Risk sharing with Multilateral Financial Institutions in infrastructure and energy project financing : effect on capital relief for commercial banks

(Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analyse the main instruments for risk mitigation in infrastructure financing with Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs). Their review coincided with the global financial crisis of 2007-08, and is highly relevant in current times considering the sovereign debt crisis, the lack of available capital and the increases in bank regulation in Western economies. The current macroeconomic environment has seen a slowdown in the level of finance for infrastructure projects, as they pose a higher credit risk given their requirements for long term investments. The rationale for this work is to look for innovative solutions that are focused on the credit risk mitigation of infrastructure and energy projects whilst optimizing the economic capital allocation for commercial banks. This objective is achieved through risk-sharing with MFIs and looking for capital relief in project finance transactions. This research finds out the answer to the main question: "What is the impact of risk-sharing with MFIs on project finance transactions to increase their efficiency and viability?", and is developed from the perspective of a commercial bank assessing the economic capital used and analysing the relevant variables for it: Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). An overview of project finance for the infrastructure and energy sectors in terms of the volume of transactions worldwide is outlined, along with a summary of risk-sharing financing with MFIs. A review of the current regulatory framework beneath risk-sharing in structured finance with MFIs is also analysed. From here, the impact of risk-sharing and the diversification effect in infrastructure and energy projects is assessed, from the perspective of economic capital allocation for a commercial bank. CreditMetrics (J. P. Morgan, 1997) is applied over an existing well diversified portfolio of project finance infrastructure and energy investments, working with the main risk capital measures: economic capital, RAROC, and EVA. The conclusions of this research show that economic capital allocation on a portfolio of project finance along with risk-sharing with MFIs have a huge impact on capital relief whilst increasing performance profitability for commercial banks. There is an outstanding diversification effect due to the portfolio, which is combined with risk mitigation and an improvement in recovery rates through Partial Credit Guarantees issued by MFIs. A stress test scenario analysis is applied to the current assumptions and credit risk model, considering a downgrade in the rating for the commercial bank (lender) and an increase of default in emerging countries, presenting a direct impact on economic capital, through an increase in expected loss and a decrease in performance profitability. Getting capital relief through risk-sharing makes it more viable for commercial banks to finance infrastructure and energy projects, with the beneficial effect of a direct impact of these investments on GDP growth and employment. The main contribution of this work is to promote a strategic economic capital allocation in infrastructure and energy financing through innovative risk-sharing with MFIs and economic pricing to create economic value added for banks, and to allow the financing of more infrastructure and energy projects. This work suggests several topics for further research in relation to issues analysed. (Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analizan los principales instrumentos de mitigación de riesgos en las Instituciones Financieras Multilaterales (IFMs) para la financiación de infraestructuras. Su presentación coincidió con el inicio de la crisis financiera en Agosto de 2007, y sus consecuencias persisten en la actualidad, destacando la deuda soberana en economías desarrolladas y los problemas capitalización de los bancos. Este entorno macroeconómico ha ralentizado la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras. El actual trabajo de investigación tiene su motivación en la búsqueda de soluciones para la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, mitigando los riesgos inherentes, con el objeto de reducir el consumo de capital económico en los bancos financiadores. Este objetivo se alcanza compartiendo el riesgo de la financiación con IFMs, a través de estructuras de risk-sharing. La investigación responde la pregunta: "Cuál es el impacto de risk-sharing con IFMs, en la financiación de proyectos para aumentar su eficiencia y viabilidad?". El trabajo se desarrolla desde el enfoque de un banco comercial, estimando el consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos y analizando las principales variables del riesgo de crédito, Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). La investigación presenta las cifras globales de Project Finance en los sectores de infraestructuras y de energía, y analiza el marco regulatorio internacional en relación al consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos en los que participan IFMs. A continuación, el trabajo modeliza una cartera real, bien diversificada, de Project Finance de infraestructuras y de energía, aplicando la metodología CreditMet- rics (J. P. Morgan, 1997). Su objeto es estimar el consumo de capital económico y la rentabilidad de la cartera de proyectos a través del RAROC y EVA. La modelización permite estimar el efecto diversificación y la liberación de capital económico consecuencia del risk-sharing. Los resultados muestran el enorme impacto del efecto diversificación de la cartera, así como de las garantías parciales de las IFMs que mitigan riesgos, mejoran el recovery rate de los proyectos y reducen el consumo de capital económico para el banco comercial, mientras aumentan la rentabilidad, RAROC, y crean valor económico, EVA. En escenarios económicos de inestabilidad, empeoramiento del rating de los bancos, aumentos de default en los proyectos y de correlación en las carteras, hay un impacto directo en el capital económico y en la pérdida de rentabilidad. La liberación de capital económico, como se plantea en la presente investigación, permitirá financiar más proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, lo que repercutirá en un mayor crecimiento económico y creación de empleo. La principal contribución de este trabajo es promover la gestión activa del capital económico en la financiación de infraestructuras y de proyectos energéticos, a través de estructuras innovadoras de risk-sharing con IFMs y de creación de valor económico en los bancos comerciales, lo que mejoraría su eficiencia y capitalización. La aportación metodológica del trabajo se convierte por su originalidad en una contribución, que sugiere y facilita nuevas líneas de investigación académica en las principales variables del riesgo de crédito que afectan al capital económico en la financiación de proyectos.

Survey and brain storming studies about machines, constructions, human and environmental risk consideration in the careers of the Universidad Politécnica of Madrid

The Universidad Politécnica of Madrid (UPM) includes schools and faculties that were for engineering degrees, architecture and computer science, that are now in a quick EEES Bolonia Plan metamorphosis getting into degrees, masters and doctorate structures. They are focused towards action in machines, constructions, enterprises, that are subjected to machines, human and environment created risks. These are present in actions such as use loads, wind, snow, waves, flows, earthquakes, forces and effects in machines, vehicles behavior, chemical effects, and other environmental factors including effects of crops, cattle and beasts, forests, and varied essential economic and social disturbances. Emphasis is for authors in this session more about risks of natural origin, such as for hail, winds, snow or waves that are not exactly known a priori, but that are often considered with statistical expected distributions giving extreme values for convenient return periods. These distributions are known from measures in time, statistic of extremes and models about hazard scenarios and about responses of man made constructions or devices. In each engineering field theories were built about hazards scenarios and how to cover for important risks. Engineers must get that the systems they handle, such as vehicles, machines, firms or agro lands or forests, obtain production with enough safety for persons and with decent economic results in spite of risks. For that risks must be considered in planning, in realization and in operation, and safety margins must be taken but at a reasonable cost. That is a small level of risks will often remain, due to limitations in costs or because of due to strange hazards, and maybe they will be covered by insurance in cases such as in transport with cars, ships or aircrafts, in agro for hail, or for fire in houses or in forests. These and other decisions about quality, security for men or about business financial risks are sometimes considered with Decision Theories models, using often tools from Statistics or operational Research. The authors have done and are following field surveys about risk consideration in the careers in UPM, making deep analysis of curricula taking into account the new structures of degrees in the EEES Bolonia Plan, and they have considered the risk structures offered by diverse schools of Decision theories. That gives an aspect of the needs and uses, and recommendations about improving in the teaching about risk, that may include special subjects especially oriented for each career, school or faculty, so as to be recommended to be included into the curricula, including an elaboration and presentation format using a multi-criteria decision model.

Risk Allocation in Toll Highway Concessions in Spain: Lessons from Economic Recession

Spain has a long tradition of encouraging toll highways by granting concessions to private companies. Concessions in Spain have been characterized by a willingness to transfer considerable risk to the private sector. Traffic demand, acquisition of the right-of-way, and financial risk have often been allocated to the private sector. From 1996 to 2011, 16 toll highway concessions, covering a total distance of 835 km, were awarded by the central government of Spain with this approach. Some of those highways started their operations just before the economic recession began. The recession had negative consequences for Spain's economy. The gross domestic product per capita plummeted, and the unemployment rate increased from 9% to 20% of the working population in just 2 years. The recession also had severe consequences for the economic performance of toll highway concessions. Traffic levels declined at a much greater rate than did the gross domestic product. In addition, the conditions imposed by the financial markets on borrowers became much stricter because of the liquidity crisis. This study analyzes the impact that the economic recession ultimately had on the performance of toll highway concessions in Spain and the actions that the government adopted to avoid the bankruptcy of the concessionaires. It was found that the economic recession helped identify some deficiencies in how risk had been allocated in Spain. The measures that both Spain and the European Union are adopting so as to improve risk allocation are discussed.

Qualitative operational risk software -development of a software tool for determining the root of operational risk

This article shows software that allows determining the statistical behavior of qualitative data originating surveys previously transformed with a Likert’s scale to quantitative data. The main intention is offer to users a useful tool to know statistics' characteristics and forecasts of financial risks in a fast and simple way. Additionally,this paper presents the definition of operational risk. On the other hand, the article explains different techniques to do surveys with a Likert’s scale (Avila, 2008) to know expert’s opinion with the transformation of qualitative data to quantitative data. In addition, this paper will show how is very easy to distinguish an expert’s opinion related to risk, but when users have a lot of surveys and matrices is very difficult to obtain results because is necessary to compare common data. On the other hand, statistical value representative must be extracted from common data to get weight of each risk. In the end, this article exposes the development of “Qualitative Operational Risk Software” or QORS by its acronym, which has been designed to determine the root of risks in organizations and its value at operational risk OpVaR (Jorion, 2008; Chernobai et al, 2008) when input data comes from expert’s opinion and their associated matrices.

Propuestas regulatorias para el diseño de un mercado ibérico a plazo eficiente de la energía = Regulatory proposals for the development of an efficient iberian energy forward market

El mercado ibérico de futuros de energía eléctrica gestionado por OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, con sede en Lisboa), también conocido como el mercado ibérico de derivados de energía, comenzó a funcionar el 3 de julio de 2006. Se analiza la eficiencia de este mercado organizado, por lo que se estudia la precisión con la que sus precios de futuros predicen el precio de contado. En dicho mercado coexisten dos modos de negociación: el mercado continuo (modo por defecto) y la contratación mediante subasta. En la negociación en continuo, las órdenes anónimas de compra y de venta interactúan de manera inmediata e individual con órdenes contrarias, dando lugar a operaciones con un número indeterminado de precios para cada contrato. En la negociación a través de subasta, un precio único de equilibrio maximiza el volumen negociado, liquidándose todas las operaciones a ese precio. Adicionalmente, los miembros negociadores de OMIP pueden liquidar operaciones “Over-The-Counter” (OTC) a través de la cámara de compensación de OMIP (OMIClear). Las cinco mayores empresas españolas de distribución de energía eléctrica tenían la obligación de comprar electricidad hasta julio de 2009 en subastas en OMIP, para cubrir parte de sus suministros regulados. De igual manera, el suministrador de último recurso portugués mantuvo tal obligación hasta julio de 2010. Los precios de equilibrio de esas subastas no han resultado óptimos a efectos retributivos de tales suministros regulados dado que dichos precios tienden a situarse ligeramente sesgados al alza. La prima de riesgo ex-post, definida como la diferencia entre los precios a plazo y de contado en el periodo de entrega, se emplea para medir su eficiencia de precio. El mercado de contado, gestionado por OMIE (“Operador de Mercado Ibérico de la Energía”, conocido tradicionalmente como “OMEL”), tiene su sede en Madrid. Durante los dos primeros años del mercado de futuros, la prima de riesgo media tiende a resultar positiva, al igual que en otros mercados europeos de energía eléctrica y gas natural. En ese periodo, la prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser negativa en los mercados de petróleo y carbón. Los mercados de energía tienden a mostrar niveles limitados de eficiencia de mercado. La eficiencia de precio del mercado de futuros aumenta con el desarrollo de otros mecanismos coexistentes dentro del mercado ibérico de electricidad (conocido como “MIBEL”) –es decir, el mercado dominante OTC, las subastas de centrales virtuales de generación conocidas en España como Emisiones Primarias de Energía, y las subastas para cubrir parte de los suministros de último recurso conocidas en España como subastas CESUR– y con una mayor integración de los mercados regionales europeos de energía eléctrica. Se construye un modelo de regresión para analizar la evolución de los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo durante sus cuatro primeros años como una función de doce indicadores potenciales de liquidez. Los únicos indicadores significativos son los volúmenes negociados en las subastas obligatorias gestionadas por OMIP, los volúmenes negociados en el mercado OTC y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear. El número de creadores de mercado, la incorporación de agentes financieros y compañías de generación pertenecientes a grupos integrados con suministradores de último recurso, y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear muestran una fuerte correlación con los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo. La liquidez de OMIP está aún lejos de los niveles alcanzados por los mercados europeos más maduros (localizados en los países nórdicos (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) y Alemania (EEX)). El operador de mercado y su cámara de compensación podrían desarrollar acciones eficientes de marketing para atraer nuevos agentes activos en el mercado de contado (p.ej. industrias consumidoras intensivas de energía, suministradores, pequeños productores, compañías energéticas internacionales y empresas de energías renovables) y agentes financieros, captar volúmenes del opaco OTC, y mejorar el funcionamiento de los productos existentes aún no líquidos. Resultaría de gran utilidad para tales acciones un diálogo activo con todos los agentes (participantes en el mercado, operador de mercado de contado, y autoridades supervisoras). Durante sus primeros cinco años y medio, el mercado continuo presenta un crecimento de liquidez estable. Se mide el desempeño de sus funciones de cobertura mediante la ratio de posición neta obtenida al dividir la posición abierta final de un contrato de derivados mensual entre su volumen acumulado en la cámara de compensación. Los futuros carga base muestran la ratio más baja debido a su buena liquidez. Los futuros carga punta muestran una mayor ratio al producirse su menor liquidez a través de contadas subastas fijadas por regulación portuguesa. Las permutas carga base liquidadas en la cámara de compensación ubicada en Madrid –MEFF Power, activa desde el 21 de marzo de 2011– muestran inicialmente valores altos debido a bajos volúmenes registrados, dado que esta cámara se emplea principalmente para vencimientos pequeños (diario y semanal). Dicha ratio puede ser una poderosa herramienta de supervisión para los reguladores energéticos cuando accedan a todas las transacciones de derivados en virtud del Reglamento Europeo sobre Integridad y Transparencia de los Mercados de Energía (“REMIT”), en vigor desde el 28 de diciembre de 2011. La prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser positiva en todos los mecanismos (futuros en OMIP, mercado OTC y subastas CESUR) y disminuye debido a la curvas de aprendizaje y al efecto, desde el año 2011, del precio fijo para la retribución de la generación con carbón autóctono. Se realiza una comparativa con los costes a plazo de generación con gas natural (diferencial “clean spark spread”) obtenido como la diferencia entre el precio del futuro eléctrico y el coste a plazo de generación con ciclo combinado internalizando los costes de emisión de CO2. Los futuros eléctricos tienen una elevada correlación con los precios de gas europeos. Los diferenciales de contratos con vencimiento inmediato tienden a ser positivos. Los mayores diferenciales se dan para los contratos mensuales, seguidos de los trimestrales y anuales. Los generadores eléctricos con gas pueden maximizar beneficios con contratos de menor vencimiento. Los informes de monitorización por el operador de mercado que proporcionan transparencia post-operacional, el acceso a datos OTC por el regulador energético, y la valoración del riesgo regulatorio pueden contribuir a ganancias de eficiencia. Estas recomendaciones son también válidas para un potencial mercado ibérico de futuros de gas, una vez que el hub ibérico de gas –actualmente en fase de diseño, con reuniones mensuales de los agentes desde enero de 2013 en el grupo de trabajo liderado por el regulador energético español– esté operativo. El hub ibérico de gas proporcionará transparencia al atraer más agentes y mejorar la competencia, incrementando su eficiencia, dado que en el mercado OTC actual no se revela precio alguno de gas. ABSTRACT The Iberian Power Futures Market, managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, located in Lisbon), also known as the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market, started operations on 3 July 2006. The market efficiency, regarding how well the future price predicts the spot price, is analysed for this energy derivatives exchange. There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generating trades with an undetermined number of prices for each contract. In the call auction trading, a single price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades through OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). The five largest Spanish distribution companies have been obliged to purchase in auctions managed by OMIP until July 2009, in order to partly cover their portfolios of end users’ regulated supplies. Likewise, the Portuguese last resort supplier kept that obligation until July 2010. The auction equilibrium prices are not optimal for remuneration purposes of regulated supplies as such prices seem to be slightly upward biased. The ex-post forward risk premium, defined as the difference between the forward and spot prices in the delivery period, is used to measure its price efficiency. The spot market, managed by OMIE (Market Operator of the Iberian Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as “OMEL”), is located in Madrid. During the first two years of the futures market, the average forward risk premium tends to be positive, as it occurs with other European power and natural gas markets. In that period, the ex-post forward risk premium tends to be negative in oil and coal markets. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. The price efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market improves with the market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms within the Iberian Electricity Market (known as “MIBEL”) – namely, the dominant OTC market, the Virtual Power Plant Auctions known in Spain as Energy Primary Emissions, and the auctions catering for part of the last resort supplies known in Spain as CESUR auctions – and with further integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market during its first four years is built as a function of twelve potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the OTC market, and the OTC cleared volumes by OMIClear. The amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial members and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume by OMIClear show strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (located in the Nordic countries (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) and Germany (EEX)). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (e.g. energy intensive industries, suppliers, small producers, international energy companies and renewable generation companies) and financial agents as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions. During its firs five and a half years, the continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. The hedging performance is measured through a net position ratio obtained from the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain – MEFF Power, operating since 21 March 2011, with a new denomination (BME Clearing) since 9 September 2013 – show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). The net position ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (“REMIT”), in force since 28 December 2011. The ex-post forward risk premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (OMIP futures, OTC market and CESUR auctions) and diminishes due to the learning curve and the effect – since year 2011 – of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. Comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”) – obtained as the difference between the power futures price and the forward generation cost with a gas fired combined cycle plant taking into account the CO2 emission rates – is also performed. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The clean spark spreads built with prompt contracts tend to be positive. The biggest clean spark spreads are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains. The same recommendations are also valid for a potential Iberian gas futures market, once an Iberian gas hub – currently in a design phase, with monthly meetings amongst the stakeholders in a Working Group led by the Spanish energy regulatory authority since January 2013 – is operating. The Iberian gas hub would bring transparency attracting more shippers and improving competition and thus its efficiency, as no gas price is currently disclosed in the existing OTC market.