Goal dependent vs goal independent analysis of logic programs

Goal independent analysis of logic programs is commonly discussed in the context of the bottom-up approach. However, while the literature is rich in descriptions of top-down analysers and their application, practical experience with bottom-up analysis is still in a preliminary stage. Moreover, the practical use of existing top-down frameworks for goal independent analysis has not been addressed in a practical system. We illustrate the efficient use of existing goal dependent, top-down frameworks for abstract interpretation in performing goal independent analyses of logic programs much the same as those usually derived from bottom-up frameworks. We present several optimizations for this flavour of top-down analysis. The approach is fully implemented within an existing top-down framework. Several implementation tradeoffs are discussed as well as the influence of domain characteristics. An experimental evaluation including a comparison with a bottom-up analysis for the domain Prop is presented. We conclude that the technique can offer advantages with respect to standard goal dependent analyses.

OPPL-Galaxy, a Galaxy tool for enhancing ontology exploitation as part of bioinformatics workflows

Biomedical ontologies are key elements for building up the Life Sciences Semantic Web. Reusing and building biomedical ontologies requires flexible and versatile tools to manipulate them efficiently, in particular for enriching their axiomatic content. The Ontology Pre Processor Language (OPPL) is an OWL-based language for automating the changes to be performed in an ontology. OPPL augments the ontologists’ toolbox by providing a more efficient, and less error-prone, mechanism for enriching a biomedical ontology than that obtained by a manual treatment. Results We present OPPL-Galaxy, a wrapper for using OPPL within Galaxy. The functionality delivered by OPPL (i.e. automated ontology manipulation) can be combined with the tools and workflows devised within the Galaxy framework, resulting in an enhancement of OPPL. Use cases are provided in order to demonstrate OPPL-Galaxy’s capability for enriching, modifying and querying biomedical ontologies. Conclusions Coupling OPPL-Galaxy with other bioinformatics tools of the Galaxy framework results in a system that is more than the sum of its parts. OPPL-Galaxy opens a new dimension of analyses and exploitation of biomedical ontologies, including automated reasoning, paving the way towards advanced biological data analyses.

Automated end user-centred adaptation of web components through automated description logic-based reasoning

Context: This paper addresses one of the major end-user development (EUD) challenges, namely, how to pack today?s EUD support tools with composable elements. This would give end users better access to more components which they can use to build a solution tailored to their own needs. The success of later end-user software engineering (EUSE) activities largely depends on how many components each tool has and how adaptable components are to multiple problem domains. Objective: A system for automatically adapting heterogeneous components to a common development environment would offer a sizeable saving of time and resources within the EUD support tool construction process. This paper presents an automated adaptation system for transforming EUD components to a standard format. Method: This system is based on the use of description logic. Based on a generic UML2 data model, this description logic is able to check whether an end-user component can be transformed to this modeling language through subsumption or as an instance of the UML2 model. Besides it automatically finds a consistent, non-ambiguous and finite set of XSLT mappings to automatically prepare data in order to leverage the component as part of a tool that conforms to the target UML2 component model. Results: The proposed system has been successfully applied to components from four prominent EUD tools. These components were automatically converted to a standard format. In order to validate the proposed system, rich internet applications (RIA) used as an operational support system for operators at a large services company were developed using automatically adapted standard format components. These RIAs would be impossible to develop using each EUD tool separately. Conclusion: The positive results of applying our system for automatically adapting components from current tool catalogues are indicative of the system?s effectiveness. Use of this system could foster the growth of web EUD component catalogues, leveraging a vast ecosystem of user-centred SaaS to further current EUSE trends.

Approximate Relational Reasoning for Probabilistic Programs

La seguridad verificada es una metodología para demostrar propiedades de seguridad de los sistemas informáticos que se destaca por las altas garantías de corrección que provee. Los sistemas informáticos se modelan como programas probabilísticos y para probar que verifican una determinada propiedad de seguridad se utilizan técnicas rigurosas basadas en modelos matemáticos de los programas. En particular, la seguridad verificada promueve el uso de demostradores de teoremas interactivos o automáticos para construir demostraciones completamente formales cuya corrección es certificada mecánicamente (por ordenador). La seguridad verificada demostró ser una técnica muy efectiva para razonar sobre diversas nociones de seguridad en el área de criptografía. Sin embargo, no ha podido cubrir un importante conjunto de nociones de seguridad “aproximada”. La característica distintiva de estas nociones de seguridad es que se expresan como una condición de “similitud” entre las distribuciones de salida de dos programas probabilísticos y esta similitud se cuantifica usando alguna noción de distancia entre distribuciones de probabilidad. Este conjunto incluye destacadas nociones de seguridad de diversas áreas como la minería de datos privados, el análisis de flujo de información y la criptografía. Ejemplos representativos de estas nociones de seguridad son la indiferenciabilidad, que permite reemplazar un componente idealizado de un sistema por una implementación concreta (sin alterar significativamente sus propiedades de seguridad), o la privacidad diferencial, una noción de privacidad que ha recibido mucha atención en los últimos años y tiene como objetivo evitar la publicación datos confidenciales en la minería de datos. La falta de técnicas rigurosas que permitan verificar formalmente este tipo de propiedades constituye un notable problema abierto que tiene que ser abordado. En esta tesis introducimos varias lógicas de programa quantitativas para razonar sobre esta clase de propiedades de seguridad. Nuestra principal contribución teórica es una versión quantitativa de una lógica de Hoare relacional para programas probabilísticos. Las pruebas de correción de estas lógicas son completamente formalizadas en el asistente de pruebas Coq. Desarrollamos, además, una herramienta para razonar sobre propiedades de programas a través de estas lógicas extendiendo CertiCrypt, un framework para verificar pruebas de criptografía en Coq. Confirmamos la efectividad y aplicabilidad de nuestra metodología construyendo pruebas certificadas por ordendor de varios sistemas cuyo análisis estaba fuera del alcance de la seguridad verificada. Esto incluye, entre otros, una meta-construcción para diseñar funciones de hash “seguras” sobre curvas elípticas y algoritmos diferencialmente privados para varios problemas de optimización combinatoria de la literatura reciente. ABSTRACT The verified security methodology is an emerging approach to build high assurance proofs about security properties of computer systems. Computer systems are modeled as probabilistic programs and one relies on rigorous program semantics techniques to prove that they comply with a given security goal. In particular, it advocates the use of interactive theorem provers or automated provers to build fully formal machine-checked versions of these security proofs. The verified security methodology has proved successful in modeling and reasoning about several standard security notions in the area of cryptography. However, it has fallen short of covering an important class of approximate, quantitative security notions. The distinguishing characteristic of this class of security notions is that they are stated as a “similarity” condition between the output distributions of two probabilistic programs, and this similarity is quantified using some notion of distance between probability distributions. This class comprises prominent security notions from multiple areas such as private data analysis, information flow analysis and cryptography. These include, for instance, indifferentiability, which enables securely replacing an idealized component of system with a concrete implementation, and differential privacy, a notion of privacy-preserving data mining that has received a great deal of attention in the last few years. The lack of rigorous techniques for verifying these properties is thus an important problem that needs to be addressed. In this dissertation we introduce several quantitative program logics to reason about this class of security notions. Our main theoretical contribution is, in particular, a quantitative variant of a full-fledged relational Hoare logic for probabilistic programs. The soundness of these logics is fully formalized in the Coq proof-assistant and tool support is also available through an extension of CertiCrypt, a framework to verify cryptographic proofs in Coq. We validate the applicability of our approach by building fully machine-checked proofs for several systems that were out of the reach of the verified security methodology. These comprise, among others, a construction to build “safe” hash functions into elliptic curves and differentially private algorithms for several combinatorial optimization problems from the recent literature.