Implementation of safety based incentives in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs): an empirical analysis for the case of Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented to circumvent budgetary constraints, and to encourage efficiency and quality in the provision of public infrastructure in order to reach social welfare. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs in such a way that the better the safety outcome the greater larger will be the economic reward to the contractor. The main aim of this paper is to identify whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To that end, Poisson and negative binomial regression models have been applied using information of motorways of the Spanish network of 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Effectiveness of safety-based incentives in Public Private Partnerships: Evidence from the case of Spain

Many countries around the world are implementing Public?Private?Partnership (PPP) contacts to manage road infrastructure. In some of these contracts the public sector introduces economic incentives to the private operator to foster the accomplishment of social goals. One of the incentives that have been introduced in some PPP contracts is related to safety in such a way that the better the safety outcome the greater will be the economic reward to the contractor. The aim of this paper is at identify whether the incentives to improve road safety in highway PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety ratios. To this end Poisson and negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from highway sections in Spain. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Public Private Partnerships in the Humanitarian Aid

This master thesis is intended to perform an exploratory approach for the potential to Public-Private Partnerships as a tool for advanced collaboration between businesses and the cooperation system in the specific context of humanitarian action. It intends to conduct a case study analysis of representative interactions between the public and private actors in the humanitarian aid, and in conjunction with a profound revision of the existing literature, creates a set of conclusions and recommendations that can serve as a prototype for possible inclusion guide the private sector in humanitarian action through new paradigms that go beyond the classical donor-recipient model.

EU support mechanisms to promote public private partnerships for financing Trans-European transport infrastructure

Since the mid 80ies the Trans ‐European Transport Network (TEN‐T) policy has been setting the framework for the development of infrastructure for the smooth functioning of the internal market within the European Union (EU). Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have always been regarded by the EU as a key instrument to promote the TEN‐T.

Analysis of safety-based incentives in public private partnerships. The case of Spain

OUTLINE: • Introduction • Experimental Setup • Experimental Procedure • Experimental Results - Surface Roughness - Residual Stresses - Friction - Wear - EDX • Conclusions

Analysis of alternative tendering mechanisms for transportation Public-Private Partnerships

This paper describes a theoretical model based primarily on transaction costs, for comparing the various tendering mechanisms used for transportation Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. In particular, the model contrasts negotiated procedures with the open procedure, as defined by the current European Union legislation on public tendering. The model includes both ex ante transaction costs (borne during the tendering stage) and ex post transaction costs (such as enforcement costs, re-negotiation costs, and costs arising from litigation between partners), explaining the trade-off between them. Generally speaking, it is assumed that the open procedure implies lower transaction costs ex ante, while the negotiated procedure reduces the probability of the appearance of new contingencies not foreseen in the contract, hence diminishing the expected value of transaction costs ex post. Therefore, the balance between ex ante and ex post transaction costs is the main criterion for deciding whether the open or negotiated procedure would be optimal. Notwithstanding, empirical evidence currently exists only on ex ante transaction costs in transportation infrastructure projects. This evidence has shown a relevant difference between the two procedures as far as ex ante costs are concerned, favouring the open procedure. The model developed in this paper also demonstrates that a larger degree of complexity in a contract does not unequivocally favour the use of a negotiated procedure. Only in those cases dealing with very innovative projects, where important dimensions of the quality of the asset or service are not verifiable, may we observe an advantage in favour of the negotiated procedure. The bottom line is that we find it difficult to justify the employment of negotiated procedures in most transportation PPP contracts, especially in the field of roads. Nevertheless, the field remains open for future empirical work and research on the levels of transaction costs borne ex post in PPP contracts, as well as on the probabilities of such costs appearing under any of the procurement procedures.

Application of Public Private Partnerships to the Spanish Airport System

The current deficit situation of the Spanish airport system suggests the need to manage this in a more efficient and profitable way. One of the possible options is through private management and being able to do this through Public Private Partnerships (PPP). This study analyzes the situation of the sector and its economic importance and the different possibilities for introducing private management in a public company, specifying the situation in the case of airports, presenting the advantages and disadvantages of these possibilities, and aiming at results obtained in other places where it has been applied. It is proposed that the ideal model for the introduction of private management would be through PPP models tailored to each airport, but having common characteristics according to the group they belong to. Finally, we observe that not all airports are commercially attractive, so that the PPP concept does not apply to all of them. In some cases even the operability itself is not viable at all, and that should be considered separately in order to avoid creating a private monopoly while trying to enhance competition among them.

Do Public Private Partnerships Improve Road Safety? The Case of Toll Concessions in Spain

El Transportation Research Board es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte. Aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to evaluate whether PPPs lead to an improvement in road safety, when compared with other infrastructure management systems. Second, is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPP contracts in Spain have been effective at improving safety performance. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high-capacity network covering years 2007-2009. The results showed that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not manageable by the private concessionaire such as the average annual daily traffic, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of accidents.

The role of private sector in development: The relation between public-private investment in infrastructure and agricultural exports in developing countries

Increasing foreign private investment in developing countries explains why the Public-Private Investment (PPI) is becoming a key tool to reach the development goal. This article analyzes the relation between PPI in infrastructure and agricultural exports in developing countries. We use the panel data approach (52 countries and 17 years). Results show that PPI in infrastructure has a positive impact on agricultural exports of developing countries. The impact is greater in developing countries with higher income rates. This suggests that the lower income countries require the intervention of public sector without which private investment cannot help to economic development.

Analysis of road safety incentives in highway concessions in Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, encourage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. These performance based standards often refer to different aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high capacity network in 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Is there scope for a new project bond market in Europe? A promising opportunity for promoting transnational infrastructure

La Unión Europea acaba de lanzar una iniciativa para fomentar Participaciones Público Privadas (PPPs) mediante bonos de proyecto más atractivos a inversores institucionales para promover proyectos transeuropeos. Esto se logra a través de mecanismos de mejora crediticia como garantías de liquidez o tramos de deuda subordinada facilitados por el Banco Europeo de Inversiones. Esta iniciativa pretende evitar los problemas de liquidez experimentados actualmente por bancos comerciales en Europa para financiar megaproyectos. En este artículo exploramos las ventajas e inconvenientes de esta iniciativa para promover redes de infraestructuras transnacionales en Europa, y analizamos su aplicabilidad a otras áreas como Latino-América. The European Union recently launched an initiative to foster Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for delivering Trans-European projects by making long-term project-bonds more appealing to institutional investors. This is achieved through credit-enhancement mechanisms such as partial stand-by liquidity guarantees, or layers of subordinated debt provided by the European Investment Bank. This initiative intends to circumvent the liquidity problems currently endured by commercial banks in Europe to fund megaprojects. In this paper we explore the advantages and drawbacks of this initiative for promoting transnational infrastructure networks in Europe, and analyse its applicability to other economic areas such as Latin America.

PPP in light rail transit systems in Spain

Light rail systems have proliferated in Spain in the last decade, following a tendency that is common not only in other European countries but also in other parts of the world. This paper reviews the benefits of light rail systems, both related to environmental issues and mobility issues. It analyses the evolution of light rail projects in Spain and shows that light rail systems in this country have evolved towards an extensive use of public-private partnerships. The analysis of the Spanish projects, however, does not contribute any conclusive evidence about whether public-private partnerships have been more efficient than publicly owned enterprises in building and operating light rail systems.

Analysis of road safety incentives in highway concessions in Spain

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, encourage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. These performance based standards often refer to different aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high capacity network in 2006. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.

Impacto del entorno institucional en la financiación público-privada de infraestructuras de transporte

Actualmente el sector privado posee un papel relevante en la provisión y gestión de infraestructuras de transporte en los países de ingreso medio‐bajo, principalmente a través de los proyectos de participación público‐privada (PPPs). Muchos países han impulsado este tipo de proyectos con el fin de hacer frente a la gran demanda de infraestructuras de transporte existente, debido a la escasez de recursos públicos y a la falta de eficiencia en la provisión de los servicios públicos. Como resultado, las PPPs han experimentado un crecimiento importante en las últimas dos décadas a nivel mundial. A pesar de esta tendencia creciente, muchos países no han sido capaces de atraer la participación del sector privado para la provisión de sus infraestructuras o no han logrado el nivel de participación privada que habrían requerido para alcanzar sus objetivos. Según numerosos autores, el desarrollo y el éxito de los proyectos PPP de infraestructuras de transporte de cualquier país está condicionado por una diversidad de factores, siendo uno de ellos la calidad de su entorno institucional. La presente tesis tiene como objetivo principal analizar la influencia del entorno institucional en el volumen de inversión en proyectos de participación público‐privada de infraestructuras de transporte en los países de ingreso medio‐bajo. Para acometer dicho objetivo se ha realizado un análisis empírico de 81 países distribuidos en seis regiones del mundo, durante el periodo 1996‐2013. En el análisis se han desarrollado dos modelos empíricos aplicando principalmente dos metodologías: el contraste de hipótesis y los modelos de datos de panel Tobit. El desarrollo de estos modelos ha permitido analizar de una forma exhaustiva el tema de estudio. Los resultados obtenidos aportan evidencia de que la calidad del entorno institucional posee una influencia significativa en el volumen de inversión en los proyectos PPP de transporte. En general, en esta tesis se muestran evidencias empíricas de que el sector privado ha tendido a invertir en mayor medida en países con entornos institucionales fuertes, es decir, en aquellos países en los que ha existido un mayor nivel de Estado de derecho, estabilidad política y regulatoria, efectividad del gobierno, así como un mayor control de la corrupción. Además, aquellos países donde se ha registrado una mejora en el nivel de su calidad institucional también han experimentado un incremento en el volumen de inversión en PPP de transporte. The private sector has an important role in the provision and management of transport infrastructure in countries of medium‐low income, primarily through projects of public‐private partnerships (PPPs). Many countries have developed PPP projects to meet the high demand of transport infrastructure, due to the scarcity of public resources and the lack of efficiency in the provision of public services. As a result, PPPs have experienced a significant growth, worldwide, in the past two decades. Despite this growing trend, many countries have not been able to attract private sector participation in the provision of infrastructure or have not accomplished the level of private participation that would have required to achieve its objectives. According to various authors, the development of PPP projects for transport infrastructure is determined by a number of factors, one of them being the quality of the institutional environment. The main objective of this dissertation is to analyze the influence of the institutional environment on the volume of investment, in projects of public‐private partnerships for transport infrastructure in countries of medium‐low income. In order to meet this objective, we conducted an empirical analysis of 81 countries, in six regions of the world, during the period of 1996‐2013. The analysis used two empirical models, implementing different methodologies and various statistical techniques: hypothesis testing, and Tobit model using panel data. The development of these models allowed to carry out a more comprehensive analysis. The results show that the quality of the institutional environment has a significant influence on the volume of investment in PPP projects of transport. Overall, this dissertation shows that the private sector tends to invest more in countries with stronger institutional environments, i.e. countries where there has been a higher level of Rule of Law, political and regulatory stability, and an effective control of corruption. In addition, those that have improved the level of institutional quality have also experienced an increase in the volume of investment in PPP of transport.

Evaluación de la distribución de riesgos en los distintos modelos de asociación público-privada para la provisión de infraestructura carretera en México

México es de los pocos países en el mundo que ha realizado dos grandes programas para la construcción de autopistas en colaboración con el sector privado. El primero, fue realizado entre 1989 y 1994, con resultados adversos por el mal diseño del esquema de concesiones; y, el segundo con mejores resultados, en operación desde 2003 mediante nuevos modelos de asociación público-privada (APP). El objetivo de la presente investigación es estudiar los modelos de asociación público-privada empleados en México para la provisión de infraestructura carretera, realizando el análisis y la evaluación de la distribución de riesgos entre el sector público y privado en cada uno de los modelos con el propósito de establecer una propuesta de reasignación de riesgos para disminuir el costo global y la incertidumbre de los proyectos. En la primera parte se describe el estado actual del conocimiento de las asociaciones público-privadas para desarrollar proyectos de infraestructura, incluyendo los antecedentes, la definición y las tipologías de los esquemas APP, así como la práctica internacional de programas como el modelo británico Private Finance Initiative (PFI), resultados de proyectos en la Unión Europea y programas APP en otros países. También, se destaca la participación del sector privado en el financiamiento de la infraestructura del transporte de México en la década de 1990. En los capítulos centrales se aborda el estudio de los modelos APP que se han utilizado en el país en la construcción de la red de carreteras de alta capacidad. Se presentan las características y los resultados del programa de autopistas 1989-94, así como el rescate financiero y las medidas de reestructuración de los proyectos concesionados, aspectos que obligaron a las autoridades mexicanas a cambiar la normatividad para la aprobación de los proyectos según su rentabilidad, modificar la legislación de caminos y diseñar nuevos esquemas de colaboración entre el gobierno y el sector privado. Los nuevos modelos APP vigentes desde 2003 son: nuevo modelo de concesiones para desarrollar autopistas de peaje, modelo de proyectos de prestación de servicios (peaje sombra) para modernizar carreteras existentes y modelo de aprovechamiento de activos para concesionar autopistas de peaje en operación a cambio de un pago. De estos modelos se realizaron estudios de caso en los que se determinan medidas de desempeño operativo (niveles de tráfico, costos y plazos de construcción) y rentabilidad financiera (tasa interna de retorno y valor presente neto). En la última parte se efectúa la identificación, análisis y evaluación de los riesgos que afectaron los costos, el tiempo de ejecución y la rentabilidad de los proyectos de ambos programas. Entre los factores de riesgo analizados se encontró que los más importantes fueron: las condiciones macroeconómicas del país (inflación, producto interno bruto, tipo de cambio y tasa de interés), deficiencias en la planificación de los proyectos (diseño, derecho de vía, tarifas, permisos y estimación del tránsito) y aportaciones públicas en forma de obra. Mexico is one of the few countries in the world that has developed two major programs for highway construction in collaboration with the private sector. The first one was carried out between 1989 and 1994 with adverse outcomes due to the wrong design of concession schemes; and, the second one, in operation since 2003, through new public-private partnership models (PPPs). The objective of this research is to study public-private partnership models used in Mexico for road infrastructure provision, performing the analysis and evaluation of risk’s distribution between the public and the private sector in each model in order to draw up a proposal for risk’s allocation to reduce the total cost and the uncertainty of projects. The first part describes the current state of knowledge in public-private partnership to develop infrastructure projects, including the history, definition and types of PPP models, as well as international practice of programs such as the British Private Finance Initiative (PFI) model, results in the European Union and PPP programs in other countries. Also, it stands out the private sector participation in financing of Mexico’s transport infrastructure in 1990s. The next chapters present the study of public-private partnerships models that have been used in the country in the construction of the high capacity road network. Characteristics and outcomes of the highway program 1989-94 are presented, as well as the financial bailout and restructuring measures of the concession projects, aspects that forced the Mexican authorities to change projects regulations, improve road’s legislation and design new schemes of cooperation between the Government and the private sector. The new PPP models since 2003 are: concession model to develop toll highways, private service contracts model (shadow toll) to modernize existing roads and highway assets model for the concession of toll roads in operation in exchange for a payment. These models were analyzed using case studies in which measures of operational performance (levels of traffic, costs and construction schedules) and financial profitability (internal rate of return and net present value) are determined. In the last part, the analysis and assessment of risks that affect costs, execution time and profitability of the projects are carried out, for both programs. Among the risk factors analyzed, the following ones were found to be the most important: country macroeconomic conditions (inflation, gross domestic product, exchange rate and interest rate), deficiencies in projects planning (design, right of way, tolls, permits and traffic estimation) and public contributions in the form of construction works.