The secret to legal foretelling: generic and inter-generic aspects of vagueness in contracts, patents and regulations

In this genre analysis research paper, we compare U.S. patents, contracts, and regulations on technical matters with a focus upon the relation between vagueness and communicative purposes and subpurposes of these three genres. Our main interest is the investigation of intergeneric conventions across the three genres, based on the software analysis of three corpora (one for each genre, 1 million words per corpus). The result of the investigation is that intergeneric conventions are found at the level of types of expressed linguistic vagueness, but that intergeneric conventions at the level of actual formulations are rare. The conclusion is that at this latter level the influence from the situation type underlying the individual genre is more important than the overarching legal character of the genres, when we talk about introducing explicit vagueness in the text.

Evaluation of the trading development in the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market

The efficiency of the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market in its first five and a half years is assessed in terms of volume, open interest and price. The continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. Its volume is strongly correlated to that of the Over The Counter (OTC) market, the amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial agents and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume in its clearing house. The hedging efficiency, measured through the ratio between the final open interest and the cleared volume, shows the lowest values for the Spanish base load futures as they are the most liquid contracts. The ex-post forward risk premium has diminished due to the learning curve and the effect of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. This market is quite less developed than the European leaders headquartered in Norway and Germany. Enrolment of more traders, mainly international energy companies, financial agents, energy intensive industries and renewable generation companies is desired. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains.

Analysis of the Iberian Power Forward Price Formation

The price formation of the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market-the power futures market-starting in July 2006, is assessed until November 2011, through the evolution of the difference between forward and spot prices in the delivery period (“ex-post forward risk premium”) and the comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”). The premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (futures, Over-the-Counter and auctions for catering part of the last resort supplies). Since year 2011, the values are smaller due to regulatorily recognized prices for coal power plants. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The spreads built with prompt contracts tend also to be positive. The biggest ones are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity.

Analysis of the traded volume drivers of the Iberian power futures market

A comprehensive assessment of the liquidity development in the Iberian power futures market managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”) in its first 4 years of existence is performed. This market started on July 2006. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market is built as a function of 12 potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the “Over The Counter” (OTC) market, and the OTC cleared volumes in OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). Furthermore, the enrollment of financial members shows strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (Nord Pool and EEX). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (energy intensive industries, suppliers, and small producers) as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions.

Water option contracts for reducing water supply risks: an application to the Tagus-Segura Transfer

El agua es un recurso cada vez más escaso y valioso. Por ello, los recursos hídricos disponibles deben asignarse de una forma eficiente entre los diferentes usos. El cambio climático aumentará la frecuencia y severidad de los eventos extremos, y podría incrementar la demanda de agua de los cultivos. El empleo de mecanismos flexibles de asignación de agua puede ser imprescindible para hacer frente a este aumento en la variabilidad del balance hídrico y para asegurar que los riesgos de suministro, y no solo los recursos, son compartidos de manera eficiente entre los usuarios. Los mercados de agua permiten la reasignación de los recursos hídricos, favoreciendo su transferencia desde los usos de menor a los de mayor valor. Diferentes tipos de mercados de agua se han establecido en diferentes partes del mundo, ayudando a los participantes a afrontar los problemas de escasez de agua en esas zonas. En España, los intercambios de agua están permitidos desde 1999, aunque la participación de los usuarios en el mercado ha sido limitada. Hay varios aspectos de los mercados de agua en España que deben mejorarse. Esta tesis, además de proponer una serie de cambios en el marco regulatorio, propone la introducción de contratos de opción de agua como una posible mejora. La principal ventaja de este tipo de contratos es la estabilidad legal e institucional que éstos proporcionan tanto a compradores como vendedores. Para apoyar esta propuesta, se han llevado a cabo diferentes análisis que muestran el potencial de los contratos de opción como herramienta de reducción del riesgo asociado a una oferta de agua inestable. La Cuenca del Segura (Sureste de España), la Cuenca del Tajo y el Acueducto Tajo- Segura han sido seleccionados como casos de estudio. Tres análisis distintos aplicados a dicha región se presentan en esta tesis: a) una evaluación de los contratos de opción como mecanismo para reducir los riesgos de disponibilidad de agua sufridos por los regantes en la Cuenca del Segura; b) un marco teórico para analizar las preferencias de los regantes por diferentes mecanismos de gestión del riesgo de disponibilidad de agua, su disposición a pagar por ellos y los precios aproximados de estos instrumentos (seguro de sequía y contratos de opción de agua); y c) una evaluación del papel de los contratos de opción en las decisiones de aprovisionamiento de agua de una comunidad de regantes ante una oferta de agua incierta. Los resultados muestran el potencial de reducción del riesgo de los contratos de opción para regantes en España, pero pueden ser extrapolados a otros sectores o regiones. Las principales conclusiones de esta tesis son: a) la agricultura será uno de los sectores más afectados por el cambio climático. Si los precios del agua aumentan, la rentabilidad de los cultivos puede caer hasta niveles negativos, lo que podría dar lugar al abandono de cultivos de regadío en algunas zonas de España. Las políticas de cambio climático y de agua deben estar estrechamente coordinadas para asegurar un uso de agua eficiente y la rentabilidad de la agricultura; b) aunque los mercados de agua han ayudado a algunos usuarios a afrontar problemas de disponibilidad del recurso en momentos de escasez, hay varios aspectos que deben mejorarse; c) es necesario desarrollar mercados de agua más flexibles y estables para garantizar una asignación eficiente de los recursos entre los usuarios de agua; d) los resultados muestran los beneficios derivados del establecimiento de un contrato de opción entre usuarios de agua del Tajo y del Segura para reducir el riesgo de disponibilidad de agua en la cuenca receptora; e) la disposición a pagar de los regantes por un contrato de opción de agua o un seguro de sequía hidrológica, que representa el valor que tienen estos mecanismos para aquellos usuarios de agua que se enfrentan a riesgos relacionados con la disponibilidad del recurso, es consistente con los resultados obtenidos en estudios previos y superior al precio de mercado de estos instrumentos, lo que favorece la viabilidad de estos mecanismos de gestión del riesgo ; y f) los contratos de opción podrían ayudar a optimizar las decisiones de aprovisionamiento de agua bajo incertidumbre, proporcionando más estabilidad y flexibilidad que los mercados temporales de agua. ABSTRACT Water is becoming increasingly scarce and valuable. Thus, existing water resources need to be efficiently allocated among users. Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of extreme events, and it may also increase irrigated crops' water demand. The implementation of flexible allocation mechanisms could be essential to cope with this increased variability of the water balance and ensure that supply risks, and not only water resources, are also efficiently shared and managed. Water markets allow for the reallocation of water resources from low to high value uses. Different water trading mechanisms have been created in different parts of the world and have helped users to alleviate water scarcity problems in those areas. In Spain, water trading is allowed since 1999, although market activity has been limited. There are several issues in the Spanish water market that should be improved. This thesis, besides proposing several changes in the legislative framework, proposes the introduction of water option contracts as a potential improvement. The main advantage for both buyer and seller derived from an option contract is the institutional and legal stability it provides. To support this proposal, different analyses have been carried out that show the potential of option contracts as a risk reduction tool to manage water supply instability. The Segura Basin (Southeast Spain), the Tagus Basin and the Tagus-Segura inter-basin Transfer have been selected as the case study. Three different analyses applied to this region are presented in this thesis: a) an evaluation of option contracts as a mechanisms to reduce water supply availability risks in the Segura Basin; b) a theoretical framework for analyzing farmer’s preferences for different water supply risk management tools and farmers’ willingness to pay for them, together with the assessment of the prices of these mechanisms (drought insurance and water option contracts); and c) an evaluation of the role of option contracts in water procurement decisions under uncertainty. Results show the risk-reduction potential of option contracts for the agricultural sector in Spain, but these results can be extrapolated to other sectors or regions. The main conclusions of the thesis are: a) agriculture would be one of the most affected sectors by climate change. With higher water tariffs, crop’s profitability can drop to negative levels, which may result in the abandoning of the crop in many areas. Climate change and water policies must be closely coordinated to ensure efficient water use and crops’ profitability; b) although Spanish water markets have alleviated water availability problems for some users during water scarcity periods, there are several issues that should be improved; c) more flexible and stable water market mechanisms are needed to allocate water resources and water supply risks among competing users; d) results show the benefits derived from the establishment of an inter-basin option contract between water users in the Tagus and the Segura basins for reducing water supply availability risks in the recipient area; e) irrigators’ willingness to pay for option contracts or drought insurance, that represent the value that this kind of trading mechanisms has for water users facing water supply reliability problems, are consistent with results obtained in previous works and higher than the prices of this risk management tools, which shows the feasibility of these mechanisms; and f) option contracts would help to optimize water procurement decisions under uncertainty, providing more flexibility and stability than the spot market.

Unbundling tolls from contracts: a new road PPP model

Considerable evidence from different countries has revealed important shortcomings in most road public-private partnership (PPP) models. In this paper a new PPP model is presented that overcomes some of the problems found in PPP road contracts. The new model is based on separating user tolls from the fees paid to PPP contractors and setting up new institutional arrangements to oversee PPPs.

Propuestas regulatorias para el diseño de un mercado ibérico a plazo eficiente de la energía = Regulatory proposals for the development of an efficient iberian energy forward market

El mercado ibérico de futuros de energía eléctrica gestionado por OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, con sede en Lisboa), también conocido como el mercado ibérico de derivados de energía, comenzó a funcionar el 3 de julio de 2006. Se analiza la eficiencia de este mercado organizado, por lo que se estudia la precisión con la que sus precios de futuros predicen el precio de contado. En dicho mercado coexisten dos modos de negociación: el mercado continuo (modo por defecto) y la contratación mediante subasta. En la negociación en continuo, las órdenes anónimas de compra y de venta interactúan de manera inmediata e individual con órdenes contrarias, dando lugar a operaciones con un número indeterminado de precios para cada contrato. En la negociación a través de subasta, un precio único de equilibrio maximiza el volumen negociado, liquidándose todas las operaciones a ese precio. Adicionalmente, los miembros negociadores de OMIP pueden liquidar operaciones “Over-The-Counter” (OTC) a través de la cámara de compensación de OMIP (OMIClear). Las cinco mayores empresas españolas de distribución de energía eléctrica tenían la obligación de comprar electricidad hasta julio de 2009 en subastas en OMIP, para cubrir parte de sus suministros regulados. De igual manera, el suministrador de último recurso portugués mantuvo tal obligación hasta julio de 2010. Los precios de equilibrio de esas subastas no han resultado óptimos a efectos retributivos de tales suministros regulados dado que dichos precios tienden a situarse ligeramente sesgados al alza. La prima de riesgo ex-post, definida como la diferencia entre los precios a plazo y de contado en el periodo de entrega, se emplea para medir su eficiencia de precio. El mercado de contado, gestionado por OMIE (“Operador de Mercado Ibérico de la Energía”, conocido tradicionalmente como “OMEL”), tiene su sede en Madrid. Durante los dos primeros años del mercado de futuros, la prima de riesgo media tiende a resultar positiva, al igual que en otros mercados europeos de energía eléctrica y gas natural. En ese periodo, la prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser negativa en los mercados de petróleo y carbón. Los mercados de energía tienden a mostrar niveles limitados de eficiencia de mercado. La eficiencia de precio del mercado de futuros aumenta con el desarrollo de otros mecanismos coexistentes dentro del mercado ibérico de electricidad (conocido como “MIBEL”) –es decir, el mercado dominante OTC, las subastas de centrales virtuales de generación conocidas en España como Emisiones Primarias de Energía, y las subastas para cubrir parte de los suministros de último recurso conocidas en España como subastas CESUR– y con una mayor integración de los mercados regionales europeos de energía eléctrica. Se construye un modelo de regresión para analizar la evolución de los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo durante sus cuatro primeros años como una función de doce indicadores potenciales de liquidez. Los únicos indicadores significativos son los volúmenes negociados en las subastas obligatorias gestionadas por OMIP, los volúmenes negociados en el mercado OTC y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear. El número de creadores de mercado, la incorporación de agentes financieros y compañías de generación pertenecientes a grupos integrados con suministradores de último recurso, y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear muestran una fuerte correlación con los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo. La liquidez de OMIP está aún lejos de los niveles alcanzados por los mercados europeos más maduros (localizados en los países nórdicos (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) y Alemania (EEX)). El operador de mercado y su cámara de compensación podrían desarrollar acciones eficientes de marketing para atraer nuevos agentes activos en el mercado de contado (p.ej. industrias consumidoras intensivas de energía, suministradores, pequeños productores, compañías energéticas internacionales y empresas de energías renovables) y agentes financieros, captar volúmenes del opaco OTC, y mejorar el funcionamiento de los productos existentes aún no líquidos. Resultaría de gran utilidad para tales acciones un diálogo activo con todos los agentes (participantes en el mercado, operador de mercado de contado, y autoridades supervisoras). Durante sus primeros cinco años y medio, el mercado continuo presenta un crecimento de liquidez estable. Se mide el desempeño de sus funciones de cobertura mediante la ratio de posición neta obtenida al dividir la posición abierta final de un contrato de derivados mensual entre su volumen acumulado en la cámara de compensación. Los futuros carga base muestran la ratio más baja debido a su buena liquidez. Los futuros carga punta muestran una mayor ratio al producirse su menor liquidez a través de contadas subastas fijadas por regulación portuguesa. Las permutas carga base liquidadas en la cámara de compensación ubicada en Madrid –MEFF Power, activa desde el 21 de marzo de 2011– muestran inicialmente valores altos debido a bajos volúmenes registrados, dado que esta cámara se emplea principalmente para vencimientos pequeños (diario y semanal). Dicha ratio puede ser una poderosa herramienta de supervisión para los reguladores energéticos cuando accedan a todas las transacciones de derivados en virtud del Reglamento Europeo sobre Integridad y Transparencia de los Mercados de Energía (“REMIT”), en vigor desde el 28 de diciembre de 2011. La prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser positiva en todos los mecanismos (futuros en OMIP, mercado OTC y subastas CESUR) y disminuye debido a la curvas de aprendizaje y al efecto, desde el año 2011, del precio fijo para la retribución de la generación con carbón autóctono. Se realiza una comparativa con los costes a plazo de generación con gas natural (diferencial “clean spark spread”) obtenido como la diferencia entre el precio del futuro eléctrico y el coste a plazo de generación con ciclo combinado internalizando los costes de emisión de CO2. Los futuros eléctricos tienen una elevada correlación con los precios de gas europeos. Los diferenciales de contratos con vencimiento inmediato tienden a ser positivos. Los mayores diferenciales se dan para los contratos mensuales, seguidos de los trimestrales y anuales. Los generadores eléctricos con gas pueden maximizar beneficios con contratos de menor vencimiento. Los informes de monitorización por el operador de mercado que proporcionan transparencia post-operacional, el acceso a datos OTC por el regulador energético, y la valoración del riesgo regulatorio pueden contribuir a ganancias de eficiencia. Estas recomendaciones son también válidas para un potencial mercado ibérico de futuros de gas, una vez que el hub ibérico de gas –actualmente en fase de diseño, con reuniones mensuales de los agentes desde enero de 2013 en el grupo de trabajo liderado por el regulador energético español– esté operativo. El hub ibérico de gas proporcionará transparencia al atraer más agentes y mejorar la competencia, incrementando su eficiencia, dado que en el mercado OTC actual no se revela precio alguno de gas. ABSTRACT The Iberian Power Futures Market, managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, located in Lisbon), also known as the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market, started operations on 3 July 2006. The market efficiency, regarding how well the future price predicts the spot price, is analysed for this energy derivatives exchange. There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generating trades with an undetermined number of prices for each contract. In the call auction trading, a single price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades through OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). The five largest Spanish distribution companies have been obliged to purchase in auctions managed by OMIP until July 2009, in order to partly cover their portfolios of end users’ regulated supplies. Likewise, the Portuguese last resort supplier kept that obligation until July 2010. The auction equilibrium prices are not optimal for remuneration purposes of regulated supplies as such prices seem to be slightly upward biased. The ex-post forward risk premium, defined as the difference between the forward and spot prices in the delivery period, is used to measure its price efficiency. The spot market, managed by OMIE (Market Operator of the Iberian Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as “OMEL”), is located in Madrid. During the first two years of the futures market, the average forward risk premium tends to be positive, as it occurs with other European power and natural gas markets. In that period, the ex-post forward risk premium tends to be negative in oil and coal markets. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. The price efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market improves with the market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms within the Iberian Electricity Market (known as “MIBEL”) – namely, the dominant OTC market, the Virtual Power Plant Auctions known in Spain as Energy Primary Emissions, and the auctions catering for part of the last resort supplies known in Spain as CESUR auctions – and with further integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market during its first four years is built as a function of twelve potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the OTC market, and the OTC cleared volumes by OMIClear. The amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial members and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume by OMIClear show strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (located in the Nordic countries (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) and Germany (EEX)). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (e.g. energy intensive industries, suppliers, small producers, international energy companies and renewable generation companies) and financial agents as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions. During its firs five and a half years, the continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. The hedging performance is measured through a net position ratio obtained from the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain – MEFF Power, operating since 21 March 2011, with a new denomination (BME Clearing) since 9 September 2013 – show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). The net position ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (“REMIT”), in force since 28 December 2011. The ex-post forward risk premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (OMIP futures, OTC market and CESUR auctions) and diminishes due to the learning curve and the effect – since year 2011 – of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. Comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”) – obtained as the difference between the power futures price and the forward generation cost with a gas fired combined cycle plant taking into account the CO2 emission rates – is also performed. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The clean spark spreads built with prompt contracts tend to be positive. The biggest clean spark spreads are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains. The same recommendations are also valid for a potential Iberian gas futures market, once an Iberian gas hub – currently in a design phase, with monthly meetings amongst the stakeholders in a Working Group led by the Spanish energy regulatory authority since January 2013 – is operating. The Iberian gas hub would bring transparency attracting more shippers and improving competition and thus its efficiency, as no gas price is currently disclosed in the existing OTC market.

Cities Futures: A critical assessment of how future studies are applied to cities

Análisis critic de la aplicación de los estudios de future al campo de la planificación urbana

Optimal safety incentives in road concession contracts

Changes in the roles of the government and the private sector in the provision of public services along with budget constraints are resulting in an increasing use of the concession approach for financing and managing roads. In the last few years, many of these contracts set up incentives linked to bonuses to encourage the concessionaire to render a better service to the users. Road safety is one the aspects on the basis of which concessionaires can be rewarded according to their performance. The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether road safety incentives are being defined in the right way nowadays in different European countries and also identify what incentives would need to be implemented to achieve a socially optimal road safety level. To that end, we develop a specific incentive for road concession contracts that encourages companies to achieve the optimal level. We apply this methodology to three case studies of concessions recently awarded in order to determine to what extend the incentives they set up are closer or farther to the optimum.

Option contracts for allocating water in inter-basin transfers: the case of the Tagus-Segura Basin in Spain

Users in the Mediterranean region face significant water supply risks. Water markets mechanisms can provide flexibility to water systems run in tight situations. The largest water infrastructure in the Iberian Peninsula connects the Segura and Tagus Basins. Stakeholders and politicians in the Tagus Basin have asked that water transfers between the two basins be eventually phased out. The need to increase the statutory minimum environmental flow in the middle Tagus and to meet new urban demands is going to result in a redefinition of the Transfer?s management rules, leading to a reduction in the transferable volumes. To minimise the consequences of such restrictions to irrigators in the Segura Basin who depend on the transferred volumes, we propose the establishment of water option contracts between both basins that represents an institutional innovation with respect to previous inter-basin spot market experiences. Based on the draft of the new Tagus Basin Plan, we propose both a modification of the Transfer?s management rule and an innovative inter-basin option contract. The main goal of the paper is to define this contract and evaluate it with respect to non-market scenarios. We also assess the resulting impact on environmental flows in the Tagus River and water availability for users in the Segura Basin, together with the economic impacts of such contract on both basins. Our results show that the proposed option contract would reduce the impact of a change in the transfer?s management rule, and reduce the supply risks of the recipient area.

Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is linear and contains an incentive mechanism to enhance the effort of the agent to reduce construction costs. A theoretical model is proposed starting from a cost function with a random component and assuming that both the public authority and the firm are risk averse. The main outcome of the paper is that the optimal transfer of construction risk will be lower when the variance of errors in cost forecast, the risk aversion of the firm and the marginal cost of public funds are larger, while the optimal transfer of construction risk will grow when the variance of errors in cost monitoring and the risk aversion of the public authority are larger

Optimization of water procurement decisions in an irrigation district: the role of option contracts

Water supply instability is one of the main risks faced by irrigation districts and farmers. Water procurement decision optimisation is essential in order to increase supply reliability and reduce costs. Water markets, such as spot purchases or water supply option contracts, can make this decision process more flexible. We analyse the potential interest in an option contract for an irrigation district that has access to several water sources. We apply a stochastic recursive mathematical programming model to simulate the water procurement decisions of an irrigation district?s board operating in a context of water supply uncertainty in south-eastern Spain. We analyse what role different option contracts could play in securing its water supply. Results suggest that the irrigation district would be willing to accept the proposed option contract in most cases subject to realistic values of the option contract financial terms. Of nine different water sources, desalination and the option contract are the main substitutes, where the use of either depends on the contract parameters. The contract premium and optioned volume are the variables that have a greater impact on the irrigation district?s decisions. Key words: Segura Basin, stochastic recursive programming, water markets, water supply option contract, water supply risk.