Solving identity delegation problem in the e-government environment

At present, many countries allow citizens or entities to interact with the government outside the telematic environment through a legal representative who is granted powers of representation. However, if the interaction takes place through the Internet, only primitive mechanisms of representation are available, and these are mainly based on non-dynamic offline processes that do not enable quick and easy identity delegation. This paper proposes a system of dynamic delegation of identity between two generic entities that can solve the problem of delegated access to the telematic services provided by public authorities. The solution herein is based on the generation of a delegation token created from a proxy certificate that allows the delegating entity to delegate identity to another on the basis of a subset of its attributes as delegator, while also establishing in the delegation token itself restrictions on the services accessible to the delegated entity and the validity period of delegation. Further, the paper presents the mechanisms needed to either revoke a delegation token or to check whether a delegation token has been revoked. Implications for theory and practice and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used