Assessment of irrigators’ preferences for different water supply risk management tools: option contract and insurance.

Irrigators face the risk of not having enough water to meet their crops’ demand. There are different mechanisms to cope with this risk, including water markets (option contracts) or insurance. A farmer will purchase them when the expected utility change derived from the tool is positive. This paper presents a theoretical assessment of the farmer’s expected utility under two different option contracts, a drought insurance and a combination of an option contract and the insurance. We analyze the conditions that determine farmer’s reference for one instrument or the other and perform a numerical application that is relevant for a Spanish region.

Innovative tools to address drought risk in grazing lands

Drought spells can impose severe impacts in most vulnerable farms. It is well known that uninsured exposure exacerbates income inequality in farming systems. However, high administrative costs of traditional insurance hinder small farmers? access to risk management tools. The existence of moral hazard and systemic risk prevents the implementation of traditional insurance programs to address drought risk in rural areas. Innovative technologies like satellite images are being used to derive vegetation index which are highly correlated with drought impacts. The implementation of this technology in agricultural insurance may help to overcome some of the limitations of traditional insurance. However, basis risk has been identified as one of the main problems that hinder the acceptance of index insurance. In this paper we focus on the analyses of basis risk under different contract options in the grazing lands of the Araucanía region. A vegetation index database is used to develop an actuarial insurance model and estimate risk premiums for moderate and severe drought coverage. Risk premium sharply increases with risk coverage. In contrast with previous findings in the literature, our results are not conclusive and show that lowering the coverage level does not necessarily imply a reduction in basis risk. Further analyses of the relation between contract design and basis risk is a promising area of research that may render an important social utility for most vulnerable farming systems.

Analysis of the Optimal Sharing of Construction Risk in Public Procurement Contracts

This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is linear and contains an incentive mechanism to enhance the effort of the agent to reduce construction costs. A theoretical model is proposed starting from a cost function with a random component and assuming that both the public authority and the firm are risk averse. The main outcome of the paper is that the optimal transfer of construction risk will be lower when the variance of errors in cost forecast, the risk aversion of the firm and the marginal cost of public funds are larger, while the optimal transfer of construction risk will grow when the variance of errors in cost monitoring and the risk aversion of the public authority are larger