Modeling the Transport Sector: The Role of Existing Fuel Taxes in Climate Policy

Existing fuel taxes play a major role in determining the welfare effects of exempting the transportation sector from measures to control greenhouse gases. To study this phenomenon we modify the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model to disaggregate the household transportation sector. This improvement requires an extension of the GTAP data set that underlies the model. The revised and extended facility is then used to compare economic costs of cap-and-trade systems differentiated by sector, focusing on two regions: the USA where the fuel taxes are low, and Europe where the fuel taxes are high. We find that the interplay between carbon policies and pre-existing taxes leads to different results in these regions: in the USA exemption of transport from such a system would increase the welfare cost of achieving a national emissions target, while in Europe such exemptions will correct pre-existing distortions and reduce the cost.

Temporary and Permanent Buyout Prices in Online Auctions

Increasingly used in online auctions, buyout prices allow bidders to instantly purchase the item listed. We distinguish two types: a temporary buyout option disappears if a bid above the reserve price is made; a permanent one remains throughout the auction or until it is exercised. In a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times, we focus on finding temporary and permanent buyout prices maximizing the seller's discounted revenue, and examine the relative benefit of using each type of option in various environments. We characterize equilibrium bidder strategies in both cases and then solve the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation. Our numerical experiments suggest that buyout options may significantly increase a seller’s revenue. Additionally, while a temporary buyout option promotes early bidding, a permanent option gives an incentive to the bidders to bid late, thus leading to concentrated bids near the end of the auction.