Analysis of advanced European nuclear fuel cycle scenarios including transmutation and economic estimates

Four European fuel cycle scenarios involving transmutation options (in coherence with PATEROS and CPESFR EU projects) have been addressed from a point of view of resources utilization and economic estimates. Scenarios include: (i) the current fleet using Light Water Reactor (LWR) technology and open fuel cycle, (ii) full replacement of the initial fleet with Fast Reactors (FR) burning U?Pu MOX fuel, (iii) closed fuel cycle with Minor Actinide (MA) transmutation in a fraction of the FR fleet, and (iv) closed fuel cycle with MA transmutation in dedicated Accelerator Driven Systems (ADS). All scenarios consider an intermediate period of GEN-III+ LWR deployment and they extend for 200 years, looking for long term equilibrium mass flow achievement. The simulations were made using the TR_EVOL code, capable to assess the management of the nuclear mass streams in the scenario as well as economics for the estimation of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) and other costs. Results reveal that all scenarios are feasible according to nuclear resources demand (natural and depleted U, and Pu). Additionally, we have found as expected that the FR scenario reduces considerably the Pu inventory in repositories compared to the reference scenario. The elimination of the LWR MA legacy requires a maximum of 55% fraction (i.e., a peak value of 44 FR units) of the FR fleet dedicated to transmutation (MA in MOX fuel, homogeneous transmutation) or an average of 28 units of ADS plants (i.e., a peak value of 51 ADS units). Regarding the economic analysis, the main usefulness of the provided economic results is for relative comparison of scenarios and breakdown of LCOE contributors rather than provision of absolute values, as technological readiness levels are low for most of the advanced fuel cycle stages. The obtained estimations show an increase of LCOE ? averaged over the whole period ? with respect to the reference open cycle scenario of 20% for Pu management scenario and around 35% for both transmutation scenarios. The main contribution to LCOE is the capital costs of new facilities, quantified between 60% and 69% depending on the scenario. An uncertainty analysis is provided around assumed low and high values of processes and technologies.

Estudio y diseño de un régimen fiscal que optimice la inversión en exploración y producción de hidrocarburos

Los regímenes fiscales que se aplican a los contratos de exploración y desarrollo de petróleo y gas, entre los propietarios del recurso natural (generalmente el país soberano representado por su gobierno) y las compañías operadoras internacionales (COI) que aportan capital, experiencia y tecnología, no han sabido responder a la reciente escalada de los precios del crudo y han dado lugar a que los países productores no estén recibiendo la parte de renta correspondiente al incremento de precios. Esto ha provocado una ola de renegociaciones llegándose incluso a la imposición unilateral de nuevos términos por parte de algunos gobiernos entre los que destacan el caso de Venezuela y Argentina, por ser los más radicales. El objetivo del presente trabajo es el estudio y diseño de un régimen fiscal que, en las actuales condiciones del mercado, consiga que los gobiernos optimicen sus ingresos incentivando la inversión. Para ello se simulan los efectos de siete tipos diferentes de fiscalidades aplicadas a dos yacimientos de características muy distintas y se valoran los resultados. El modelo utilizado para la simulación es el modelo de escenarios, ampliamente utilizado tanto por la comunidad académica como por la industria para comparar el comportamiento de diferentes regímenes fiscales. Para decidir cuál de las fiscalidades estudiadas es la mejor se emplea un método optimización multicriterio. Los criterios que se han aplicado para valorar los resultados recogen la opinión de expertos de la industria sobre qué factores se consideran deseables en un contrato a la hora invertir. El resultado permite delinear las características de un marco fiscal ideal del tipo acuerdo de producción compartida, sin royalties, con un límite alto de recuperación de crudo coste que permita recobrar todos los costes operativos y una parte de los de capital en cualquier escenario de precios, un reparto de los beneficios en función de un indicador de rentabilidad como es la TIR, con un mecanismo de recuperación de costes adicional (uplift) que incentive la inversión y con disposiciones que premien la exploración y más la de alto riesgo como la amortización acelerada de los gastos de capital o una ampliación de la cláusula de ringfence. Un contrato con estas características permitirá al gobierno optimizar los ingresos obtenidos de sus reservas de petróleo y gas maximizando la producción al atraer inversión para la exploración y mejorar la recuperación alargando la vida del yacimiento. Además al reducir el riesgo percibido por el inversor que recupera sus costes, menor será la rentabilidad exigida al capital invertido y por tanto mayor la parte de esos ingresos que irá a parar al gobierno del país productor. ABSTRACT Fiscal systems used in petroleum arrangements between the owners of the resource (usually a sovereign country represented by its government) and the international operating company (IOC) that provides capital, knowhow and technology, have failed to allocate profits from the recent escalation of oil prices and have resulted in producing countries not receiving the right share of that increase. This has caused a wave of renegotiations and even in some cases, like Venezuela and Argentina, government unilaterally imposed new terms. This paper aims to outline desirable features of a petroleum fiscal system, under current market conditions, for governments to maximize their revenues while encouraging investment. Firstly the impact of seven different types of fiscal regimes is studied with a simulation for two separate oil fields using the scenario approach. The scenario approach has been frequently employed by academic and business researchers to compare the performance of diverse fiscal regimes. In order to decide which of the fiscal regimes’ performance is best we used a multi-objective optimization decision making approach to assess the results. The criteria applied gather the preferences of a panel of industry experts about the desirable features of a contract when making investment decisions. The results show the characteristics of an ideal fiscal framework that closely resembles a production sharing contract, with no royalty payment and a high cost recovery limit that allows the IOC to recover all operating expenses and a share of its capital costs under any price scenario, a profit oil sharing mechanism based on a profitability indicator such as the ROR, with an uplift that allows to recover an additional percentage of capital costs and provisions that promote exploration investment, specially high-risk exploration, such as accelerated depreciation for capital costs and a wide definition of the ringfence clause. A contract with these features will allow governments to optimize overall revenues from its petroleum resources maximizing production by promoting investment on exploration and extending oil fields life. Also by reducing the investor’s perception of risk it will reduce the minimum return to capital required by the IOC and therefore it will increase the government share of those revenues.