de la estructura fue su dilatación como consecuencia de las altas temperaturas que se produjeron aquella primavera. Y ello a pesar de que el hundimiento ocurrió a las 7 de la mañana... Con base en esta información se ha analizado el comportamiento estructural de la cubierta, permitiendo evaluar el papel que diversos factores pudieron tener en el inicio del hundimiento y en su extensión a toda la superficie construida, concluyéndose así cuáles fueron las causas del siniestro. De los resultados obtenidos se presta especial atención a las enseñanzas que se desprenden de la ocurrencia del hundimiento, enfatizándose en la relevancia de la historia -y en particular de los casos históricos de error- para la formación continua que debe existir en la Ingeniería. En el caso del hundimiento del Tercer Depósito algunas de estas "enseñanzas" son de plena actualidad, tales como la importancia de los detalles constructivos en la "robustez" de la estructuras, el diseño de estructuras "integrales" o la vigilancia del proceso constructivo. Por último, la investigación ha servido para recuperar, una vez más, la figura de D. José Eugenio Ribera, cuyo papel en la introducción del hormigón armado en España fue decisivo. En la obra del Tercer Depósito se arriesgó demasiado, y provocó un desastre que aceleró la transición hacia una nueva etapa en el hormigón estructural al abrigo de un mayor conocimiento científico y de las primeras normativas. También en esta etapa sería protagonista. This dissertation analyses the cause of the collapse of the 4th compartment of the 3th Reservoir of Canal de Isabel II in Madrid. It happened in 1905, on April 8th, being one of the most disastrous accidents occurred in the history of Spanish construction: 30 people died and 60 were injured. The design and construction supervision were carried out by D. José Eugenio Ribera, one of the main figures in Civil Engineering of our country, whose career could have been destroyed as a result of this accident. Since it occurred more than 100 years ago, the investigation started by compiling information about the structure`s design and construction, followed by reviewing the available information about the accident. With regard to the construction, it is interesting to point out its daring structural configuration. It covered a huge area of 74.000 m2 with a series of reinforced concrete vaults with a thickness of not more than 5 cm, a 6 m span and a rise of 1/10th. In turn, these vaults were supported by frames composed of very slender 0,25 m x 0,25 m columns with a height of 8 m. It is noteworthy that this took place in a time when the technology and knowledge about this "new" material was largely based on patents. In relation to the information about the collapse, its significance is shown by the important experts and lawyers that were involved in the trial and the subsequent administrative procedure. For example, Echegaray -the most important intellectual of that time- defended Ribera, Melquiades Álvarez –the future president of the Congress- was his lawyer, and General Marvá -who represented the important role of the military engineers in the introduction of reinforced concrete in our country-, led the Commission that was put in charge by the judge of the root cause analysis. In addition, the matter caught the interest of renowned foreigners like Dr. von Emperger or Hennebique and their opinions had a great influence. Nonetheless, this structural failure is unknown to most of today’s engineers. However, what is most surprising are the different causes that were claimed to lie at the root of the disaster: material defects, construction flaws, errors in the design, load tests performed after the structure was finished, etc. The final cause that was put forth during the trial and in the following reports was attributed to the dilatation of the roof due to the high temperatures that spring, albeit the collapse occurred at 7 AM... Based on this information the structural behaviour of the roof has been analysed, which allowed identifying the causes that could have provoked the initial failure and those that could have led to the global collapse. Lessons have been learned from these results, which points out the relevance of history -and in particular, of examples gone wrong- for the continuous education that should exist in engineering. In the case of the 3th Reservoir some of these lessons are still relevant during the present time, like the importance of detailing in "robustness", the design of "integral" structures or the due consideration of construction methods. Finally, the investigation has revived, once again, the figure of D. José Eugenio Ribera, whose role in the introduction of reinforced concrete in Spain was crucial. With the construction of the 3th Reservoir he took too much risk and caused a disaster that accelerated the transition to a new era in structural concrete based on greater scientific knowledge and the first codes. In this new period he would also play a major role.