Innovative tools to address drought risk in grazing lands

Drought spells can impose severe impacts in most vulnerable farms. It is well known that uninsured exposure exacerbates income inequality in farming systems. However, high administrative costs of traditional insurance hinder small farmers? access to risk management tools. The existence of moral hazard and systemic risk prevents the implementation of traditional insurance programs to address drought risk in rural areas. Innovative technologies like satellite images are being used to derive vegetation index which are highly correlated with drought impacts. The implementation of this technology in agricultural insurance may help to overcome some of the limitations of traditional insurance. However, basis risk has been identified as one of the main problems that hinder the acceptance of index insurance. In this paper we focus on the analyses of basis risk under different contract options in the grazing lands of the Araucanía region. A vegetation index database is used to develop an actuarial insurance model and estimate risk premiums for moderate and severe drought coverage. Risk premium sharply increases with risk coverage. In contrast with previous findings in the literature, our results are not conclusive and show that lowering the coverage level does not necessarily imply a reduction in basis risk. Further analyses of the relation between contract design and basis risk is a promising area of research that may render an important social utility for most vulnerable farming systems.

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used