Solving identity delegation problem in the e-government environment

At present, many countries allow citizens or entities to interact with the government outside the telematic environment through a legal representative who is granted powers of representation. However, if the interaction takes place through the Internet, only primitive mechanisms of representation are available, and these are mainly based on non-dynamic offline processes that do not enable quick and easy identity delegation. This paper proposes a system of dynamic delegation of identity between two generic entities that can solve the problem of delegated access to the telematic services provided by public authorities. The solution herein is based on the generation of a delegation token created from a proxy certificate that allows the delegating entity to delegate identity to another on the basis of a subset of its attributes as delegator, while also establishing in the delegation token itself restrictions on the services accessible to the delegated entity and the validity period of delegation. Further, the paper presents the mechanisms needed to either revoke a delegation token or to check whether a delegation token has been revoked. Implications for theory and practice and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Do charges to freight trucks and trains in the European Union reflect their social marginal costs? Application to the case of Spain

In the last few years, the European Union (EU) has become greatly concerned about the environmental costs of road transport in Europe as a result of the constant growth in the market share of trucks and the steady decline in the market share of railroads. In order to reverse this trend, the EU is promoting the implementation of additional charges for heavy goods vehicles (HGV) on the trunk roads of the EU countries. However, the EU policy is being criticised because it does not address the implementation of charges to internalise the external costs produced by automobiles and other transport modes such as railroad. In this paper, we first describe the evolution of the HGV charging policy in the EU, and then assess its practical implementation across different European countries. Second, and of greater significance, by using the case study of Spain, we evaluate to what extent the current fees on trucks and trains reflect their social marginal costs, and consequently lead to an allocative-efficient outcome. We found that for the average case in Spain the truck industry meets more of the marginal social cost produced by it than does the freight railroad industry. The reason for this lies in the large sums of money paid by truck companies in fuel taxes, and the subsidies that continue to be granted by the government to the railroads.

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used